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Ab s t r a c t
This study examines the state assisted demobilisation and civilian reintegration of women ex­
combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The study is based on life history interviews 
conducted with 36 women who fought for Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Azanian People’s 
Liberation Army (APLA) and Amabutho Self-Defence Unit. There is agreement across the 
literature that the armed struggle against apartheid falls within the category of guerilla warfare, 
fought in multiple terrains, that blur conventional distinctions of civilian and combatant, 
homefront and battlefront, as well as the domestic and transnational. Located within feminist 
International Relations theory, the study argues that the formal process that led to the integration 
of statutory and non-statutory forces to form the South African National Defence Force, which 
facilitated the demobilisation process, was framed in ways that did not reflect the unconventional 
nature of the armed struggle against apartheid. The few women who participated in this process 
were the transnationally trained combatants of MK and APLA. The majority of women who 
participated in the multiple and overlapping sites of the domestic and international apartheid 
battlefront were left out of this process. It is argued that women’s roles in the armed struggle 
were shaped by various factors, such as age, space and period of struggle. Three categories, 
guerilla girls, combative mothers and the in-betweeners, are introduced in order to demonstrate 
the different spaces from within which women fought, and the methods they used, all of which 
were central to the success of the People’s War strategy. In this regard, the venerated 
transnationally trained woman combatant, like their male counterpart, is argued to be an 
exception, as the majority of women were thrust into the armed struggle without military 
training. Furthermore, it is argued that conservative feminist readings of black women’s 
relationship with nationalism in the anti-apartheid struggle have misrecognised and undermined 
women’s combatant contributions, by inscribing their forms of resistance as maternal, and 
outside the war effort. The study shows that the majority of women combatants have transitioned 
to civilian life without formal state recognition and assistance. The erasure of women’s role as 
combatants also means that they are excluded from the current legislative framework facilitated 
by the Department of Military Veterans to support the welfare of former combatants. As such, 
the study builds on Jacklyn Cock’s (1991) pioneering study on war and gender in South Africa; it
v
is the first study that exclusively focuses on women ex-combatants’ experiences in post­
apartheid South Africa.
De d ic a t io n
For my mother, Zodwa, and my aunts, Nozuko and Nomavo
v i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................... ii
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................... v
Dedication....................................................................................................................................vii
List of figures............................................................................................................................... xii
List of tables................................................................................................................................ xiii
List of abbreviations and acronyms........................................................................................xiiii
Chapter One:................................................................................................................................16
Introduction..................................................................................................................................16
1.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................16
1.2 Research questions and objectives...................................................................................... 27
1.3 Thesis outline...................................................................................................................... 28
Chapter Two:............................................................................................................................. 33
Women in the Time of ‘The People’s War’ .............................................................................. 33
2.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 33
2.2 The contours of a transnational “late twentieth century” war............................................. 35
2.2.1 Wars in the township........................................................................................................... 36
2.2.2 Poqo and revolts in the countryside..................................................................................... 44
2.2.3 The international front......................................................................................................... 49
2.2.3.1 The liberation movements........................................................................................ 49
2.2.3.2. "The forward areas" and the underground................................................................ 51
2.2.3.4 The apartheid state response..................................................................................... 56
2.3 2 An unconventional war...................................................................................................... 59
vii
2.4 Women and guerilla warfare................................................................................................... 63
2.5 Women and the national liberation movements in South Africa............................................69
2.5.1 Motherism versus feminism: "I'm a guerilla because I'm mother".................................69
2.5.2 Women and the multiple battlefronts............................................................................... 74
2.6 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................. 81
Chapter Three:............................................................................................................................ 83
Heroes and Misfits: Women and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration........... 83
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 83
3.2 ‘Do something for these soldier boys’: experiences from the United States.........................84
3.3 DDR in Africa......................................................................................................................... 90
3.4 Women and DDR.................................................................................................................... 95
3.5 South African demobilisation process.................................................................................... 99
3.5.1 The formation of the SANDF........................................................................................ 99
3.5.2 Demobilisation and reintegration................................................................................. 104
3. 5. 3 Literature on the demobilised South African ex-combatant.....................................107
3.6 Women and demobilisation.................................................................................................. 109
3.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................................110
Chapter Four..............................................................................................................................112
“Things Look Different From Below”: Life Histories and Thematic Analysis....................112
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................112
4.2 Narrative research..................................................................................................................113
4.3 “In the shadows of IR people dwell”: IR writing women in war........................................118
4.4 Gender and struggle writing: silence as resistance................................................................122
4.5 Research design and method..................................................................................................129
vi ii
4.5.1 Sampling...................................................................................................................... 129
4.5.2 The interview process.................................................................................................. 135
4.5.3 Positionality: "one needs a strong stomach".................................................................135
4.6 Data analysis..........................................................................................................................138
4.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 140
Chapter Five.............................................................................................................................. 141
“Yayi lixesha lento ayithethwa! " (It was the time of that which could not pass our lips):.. 141 
Guerrilla girls, Combative mothers and the In-betweeners ................................................  141
5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................141
5.2 Guerilla girls..........................................................................................................................144
5.2.1 Personal violence: “I didn’t have a choice” ................................................................. 146
5.2.2 Unrest in schools: “no choice but to leave” ................................................................. 150
5.2.3 Underground work....................................................................................................... 156
5.2.4 Training and life in MK................................................................................................163
5.3 Combative mothers................................................................................................................169
5.3.1 Contesting Bantu Authorities....................................................................................... 170
5.3.2 Church.......................................................................................................................... 172
5.3.3. Protecting the children.................................................................................................175
5.4 The in-betweeners..................................................................................................................177
5.4.1 Personal/communal violence and unrest in schools.................................................... 178
5.4.2 Funerals........................................................................................................................180
5.5. Conclusion............................................................................................................................183
Chapter Six ...............................................................................................................................  184
ix
Experiences of Demobilisation, the Never Demobilised and Life in the Aftermath.......... 184
6.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................184
6.2 Experiences of formally demobilised women....................................................................186
6.2.1 Demobilisation............................................................................................................. 187
6.2.2 Education and ranking: “they didn’t recognise our training” .....................................187
6.2.3 Assimilation: “we humiliated our veterans” ................................................................ 190
6.2.4 Health and age.............................................................................................................. 193
6.2.5 Not a career soldier: “I just wanted to be independent” .............................................194
6.2.6 Family: “we’ve been away for a long time” ...............................................................195
6.2.7 Demobilisation payment: “not worth what I went through” .......................................196
6.2.8 Service corps................................................................................................................ 198
6.3 Experiences of women who were not demobilised............................................................... 201
6.3.1 Special pension: “there are a lot of problems with the special pension” ....................201
6.4 Personal reintegration........................................................................................................... 205
6.4.1 Coming home: “I don’t know you” .............................................................................. 206
6.4.2 From umzabalazo to ukutabalaza (from the struggle to hustling)...............................209
6.4.3 Political involvement.................................................................................................... 211
6.5 Psychological trauma............................................................................................................ 212
6.6 Women are stronger than men.............................................................................................. 217
6.7 Memory: “Please, I mustn’t die before [he] is 21” ............................................................... 219
6.8 Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 224
Chapter Seven:.......................................................................................................................... 226
x
Better Late Than Never? The Department of Military Veterans and the Re-Emergence of
Veterans in Post-Polokwane South Africa.............................................................................  226
7.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 226
7.2 “Thrown outside like morning mucus ...” ........................................................................ 227
7. 3 Enter the Department of Defence and Military Veterans................................................ 229
7.3.1 Delivery record.................................................................................................................. 235
7.4 Celebrating guerilla girls in a gender neutral policy......................................................... 238
7.4.1 “Women are disappearing” ................................................................................................ 241
7.5 Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 245
CHAPTER 8:............................................................................................................................. 247
Conclusion................................................................................................................................. 247
8.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 247
8.2 Major findings................................................................................................................... 249
8.2.1 Conventional versus unconventional combatant............................................................... 249
8.2.2 The struggle continues....................................................................................................... 254
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................... 258
x i
List of Figures
Figure 1: Number of participants and affiliation ........................................................................132
Figure 2: Age and location of participants.................................................................................. 133
Figure 3: Military training.......................................................................................................... 133
Figure 4: Era of involvement in armed struggle........................................................................ 134
Figure 5: Participants who have served time in jail.................................................................... 134
Figure 6: Different countries of settlement by participants........................................................134
Figure 7: Officially demobilised..................................................................................................134
Figure 8: Integrated to SANDF....................................................................................................134
Lis t  o f  Ta b l e s
Table One: The content of the certified personnel register........................................................ 102
Table Two: Gratuity for demobilised combatants......................................................................105
xii
List of abbreviations and acronyms
ANC -  African National Congress
AZANLA - Azanian National Liberation Army
APLA - Azanian People’s Liberation Army
AZAPO - Azanian People's Organisation
AZASO - Azanian Students Organisation
AZASCO - Azanian Student Convention
AFRO - Anti-Collaborationist Front Group
BCM - Black Consciousness Movement
BCP - Black People’s Convention
BMATT - British Military Training Team
BOSS - Bureau of State Security
COSAS - Congress of South African Students
COSATU - Congress of South Africa Trade Unions
CPR - Certified Personal Register
CCR - Centre for Conflict Resolution
DMV - Department of Military Veterans
DDR -  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
EPLF - Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
FEDSAW - Federation of South African Women
FRELIMO - Mozambique Liberation Front
FARC-EP - Fueraz Armadas Revolucionarios Colombianos -  Ejercito del Pueblo 
GoS - Government of Sudan 
IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party
xi ii
IR -  International Relations
KZN - Kwa-Zulu Natal
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam
MK - Umkhonto we Sizwe
MKMVA - Umkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans Association
NP -  National Party
NEC- National Executive Committee
OAG - Other Armed Groups
PAC - Pan-Africanist Congress
PLAN - People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
PEBCO - Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation
PEWO - Port Elizabeth Women’s Organisation
PEYCO - Port Elizabeth Youth Congress
SACP -  South African Communist Party
SADF -  South African Defence Force
SANDF -  South African National Defence Force
SDU -  Self Defence Unit
SACCAWU - South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union
SASO - South African Student Organisation
SASCO - South African Students Congress
SSDF - South Sudan Defence Forces
SPLA - Sudan People's Liberation Army
SWAPO - South West Africa People's Organisation
SWAPOL - South West African Police
SWATF - South West African Territorial Force
TBVC - Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TEC - Transitional Executive Council
xi v
TRC - Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF - United Democratic Front
US - United States
VOW - Voice of Women
WWI - World War I
WWII - World War II
ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA - Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
xv
Ch a p t e r  On e :
In t r o d u c t io n
1.1 Introduction
The Sharpeville massacre that took place on 21 March 1960, led by the Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC), where 69 protesters against the imposition of pass laws were killed, was followed by the 
imposition of the state of emergency on 30 March 1960, and the banning of the PAC and African 
National Congress (ANC), marked a turning point in the fight against apartheid. Stephen Ellis 
(1998: 264) argues that “many inquirers, including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
regard the Sharpeville massacre...as the true beginning of hostilities.” It is the aftermath of 
Sharpeville that is often marked as the turn to the armed struggle by the liberation movements, 
who saw themselves as engaged in a protracted guerilla war against the apartheid state (Lodge, 
1986; Cock 1989; Barrell, 1991; Cock, 1991; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Kondlo, 2009; Cherry, 
2011; Ellis, 2012; Macmillan, 2013, Dlamini, 2015; Simpson, 2016). With key leaders in jail, the 
liberation movements were left with the option of continuing the highly risky work of fighting 
from either the underground, or from outside the country, and by galvanising the international 
community to recognise apartheid as a crime against humanity. The three decades stretching 
from 1960-1990 that marked the armed struggle thrust women into the centre of the all- 
encompassing transnational anti-apartheid battlefront. This study examines the lives of women 
who were combatants in the aftermath of the armed struggle against apartheid.
Although the violence of apartheid and its character was mostly felt inside the country, 
the anti-apartheid struggle became internationalised, because the liberation movements appealed 
to the international community to delegitimise the sovereignty of the minority white apartheid 
state in various ways, be it the campaign to release political prisoners, or the fact that the training 
of guerilla combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
(APLA) was done outside the country by sympathetic foreign governments, among others. Even 
though, as Ellis and Sechaba (1992) have pointed out, “the war for South Africa was only one 
phase in a much longer contest, which long pre-dated the foundation of Umkhonto we Sizwe and
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the declaration of the armed struggle for justice and freedom in South Africa” (p. 175), the 
transnationally trained combatant women and men became an important symbol of the 
internationalisation of the anti-apartheid struggle, which made this South African war a subject 
for both International Relations (IR) theory and practice. In the book, The Lusaka Years: The 
ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963 to 1994, Hugh Macmillan (2013) argues that
the increasing popularity of the ANC inside South Africa in the course of the 
1980s did derive in part from a few spectacular military operations, but its 
ultimate success was the result of its achievements in establishing itself 
internationally as the most legitimate voice of the voiceless people of South 
Africa. This was due not so much to its military activities as to a wide variety of 
efforts in the field of diplomacy, propaganda and culture, which led its 
recognition as the gatekeeper for the external funding and validation of internal 
movements (p. 12).
The internationalisation of the armed struggle and the reliance by the liberation 
movements on instruments of diplomacy, amongst others, followed IR’s disciplinary script 
which is premised on the demarcation between the domestic and the international in its 
preoccupation with matters of war and peace (Tickner, 1992; Sjoberg, 2011). From its founding, 
the study of IR has been pre-occupied with questions of war and peace and at its core have been 
the relations between states (Carr, 2001). The early preoccupation of the study of IR, following 
the First World War, was “marked by a passionate desire to prevent another war” (Tickner, 
1992: 9). In approaches to IR theory, political realism dominated the discipline in part as a 
reaction to the perceived failure of liberalism to offer sustainable answers to the question of war 
in the aftermath of World War I. As E.H Carr argues, in The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-193: An 
Introduction to the Study o f International Relations published shortly before World War II, the 
liberal idealism that influenced early writing in the discipline after World War I, did not take 
seriously the role of power in relations between states in international relations practice. Pointing 
to the failure of the League of Nations, Carr (2001: 97 -  98) argued that the core mistake of the 
“utopian writers” was that they “seriously believed that the establishment of the League of 
Nations meant the elimination of power from international relations”. He argued that “power is 
an indispensable instrument of government” which means that “to internationalise government in
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any real sense means to internationalize (sic) power; and international government is, in effect, 
government by that state which supplies the power necessary for the purpose of governing” 
(Carr, 2001: 100). His argument was that the unpredictability of relations between states was 
such that no one state would be sufficiently interested or able to use their power to ensure and 
monitor peaceful relations between states. The decision by the United States (US) Congress for 
the country to not join the League of Nations is used as an example that shows the constraints of 
achieving peace in a world that is dominated by sovereign states, and that the US recognised that, 
in the absence of a global government of states, each state must look after its own interests and 
security. The dominant thinking of other realists in the Second World War and Cold War eras, 
such as Hans Morgenthau, who argued that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle 
for power” (cited in Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 86), contributed to the pervasive idea that the day 
to day IR practice was a state’s ability to prepare “for self defence and/or seeking security­
enhancing alliances with others” (Sorenson, 2011: 108) In this regard, Lauren Wilcox (2014) 
argues that “realism draws a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics, and 
maintains that states must be able to use or threaten violence in order to maintain the state’s 
status and survival in the world.” (p. 18).
The retreat by the ANC, PAC and SACP to neighbouring countries following their 
banning, allowed the National Party government to frame the challenge to its authority by the 
national liberation movements as an attack on its sovereignty by foreign communist outsiders. As 
Tim Murithi (2014) points out, “Africa, like the rest of the world, was caught up in the proxy 
battles that were fought during the Cold War. ..whether it was through overt or covert support, 
governments and armed resistance movements could always find willing supporters from the 
Soviet or US geopolitical strategic camps” (p. 3). As Edlmann (2014:1) argues, the apartheid 
state’s “total onslaught” ideology “ensured that the National Party government worked at 
drawing every white South African into its efforts to counteract the perceived threats of 
communism and African nationalism”. Furthemore, the conventional military operations and the 
counter-insurgency methods used by the National Party in the “Border Wars” in Namibia and 
Angola were “fought against the perceived communist threat to the apartheid state” (Edlmann, 
2014: 3). In fighting for its survival, the apartheid state cast the black majority outside of its 
domestic realm in order to justify its violent responses in ways that were palatable and
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rationalised by a Cold War international context that encouraged each state to do whatever is 
necessary to protect their claimed sovereignty.
This casting of the national liberation movements outside the domestic realm in the 
context of the Cold War, contributed to the view and the glorification of the transnationally 
trained guerilla combatant in South Africa, who is understood to be the archetypal combatant of 
the armed struggle and of liberation. The privileging of the externally trained combatants has 
overshadowed the contributions of those who fought inside the country, the majority of whom 
were women. This thesis will show that women played a foundational role in the articulation of 
the armed struggle, understood as a ‘People’s War’. It will be shown that in spite of the 
international posture of the armed struggle, it was a domestic struggle in which women formed 
the basis of the domestic front in ways that became obscured by the military integration process 
that operated parallel to the political negotiations between the National Party government and the 
liberation movements at end of the war. It is argued that women’s struggle cum war efforts have 
been delegated into the private and communal sphere, which, in mainstream IR theory, is 
assumed to exist outside of the war effort, even though it is undeniable that the epicentre of the 
armed struggle was in the homes and communities of black people in South Africa. Using 
feminist IR theory, it will be shown that the privileging of the transnational aspect of the armed 
struggle, and the minimal recognition that has been given to those who fought in its domestic 
battlefront, who have been relegated to this private realm, has contributed to the reality that the 
majority of women combatants have transitioned to democratic South Africa without formal 
demobilisation, and state assisted civilian reintegration.
The end of the Cold War allowed for the emergence of other security issues, the 
reemergence of liberalism and new theoretical openings that challenged mainstream IR theories. 
As Alexander Wendt (1999: 4) notes, the collapse of the Soviet Union “caught scholars on all 
sides of guard but left orthodoxies looking particularly exposed”. Realists were particularly 
critiqued for having failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War, the peace that followed US 
unipolar dominance and the shift from inter-state war to intra-state warfare in Africa and Eastern 
Europe (Tickner, 2008; Hendricks, 2011; Kaldor, 2012). The emergence of feminist approaches 
to IR theory and social constructivism, for example, allowed scholars in IR to revisit some 
fundamental assumptions about procecesses of war and the accepted assumption in the discipline
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that the absence of a global government results in a state of anarchy that is characterised by 
pervasive insecurity. Wendt’s (1999) pioneering work on social constructivism argues that the 
post-Cold War spread of liberal democracy and the decline of wars between states show that the 
achievement of peace is not premised on the presence of centralised power. Rather, when states 
share similar norms, such as those of the respect for sovereignty, it is possible to settle disputes 
peacefully. This then frees states from the perpetual fear of a possible attack by other states and 
allows them to focus their agends on other priorities beyond security concerns of survival.
The end of the Cold War also broadened the number of actors that participate in 
international and transnational relations, the empirical activities between states and non-state 
actors that speak to engagements across state borders and the various approaches to IR. The 
increased economic interdependence between states and regions, has forced IR scholars to take 
seriously the roles of multinational corporations, for example, and their influence in the stability 
of the global international economy. As Joseph Nye (2003: 75) argues, “never have so many 
different nonstate actors competed for the authority and influence that once belonged to the state 
alone”. Until the emergence of feminist and social constructivist approaches to IR, the liberal 
approach was the main theory that included non-state actors in its analysis of transnational 
relations, especially in their analysis of the consequences of global interdependence in economic 
terms and developments in technology and transportation that are blurring the lines between the 
domestic and the international (Nye, 1976; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Nye, 2003). Joseph Nye’s 
(2003) concept of “soft power” shows the ways in which, in an interdependent world with 
multiple actors, economic and cultural resources are more important than the “hard power” of 
military resources in enabling states to achieve their individual interests and their ability to 
collectively resolve broader questions of global governance, from addressing the rise of 
transnational armed non-state actors, such Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, to climate change and the 
transnational spread of diseases, among others. This sustained work by Nye and Keohane, for 
example, which broadens the scope of actors that are analysed in the discipline, has not provided 
a gendered analysis of these global transformations in the context of war or globalisation. The 
role of women, specifically, in these discourses has been undertheorised.
As noted by Tickner (2008: 264), “feminist perspectives entered the International 
Relations discipline at the end of the 1980s, at about the same time as the end of the cold war.
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This was no coincidence”. While this new era allowed social constructivists to reexamine ideas 
of the concept of anarchy, for example, this period gave room for feminists to interrogate the 
discipline’s ideas about how and where war takes place. Feminists argued that the focus on war 
as the instrument that is used by states to attain and protect their sovereignty, erases the role of 
the individual in war and the ways in which war leads to the transformation of social relations 
and, in the main, war contributes to more insecurity than the achievement of individual security. 
Feminists argue that the erasure of the individual in IR’s discourses of war “means that IR is not 
addressing one of the key elements of war: its actual mission of injuring human bodies and 
destroying normal patterns of social relations. Neglecting the human elements for strategic and 
interest politics renders the injurious nature of war a consequence rather than the focal point of 
war” (Sylvester, 2012: 484). As Sylvester (2012: 484) argues further, feminists have thus argued 
that “to study war as experience requires that human bodies come into focus as units that have 
war agency and are also prime targets of war violence and war enthusiasms”. As with feminisms 
in other disciplines, feminists in IR are preoccupied with making visible the varied roles of 
women in the multiple processes of everyday international life, and exposing how these 
processes, including war, continue to render women powerless, invisible and insecure. They 
argue specifically that international relations practice is dominated by “men, dressed as states, 
statesmen, soldiers, decision makers, terrorists, despots and other characters with more powerful 
positions than women” (Sylvester, 1994: 4). They argue that the erasure of women’s experiences 
in international relations practice is reflected in the masculinist nature of IR theory in that many 
“concepts central to international relations theory and practice, such as power, sovereignty, and 
security have been framed in terms that we associate with masculinity” (Tickner, 1992: 18).
There are various approaches to feminist IR theory. These IR feminisms, such as liberal 
feminism, feminist poststructuralism, standpoint feminism, feminist social constructivism, 
postcolonial feminism and feminist critical theory, among others, examine women’s roles, and 
gender more broadly, from various vantage points that emphasise particular aspects of women’s 
lives in their examination of their position in international relations practice and IR theory, 
including war. Some of these differences include a focus by some feminists on women’s equal 
participation to institutions of the state, including the military, in the case of liberal feminism 
(Hudson, 2006; Tickner, 2008; Hendricks, 2011), to the standpoint feminists who believe that 
dominant theories have failed to account for the “standpoint, activities and experiences of
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women” and therefore need “to identify a set of experiences, activities as well as patterns of 
thinking, feeling and acting which can be characterized (sic) as female” (Vincent cited in 
Hendricks, 2011: 15). Sara Ruddick’s (1989) concept of “maternal peace” (discussed in Chapter 
Two) forms part of a standpoint feminism that argues that there are certain socially constructed 
practices, such as those of mothering, that place pressure on women to adopt practices of non­
violence that states can learn from in their quest for the achievement of global peace. 
Postcolonial feminists, for example, build on the work of postcolonial theorists who argue that 
“colonial relations of domination and surbodination, established under European 
imperialism...persist, and that they are built into the way Western knowledge portrays people 
and countries in the South today” (Tickner, 2008: 267). Postcolonial feminists “make similar 
claims about the way Western feminism has constructed knowledge about non-Western women”, 
and argues that “just as feminists in general have criticized Western knowledge for being 
knowledge constructed mainly in men’s lives, postcolonial feminists see similar problems arising 
from feminist knowledge that is largely based on the experiences of relatively priviledged 
Western women” (Tickner, 2008: 267). The discussion in Chapter Two that examines continuing 
tensions between feminists in the Global South and North, with regards to the theorisation of 
women’s roles in guerilla war in the Global South, draws on the contributions of postcolonial 
feminists. Similarly, the discussion about how white and black feminists have differed in 
theorising black women’s role in the national liberation movements in South Africa, also draws 
on postcolonial feminism. Thus, the reference to “IR feminism” or “feminists in IR” that is made 
throughout this thesis refers to themes and debates that come out of these different bodies of 
feminist thought and feminisms.
One of the ways in which feminists have challenged accepted conceptualisation and 
categories of war is through examining the distinction that is made between the homefront and 
the battlefront. Feminists in IR critique the discipline’s focus on rigid definitions of combat, 
which are premised on a narrow conceptualisation of the demarcation between battlefront and 
the homefront, in which women are assumed to be located in non-combatant roles in the 
homefront. One of the ways in which feminists have located women’s varied roles in wars has 
been to focus on the transformation of war itself, specifically the blurring of roles between 
combatants and non-combatants. In Women and War (1987), Elshtain argues that historically in 
the Euro-American imagination, men and women have occupied distinct roles in the activity of
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war, where women as “non-combatants” and men as “warriors”. In these roles, men pick up arms 
as “avatars of a nation’s sanctioned violence” and women as “home keepers [sic] and designated 
weepers over war’s inevitable tragedies” (Elshtain, 1987: 3-4). As she argues in the essay in the 
volume Gendered States: Feminist (Re)visions o f International Relations Theory (1992), edited 
by V.Spike Peterson, “images of being ‘at home’, of a homeland, of being homeward bound are 
visions of safety, enclosure, special and particular ties” (p. 148). In this dermacation, “male 
soldiers ‘man’ the battlefronts and female parents keep the home front”. Therefore, while 
“sovereign may bear a masculinised face but the nation itself is feminised” (Elshtain, 1992: 149). 
Her work shows that these dermacated roles for women and men do not reflect the realities of 
war. Elshtain (1987: 9) argues that the principles of “just war theory” based on the principle of 
jus in bello, stipulate that, “where, how and whom soldiers can kill in a war-fighting situation” 
operate in a significantly changed context with technological innovations in war that make 
abiding by these rules difficult. The experience of two World Wars in the twentieth century has 
dramatically changed the perception of war and the demarcation of the combatant and civilian. 
Sjoberg (2011), offering a feminist critique of Kenneth Waltz’s “Man, the State, and War” 
(1959), argues that feminists in IR are suspicious of the realist focus on anarchy, which is 
presumed to exist outside the protected boundaries of the nation state, where the threat to state’s 
security is presented as located outside of the borders. Sjoberg (2011) argues that anarchy, which 
is presented as providing the distinction between the domestic and the external, can also be 
understood as demarcating the private and the public: “the boundary between a public domestic 
place protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law, and the private space of the family 
where, in many cases, no such legal protection exists” (Tickner in Sjoberg, 2011: 122). As 
Sjoberg (2011) importantly points out:
Feminists in IR have consistently argued that both women’s lives are not just 
lived in global politics, but o f global politics, and that the discrimination women 
experience is interlinked with the existence and causes of structural and physical 
violence in the international arena. Particularly, feminists have argued that 
patriarchal social organization in global politics is a principal cause not only of 
women’s subordination, but also empire-building and globalization [sic], among 
other international processes. These approaches see that the gendering of 
women’s lives cannot be separated from the gendering of ‘man, the state and
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war’, generally or in terms of the meanings and causes of war specifically (p. 
111 emphasis original).
Eleanor O’Gorman (2011), in her case study of women in Chiweshe in the Zimbabwean 
liberation war, warns against the neat categorisation of women’s role in war which is reducible to 
neither the radical nor the maternally defined private domain. In the Zimbabwean case, she 
challenges the tendency of the liberation war literature that denies women revolutionary 
subjectivity, because women negotiate war roles together with their everyday roles as mothers. 
O’Gorman (2011) makes visible the fact that women’s complex war roles challenge neat 
categories that frame most discourses of war, because:
[w]omen’s own stories of revolution challenge the assumptions of peasant and 
revolutionary subjectivity and provide rich insights into the differentiated, 
personalised and conflicted nature of their participation in revolution. Through 
the looking glass of women’s perceptions and responses to the various demands 
placed upon them, we can understand the collapse of neat categorisations of 
women as a coherent, collective and mobilised group of revolutionary 
supporters. In their place, there is daily engagement with risk. In a grounded 
interpretation of resistance by women, even in war, where the radicalization of 
internal struggle is tempered by an understanding of resistance that is localized 
and embedded in the impetus for survival (p. 41).
It will also be shown that the interpretation of African women’s role in the national 
liberation movements as primarily based on a “mode of maternalism”, which suggests that 
women participated in the liberation movements “on behalf of their husbands and children” 
(Hassim, 2014: 29; see also Wells, 1991 and Walker, 1995); has undermined women’s 
combatant contributions in the armed struggle. It is argued that this reading of women’s 
relationship to nationalism reinforces the narrow conception of spaces that are understood to be 
‘women’s spaces’, such as the home and family, as outside of the battlefront, despite the fact that 
the home and family is where apartheid violence was mostly felt and resisted. In this regard, this 
research takes seriously the ways in which the reconfiguration of space into an all-encompassing
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battlefront against apartheid “structured [women’s] lives and how this exerted a profound 
influence on their chosen methods of activism as well as on the ways in which they perceived 
their experiences” (Magubane, 2010: 996). This is to show how the war against apartheid 
destabilised “fixed categories of war and peace, home and front, combatant and civilian” and that 
“implicit in the destabilization [sic] of these fixed categories is the destabilization [sic] of the 
spaces in which war is fought” (Bonnin, 1997: 29). The thesis will show, as Kentridge (1990) 
argues, that during apartheid,
[t]he war zone [was] everywhere. Every road, ditch, yard, river, house and hillside [was] 
a war zone. Buses, taxis, privately owned cars, police vehicles -  all these constitute 
arenas of battle. More than that, each person carrie[d] the war around with himself or 
herself...There [was] no escaping this war, it occupie[d] no defined space or time (p. 17­
18).
As Bonnin (1997) further argues, apartheid “violence redefined the meaning of dangerous 
space and safe space, and ultimately women’s spaces and men’s spaces”, thereby producing 
multiple combatants, many of whom, it must be underscored, were women (p. 29).
The colliding of multiple significant anniversaries in South Africa in 2016, such as the 
20th anniversaries of the first TRC hearings and adoption of the Constitution, the 40th year 
anniversary of the 1976 student uprisings against the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction, the 60th anniversary of the women’s march to the Union Buildings against the 
extension of pass laws to women, and the 55th anniversary of the founding of Poqo and MK, 
have laid bare the enduring legacies of the past on the present in a time when the country finds 
itself at a social, political and economic crossroads. They serve to show that history cannot be 
read as a timeline and that its continuities shift and are “returned to us with new implications” 
(Gqola, 2007: 113).
The establishment of the Department of Military Veterans in 2009 by the Jacob Zuma 
administration, and the subsequent adoption of the Military Veterans Act No. 18 of 2011, 
signalled a reemergence of the combatant as a legislative category, and as a category for debate 
in South African public culture concerning the legacies of the armed struggle. The reemergence 
of the combatant revives questions about the nature of the war that was fought between the
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apartheid state, under the National Party government, and the various liberation movements. 
Importantly, it revives questions about the combatants who fought in that war and the forms of 
recognition and benefits owed to them in the aftermath. As Mashike (2008) notes, “there is no 
universally accepted definition of a combatant in South Africa” (p. 442). The literature on the 
process of reintegration of statutory and non-statutory forces that combined to form the new 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the demobilisation that followed 
reintegration, reflects the compromises of South Africa’s negotiated peace settlement (Motumi 
and Hudson, 1995; Motumi and Mckenzie 1998; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van 
der Merwe and Lamb 2009). Susan Cook (2006:40) argues that part of the delay that South 
Africa has faced in addressing issues of ex-combatants is due to resistance by the political elite 
who have “invested considerable energy in portraying the change [from apartheid] as a seamless 
and peaceful one”. The country’s “attempts to downplay the violent nature of the conflict, and to 
ignore the messy and not easily narrativised experiences of the various armed factions, South 
Africa’s former combatants remain essentially invisible” (Cook, 2006: 40-44). Mashike (2008) 
also places the weakness of the initial integration, demobilisation and civilian reintegration 
processes on the compromises of negotiated peace. He argues that the ANC’s emphasis on 
reconciliation and the creation of the rainbow nation has meant that it “was unlikely to tamper 
with one of the remaining cornerstones of white power, the military (the economy being the 
other)”, which is why the party has “never treated former guerilla combatants as a special social 
group” (p. 452). It is important then to recognise that discourses on combatants, in general, have 
been silenced in post-apartheid South African discourses, and specifically so with regards to 
women combatants, many of whom were formally excluded in the initial state-led demobilisation 
process.
Therefore, this study’s focus on the demobilisation and civilian reintegration of women 
ex-combatants is situated within broader contestations regarding the definition of who belongs 
into the combatant/military veteran category in South Africa. The study shows that the 
broadening of combatant status will determine how many former women combatants are 
recognised and supported by the state in rebuilding their lives after apartheid. This is because the 
study shows (in Chapter Three and Six) that the majority of women, who participated in the 
multiple and overlapping sites of the apartheid battlefront, were left out of the process that was 
led by the Sub-Council on Defence under the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), tasked with
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overseeing the “military transition process at the political level”, by planning and outlining the 
“integration of all armed formations represented at the negotiations” with a view to designing a 
“military for South Africa that would be affordable, effective and legitimate” (Motumi and 
Hudson, 1995: 113).
While all reintegration and demobilisation processes take place within complex post-war 
contexts, feminists argue that these processes are also highly gendered, because they affect men 
and women in gendered ways. Feminist critiques of demobilisation in conventional IR theories 
and practice build on a sustained challenge by feminists in the discipline, that often presents the 
thinking and practice of war as a male domain, that war reconfigures all spaces of social life, and 
that women’s contributions to the war economy are central to both its conceptualisation and 
achievement (Elshtain, 1987; Enloe, 1983; Tickner, 1992; Hendricks, 2011; Mama and 
Okazawa-Rey, 2012). As shown in Chapter Three, feminist critiques of demobilisation processes 
challenge the disregard of women’s war contributions that take place in the private, domestic 
realm, especially in the context of intra-state war. As it will be shown, various cases of liberation 
wars and postcolonial wars, especially in Africa, collapse the separation of the private and 
public, and homefront and battlefront in ways that have fundamentally reconfigured the 
demobilisation processes and added more participants beyond militarily trained combatants.
Furthermore, feminist take seriously the extent to which “the demobilisation of women 
[forms] an integral part of post-war transformation”, because women’s inclusion in state-assisted 
demobilisation reflects the way in which the state and society recognise women’s war 
contributions, and their status in a post-war society (Enloe, 1983: 160). Lastly, feminist literature 
on demobilisation also makes visible the fact that even when women participate in orthodox and 
unorthodox combat, there is pressure of being “re-inscribed in more domestic roles in order to be 
accepted by society”, in the aftermath of the war (Lyons, 2004: xxiii). This study examines the 
state-assisted demobilisation and civilian reintegration of women ex-combatants in post­
apartheid South Africa.
1.2 Research questions and objectives
The main question that guides this study is: how have women ex-combatants been integrated into 
democratic South Africa? The sub-questions leading from this main question are as follows:
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• what processes has the state put in place for ex-combatants and what criteria are used to 
determine combatant recognition and access?
• what are the experiences of all women ex-combatants in state-led processes of 
integration?
• what are women ex-combatant experiences in integration beyond the procedures provided 
by the state?
The objectives of the study are therefore to:
• evaluate what the state has done for ex-combatants as a group, and to what extent women 
ex-combatants as a category, are present and absent in these processes;
• examine the experiences of all women ex-combatants concerning the challenges and 
successes in terms of demobilisation and reintegration;
• examine the narratives of all women ex-combatants concerning their integration beyond 
the state and military, whether socially, economically, politically or symbolically; and
• examine how the above may be used to inform the governance and condition women ex­
combatants in South Africa.
As a consequence of these goals, the thesis seeks to contribute to a broad appreciation of the 
terrain of the armed struggle, and as such, to a greater appreciation of a feminist interpretation of 
IR theory.
1.3 Thesis outline
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. This introductory chapter outlined the context and 
aims of this research, that is, to examine the state-led demobilisation and civilian reintegration 
process of women ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter provided a brief 
context of the armed struggle and the ways in which it assumed an international posture that has 
made it a subject of analysis in IR theories. The internationalisation of the armed struggle has 
contributed to the privileging of the transnationally trained combatants in ways that obscure the 
role of those combatants inside the country who played a foundational role in the 
conceptualisation and methods of combat; many of whom were women. The chapter located this
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study within feminist IR theory, which challenges disciplinary assumptions about the distinctions 
between the internal/external, combatant/civilian, public/private, which tend to undermine 
women’s war efforts by relegating them into the internal, civilian and private domain. In 
showing this, it will be made evident that the armed struggle was fought primarily in domains 
that IR theories often do not recognise and legimate. The chapter shows that the discussion about 
ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa ought to be understood within broader discourses 
about combatant recognition and the marginalisation of ex-combatants in public generally, and 
women’s marginalisation in particular.
Chapter Two provides an extensive account of the contours of the armed struggle, in order to 
argue that women of different ages and in different spaces and eras of struggle, played a 
foundational role in the war against apartheid. To develop the argument that women were 
foundational to the anti-apartheid war, the chapter mobilises extant literature on violence in the 
townships and the Bantustan homelands to show that it was in these intimate spaces of home and 
community where apartheid brutality was most expressly felt, as well as resisted. The anti­
apartheid struggle, which was waged along many fronts that include the sites of township 
uprisings, the rural sites of revolts, and stretching across Frontline States in Southern Africa and 
beyond, constituted an extensive terrain of battle. It is argued that women are not seen as 
combatants where war is cast in conventional terms, despite the fact that both the national 
liberation movements and the response by apartheid state were unorthodox in nature. The chapter 
shows that the rigid nature of roles as understood in conventional narratives of warfare, as 
understood in IR theories, do not capture the foundational role played by women in this war, 
both inside and outside the country. Rather, it can be defined as guerrilla war, which is indeed 
how the national liberation movements defined the war. The chapter also shows that while the 
concept of guerilla war opens up room for the appreciation of women’s varied roles in war, both 
national liberation and feminist accounts of women’s roles mainly reduce women’s contributions 
to auxiliary roles, even though these actions formed the central pillar of combat under conditions 
of guerilla warfare.
Chapter Three examines the demobilisation and reintegration process undergone by 
statutory and non-statutory forces, following the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990. 
The chapter argues that the negotiations that led to the formation of the SANDF and to
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demobilisation was a top-down process dominated by representatives of MK and the SADF. The 
chapter forwards the argument that when it comes to female participation in this SANDF led 
process, it is the transnationally trained combatant women who took part in this process to the 
exclusion of the majority of women who participated on the domestic battlefront. The emphasis 
in the process by the newly integrated SANDF leadership on a narrow distinction between 
combatants and civilians meant that those who participated in the armed struggle outside of the 
formal non-statutory forces, most of them who are women, did not qualify to participate in the 
process and therefore were obliged to self-demobilise. More broadly, the chapter shows that the 
place of the former combatant in both policy and public imagination is complex, where the 
recurrent theme about military veterans is that they are viewed as special citizens who have paid 
the ultimate price by putting their bodies on the line, for the protection of the state in the 
countries in the Global North, while in the Global South, the combatant is revered for their 
sacrifice in the achievement of national liberation. Yet, these heroified citizens also represent a 
political dilemma in the eyes of the state, where, if the state fails to support the post-war 
settlement, the former combatants are viewed as a security threat to it. It is shown that that what 
is unique about the cases from Africa is the inclusion of the non-conventional combatant into 
process of demobilisation and reintegration, and that the available literature on the challenges of 
the formally and informally demobilised combatants in South Africa has largely focused on the 
experiences of the male combatants in both statutory and non-statutory forces. Such studies offer 
limited detail about the wellbeing of the demobilised female combatant.
Chapter Four accounts for the use of the life histories interview method in the data 
collection process of this research. It demonstrates the ways in which a life history approach has 
is suitable for accounting for women’s experiences in qualitative research. It contextualises life 
history method within the narrative approach, and demonstrates the ways in which narrative 
approaches are useful for feminist researchers. It also locates qualitative research that privileges 
women’s experiences of war as an important methodological tool in feminist IR. Further to this, 
the argument is made in this chapter that dominant social science methods analysing the anti­
apartheid struggle have excluded women in their data sampling and analysis. The chapter argues 
that taking women’s contexts seriously implies that the research does not merely seek to ‘prove’ 
accepted categories through the lived experiences of participants, but rather offers a space to 
expand social categories in ways that speak to these realities, thus creating a space for new
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categories to emerge. The chapter then focuses on the design of the study with regards to 
sampling techniques and the interview process, and locates the positionality of researcher of this 
study. It concludes by discussing thematic narrative analysis as the interpretive tool for this 
research.
Chapter Five, relying on the accounts of experiences narrated by women who participated 
in this study, this chapter thematically delineates the spaces in which women were affected by 
apartheid violence, and the different methods they used to push back against such violence. The 
respective categories of ‘guerrilla girls’, ‘combative mothers’ and ‘in-betweeners’ are introduced 
in order to emphasise the importance of space/location and age that shaped the methods that 
women used in participating in apartheid combat. In this regard, the chapter argues that there is a 
particular kind of woman who would be likely to participate in the armed struggle as a trained 
guerilla, due to specific kinds of spacial conditions that made such participation possible. The 
chapter shows that the transnationally trained guerilla girl does not represent the dominant mode 
of women’s participation in the armed struggle. It is argued that taking space seriously opens 
room to ask questions about other spaces in which the majority of women entered into anti­
apartheid combat, and allows us to appreciate the various ways in which the majority of women 
participated. It is argued that the creation of multiple, and overlapping, categories is also useful 
for our understanding of women’s roles that go beyond the current binary representation of the 
trained combatant versus the maternal mother that is present in both the literature on the anti­
apartheid struggle, and feminist discourses on women’s participation in the anti-apartheid 
struggle. This task of naming women as combatants is important amidst the current 
preoccupation with developing state assistance programmes that aim to support those who risked 
their lives in order to end apartheid.
Chapter Six examines the demobilisation and reintegration of women combatants at two 
levels: 1) at the level o f state structures, where the state recognises services and benefits; and 2) 
at the personal level, where personal, family, social, political, psychological and spiritual 
dimensions converge. The chapter first addresses the experiences of the formally demobilised 
women combatants. These are delineated into different themes from: the women’s return from 
exile under continued precarious security circumstances in the country; the DDR process; the 
reasons they chose not to integrate; and demobilisation benefits. The chapter then examines the 
trajectories of women combatants who were not demobilised. In the main, the chapter shows that
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the majority of the internally-based combatants have received no form of support from the state, 
whether financial or otherwise. At a personal level, the chapter shows that women have had to 
reinvent themselves for a post-apartheid reality, in ways economic, social, political and 
psychological. The chapter concludes by examining the different ways in which women are 
navigating civilian life and how they deal with enduring memories of the past, and its persistent 
wounds.
Chapter Seven examines recent the legislative framework that guides the work of the 
Department of Military Veterans. It is shown in this chapter that the reemergence of a military 
veterans discourse has been imbued with the similar political tensions as those of the initial 
demobilisation process, in terms of contestation about the definition of the military veteran, since 
many who perceive themselves as having been combatants continue to be excluded from this 
framework and the material benefits that it offers. The chapter shows that the DMV’s policies 
and practices reveal a neutralising approach to gender that treats the challenges that women and 
men veterans as the same. The reports and statements from the DMV are assessed in terms of the 
way in which they do not demonstrate attentiveness to the ways that -  although female and male 
veterans are both marginalised in contemporary South Africa -  their material and psychological 
marginality is not experienced in the same way. It is argued that in specific ways, the attention of 
the Department seems to predominantly respond to the anxieties of destitute male veterans.
Chapter Eight provides a discussion and summary of the major findings of this study. In 
accounting for the major findings, it will be argued that this thesis has demonstrated that the 
recognition of women for participation in demobilisation process is based on an intricate 
intersection of binaries that together deligitimise women’s combatant roles such as 
combatant/civilian, internal/external, rural/urban, public/private, older/younger. This thesis 
shows that the historic exclusion of women in demobilisation processes was also coupled with 
compromises of South Africa’s political negotiations, which generally undermined the 
demobilisation process for broader political ends.
The conclusion of this thesis is that most women ex-combatants have not participated in 
state-led demobilisation process, and are, as a result, struggling to build their lives in a post­
apartheid South Africa that fails to acknowledge the true extent of either their roles or needs.
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Ch a p t e r  Tw o :
Wo m e n  in  t h e  Tim e  o f  ‘Th e  Pe o p l e ’s Wa r ’
2.1 Introduction
This chapter locates women as foundational to the war against apartheid. To develop the 
argument that women were foundational to the anti-apartheid war, I use the literature on violence 
in the townships and the Bantustan homelands to show that it was in these intimate spaces of 
home and community where apartheid brutality was predominantly expressed, felt, and resisted. 
The chapter shows the force of apartheid violence across multiple planes of battle was greatest in 
the “home and community, [where it reached] into a sphere in which women have particular 
responsibility and which they feel particularly obliged to defend” (Beall et al., cited in Cherry, 
2007: 301). The township and the homeland placed women at the center of apartheid violence (in 
multiple ways) that shatters the pervasive myth that women retreat to the private sphere to escape 
war. It focuses on the nature of the war, to establish that women are not understood as 
combatants since apartheid, because the armed struggle is broadly cast in conventional terms. It 
shows that the rigid nature of conventional warfare roles, as understood in IR theories, fails to 
capture the foundational role played by women in this war, both inside and outside the country, 
whereas, it is understood more accurately as a guerrilla war, in keeping with the way in which 
national liberation movements have understood it. Certainly, it shares several characteristics with 
guerilla warfare, whose unorthodox nature allows for a better understanding of women as 
combatants. Yet, the unconventional nature of this war, which consumed Southern Africa as an 
entire region, is often underplayed. Instead, the unconventional nature of the war has been 
associated with a kind of guerilla warfare, whose protagonist is often reduced to the transnational 
(male) guerilla fighter. This thesis seeks to extend the scope of our understanding of the various 
other national and transnational protagonists of this war, many of whom were women.
As noted in Chapter One, feminists in IR argue that the rigid distinctions made between 
private and public and civil and the military have historically contributed to obscuring women’s
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varied participation in wars. As Brown (2006) notes, the “’European state system’ today was, as 
recently as 1945, in a condition of near total collapse” (p. 128) meaning that the evolution of the 
Westphalian state system since 1648 has been a turbulent and violent process because states have 
often not adhered to the principles of sovereignty which protects the territorial integrity of each 
state. It is unsurprising then that the focus of the discipline and war strategists has been to device 
ways for states to ensure their survival from the constant threat of outside invasion. In an 
international context that is understood by realists as a “struggle for power”, where the “core 
national interest” is survival, it is unsurprising that threat is understood to be imposed from 
outside on a protected and safe domestic sphere (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 86). Within this 
context, war is understood to take place between soldiers of warring states on behalf of their 
civilian populations. Feminist critiques of realist discourses of war have made visible that war 
unravels the distinction between the civil and the military and home front and battlefront.
The chapter locates women’s participation in this particular war within its expansive 
battlefield, which in fact blurred conventional definitions of ‘combat’ that has conventionally 
been understood according to the separation of the civil sphere and the military sphere in the 
discipline. It shows that, like other unconventional wars of liberation in Africa, South America 
and Asia, the anti-apartheid struggle challenges the dominant disciplinary demarcation of 
“battlefront” and “homefront”, along with the sharp distinction between civil and military 
spheres, where the civilian and the combatant are central to process of demarcating spaces of 
warfare. In the apartheid case, the blurring of these categories is particularly evident in both the 
violent and non-violent transnational methods employed by the anti-apartheid movement, as well 
as the defensive measures used by the apartheid state, which traversed international borders. It is 
argued here that the anti-apartheid struggle ought to be understood as the combination of 
different forms of struggle, which, in their articulation, subverted conventional categories of 
“combatant” and “civilian”, “battlefront” and “home front”, and “local” and “global”. What 
became known in South Africa as “The People’s War” against apartheid, called attention into the 
all-encompassing nature of apartheid violence against black people. Therefore, if we take 
seriously the ways in which the call by the liberation movements to render the country 
ungovernable, it becomes possible to locate women in the different frontlines that permeated the 
war in a way in which they are not already recognised.
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In this regard, the chapter shows that the majority of women who participated in the armed 
struggle are not perceived as combatants for the following reasons: 1) they fought apartheid from 
their homes and community; 2) The transnationally trained combatant, who fought apartheid 
outside the country, is understood to be the exemplar combatant; 3) in this light, apartheid is cast 
as a conventional transnational battle site fought by a military-trained state and non-statutory 
forces, when it was indeed not; 4) the feminist literature on women’s roles in the anti-apartheid 
struggle more broadly, and the armed struggle more specifically, characterises women’s 
contribution as motherist, and therefore neither feminist, nor involved at the frontlines of the 
war.
This terrain of the struggle forms the backdrop to the demobilisation process. The all- 
encompassing nature of the struggle against apartheid makes it possible to examine the extent to 
which the demobilisation process resembled the context of the war, where it is argued that in 
spite of a visible consensus in the literature about the unconventional nature of the war, the post­
apartheid demobilisation process is a dissimilar, conventional and state-centric process. Due to 
the state-centric nature of this process, many of the women protagonists who participated in the 
anti-apartheid battlefront have simply not been accounted for, or taken into account.
2.2 The contours of a transnational “late twentieth century” war
According to Ellis (2012: 291), “what South Africa experienced in the late twentieth century, 
was a civil war, fought among the people.” This war “resembled many other violent conflicts in 
the late twentieth century... the point was not so much to destroy the enemy as to win political 
support” (Ellis, 2012: 278). There is consensus in the literature that the South African experience 
of war is to be located in the tradition of guerilla warfare, which is distinct from ‘orthodox’ war 
that is associated with the work of Clausewitz (2009) (This is discussed later in the chapter). This 
section demonstrates the details of South Africa’s guerilla war, which stretched throughout the 
region and beyond.
As noted in Chapter One, the Sharpeville massacre marked a turning point in the fight 
against apartheid. As illustrated later in the chapter, both the PAC and the ANC had for a time in
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the early 1960s tried to operate underground, attacking the state through sabotage campaigns 
until the arrest of top ANC and SACP leaders in a farm in Rivonia, Liliesleaf, the then-main 
leadership base for MK activities, on 11 July 1963 (Ellis, 1998). On 12 May 1962, the 
government published “John Vorster’s long-promised anti-sabotage legislation” known as the 
General Law Amendment Bill, a bill which made “sabotage subject to the same penalties as 
treason: namely death, imprisonment, property confiscation and banishment” (Simpson, 2016: 
49). On 24 June 1964, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Denis Goldberg, Govan Mbeki, Raymond 
Mhlaba, Andrew Mlangeni, Elias Motsoeledi and Ahmed Kathrada were sentenced to life 
imprisonment in Robben Island for 221 charges of sabotage for the “purpose of a violent 
revolution,” marking another turning point in the anti-apartheid struggle. It is during the three 
decades of liberation movements (from 1963 to 1990), that saw the ANC, PAC and SACP 
operated across Southern Africa and beyond, that reconfigured the forms of struggle used to 
challenge the state and its response to the challenge. While the liberation movements used the 
‘ international’ as the site from which to attack the state, inside the country the violence moved 
ever-nearer to the inside of homes, and the communities of those who remained in the country 
(during a period that stretched from the repression of the 1960s to the uprisings of 1976 and 
included the state of emergencies of the 1980s). The literature on the township as a site of 
apartheid violence where “spaces of everyday life were to be reterritorialized [sic] and new 
spaces and boundaries within the township recreated” (Bonnin, 2000: 307), shows that that the 
escalation of violence in the township propelled liberation movements to escalate their 
transnational efforts to call the international community’s attention to the brutality of apartheid.
2.2.1 Wars in the township
Khawuleza is a South African song. It comes from the townships, 
locations, reservations, whichever, near the cities o f South Africa, 
where all the black South Africans live. The children shout from the 
streets as they see police cars coming to raid their homes for one 
thing or another. They say "Khawuleza, Mama!" which simply means 
"Hurry up, Mama! Please, please don't let them catch you!
(Miriam Makeba, 1966)
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The 1960s, following the banning of the liberation movements by the National Party 
government, are understood to be the ‘golden age’ of apartheid, because the state seemed to have 
successfully silenced the majority black population from challenging the legitimacy of a minority 
government. As Saleem Badat (2012: 159) explains,
savage state repression, state authoritarianism and the decline of internal political 
resistance enabled new conditions for capitalist growth and accumulation.
Between 1963 and 1972 there was a sustained economic boom, the South African 
economy experienced a rate of expansion second only to that of Japan, and the 
rate of return on invested capital once again became among the highest in the 
world. For white South Africans the 1960s was generally a time of political calm, 
rising living standards, prosperity and a share in the sustained economic boom of 
that period.
It was only in the 1970s that the power dynamics shifted dramatically from the re­
emergence of the workers’ movement, amongst these was the March 1973 Durban strikes that 
involved over a 100 000 black workers, who challenged the horrid conditions of migrant labour, 
the pass laws and the general inhumane conditions under racist labour conditions. This decade 
also saw the re-emergence of youth politics that were predicated on the formation of the South 
African Student Organisation (SASO), formed in 1968, under the leadership of Steve Biko, 
which grew its influence under the banner of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the 
1970s. But the township, as a site of contestation between black residents and the state, come to 
be the centre of the attacks between the state and black people that escalates to its highest levels 
of brutality with the state of emergencies of 1984 and 1985. These “township centered studies” 
(Motsemme, 2011) reveal that the wrath of apartheid violence inside South Africa could be felt 
in all areas of black life in the township. For Cock (1989: 14), “during 1984-1986 black South 
African townships were reconstituted as ‘zones of terror’.w ith in  these areas relationships were 
structured around violence and fear”, by a state bent on silencing the challenge to its legitimacy.
In 1983, the ANC adopted the document “Planning for People’s War” at its conference in 
Morogoro, Tanzania. The implication this “people’s war” is that the “liberation army [became] 
rooted amongst the people who were to progressively participate actively in the armed struggle 
both politically and militarily” (Cock, 1989: 2). According to Ellis, the ANC realised that MK
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“could not hope to defeat the SADF on conventional battlefield, the key to the struggle was to 
induce the mass population to either accept or resist continued government by the National 
Party” (Ellis, 1998: 265). Ellis further notes that the ANC “came to consider the black urban 
proletariat as the important constituency and to believe that its own armed struggle could spark a 
general insurrection or ‘people’s war” (Ellis, 1998: 265).
For Cock (1989:2), the “ANC’s “People War” strategy highlights the problem of a clear 
differentiation between combatants, and non-combatants that rests on a precise demarcation of 
the battlefield” (Cock, 1 989: 2). This is complicated by the fact that the apartheid state did not 
acknowledge itself as engaged in a war. The apartheid state in the late 1970s saw itself as 
engaged in a “Total Onslaught”, preferring to refer to its “enemy” as terrorists rather than 
declaring an outright war. According to Cock and Nathan (1989), the choice for the apartheid 
state to define the conflict as unrest or terrorism as opposed to war implied that liberation 
movement fighters were denied the prisoner of war status granted by the Geneva Conventions to 
those engaged in war against colonial powers. According to Dlamini (2014: 105; see also Dale, 
1993), the apartheid’s state’s notion of ‘total strategy’ was based on the writing of a French 
general and military strategist, Andre Beaufre, a Second World War veteran, who had fought in 
Indochina and Algeria, and commanded the French forces during the 1956 Suez crisis. Thula 
Simpson (2016) notes that as far back 10 December 1959, the New Age newspaper reported that 
Defence minister Frans Erasmus declared “his intention to reorganise the Defence Force along 
the lines of the French in Algeria, to maintain ‘internal’ security” (p. 18). Dale (1993: 13) also 
points out that Beaufre was the most influential military strategist amongst SADF circles, along 
with American military writer, John J. McCuen, who believed that “the solution to the problem 
of defeating revolutionary warfare is the application of its strategy and principles in reverse” 
(quoted in Ellis, 1998: 265). According to Dlamini (2014: 105),
Beaufre’s idea, simply put, was that militaries needed to think of their battlefronts 
in total terms, meaning there should be no distinction between the civil and the 
military spheres. In other words, the military’s ambit must extend beyond the 
traditional battlefront to all aspects of society: hence the need for a total strategy.
Theresa Edlmann’s PhD dissertation on post-apartheid psycho-social legacies of 
conscription into the SADF (2014:1), argues that in this context, the compulsory conscription of
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all school-leaving white males from 1968-1993, “formed part of a broader social, political and 
ideological system of which every white South African was a part in one way or another” 
(Edlmann, 2014: 1). As Cock argues, “one of the defining features of South Africa as a country 
engaged in war is that the battlefield comprehends the entire society” (Cock, 1989: 2).
The literature on the violence in townships reveals the extent to which the battlefield 
engulfed the entire society of the township.
Belinda Bozzoli (2004: 7-11), writing about the “Six Day War” between residents and 
police in Alexandra township in Johannesburg in February, 1986, argues that the township as a 
space was “enclosed by law, memory, culture and physical boundaries, as well as by the bodily 
boundaries of racial identification”. Similarly, Bonnin (2000: 307), writing about the 
transformation of space during the political violence in KwaZulu-Natal between ANC-aligned 
United Democratic Front (UDF) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), argues that “spaces of 
everyday life were to be reterritorialised and new spaces and boundaries within the township 
recreated”.
Ruth Mompati writes about her arrest, after the March 1960 State of Emergency was 
lifted in August, while in town with her then two-year old son:
I was arrested after the State of Emergency was lifted. I took my son to town; my 
second baby who was born in 1958.. .He didn’t have shoes, so I took him to town 
early in the morning by taxi . I  went to the ANC office for a meeting. When I 
came out, the Special Branch was on my trail. I walked towards a shoe shop in 
Commissioner Street, not far from the office of Mandela and Tambo and the 
ANC. Just as I passed Orient House, a Coloured policeman, Sharpe, came up to 
me and said: “Ruth Mompati, you are under arrest.” I said: “where is your warrant 
of arrest?” I just walked to the shoe shop because I realised that they might grab 
me and I didn’t want my child to go to prison. At the shoe shop I asked for a 
phone and called Pitje’s office. He was not there. I called somebody else and told 
them: “I think I’m going to be arrested and I’ve a child with me. Could you come 
and collect him?” Then I decided: “this is not right; I must get out of here and go 
back home. These people will really arrest me with the child.” As we came out of
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the store, however, Sharpe and other policemen immediately grabbed me. I was 
holding my child’s hand. They just threw me in the back of the car. My child 
followed me because I held on to him (Mompati, 2008: 314).
In her article about women detainees in the anti-apartheid struggle, Kalpana Hiralal 
(2015) notes that throughout anti-apartheid struggle, “thousands of women were arrested, 
subjected to naked body searches, physical torture, verbal abuse and sexual harassment” (p. 36). 
She notes that parallel to the Rivonia trial, political activist Dorothy Nyembe was sentenced to 
10 years in imprisonment in Kroonstad. Yet,
during this time the Rivonia trials received world attention and together with the 
struggles of inmates on Robben Island it subsequently led to improved 
conditions on the Island. Dorothy’s imprisonment on the other hand, received 
scant attention; even her family did not support her since it was regarded as 
unacceptable for a woman to be in prison (p. 35).
In her autobiography, Emma Mashinini, founder and Secretary General of the South 
African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU), describes the bizarre 
nature of the morning of her arrest in her home in Soweto:
. I  was completely unprepared when, on the morning of 27 November 1981, I 
woke, very early to hear loud bangs and knocks at the door of our house. My 
husband opened the curtains to look out, and saw a string of cars, police and 
soldiers. He opened up to let them in and they swarmed into our bedroom to find 
me still in my nightclothes. My husband and children were all ordered out of the 
house, in their nighties and pyjamas, and locked outside for more than an hour.
They said to me, ‘Emma Mashinini, we are detaining you under Section 22’ 
(Mashinini, 2012: 57).
Mashinini was arrested and detained at John Vorster Square prison without charges for 
six months in 1981-82. In this regard, Bonnin writes:
Everyday routines and tasks, such as washing clothes or sweeping the yard, were 
altered. But it was not only daily routines that were affected by the violence; the
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rituals that marked other life cycles were also disrupted. Birthday parties, 
weddings, coming-of-age ceremonies were all indefinitely suspended as 
surviving the violence became all-consuming preoccupation (2000: 310).
Beall et al. (cited in Cherry, 2007: 301) point to the unique context in which women were 
participating in the anti-apartheid struggle, and in particular, to women’s roles in the uprisings in 
Durban. The authors argue that:
the home is traditionally regarded as the women’s domain, and the care of 
children is ‘women’s work’ ... Such tactics forced women to take positions in 
the front line of the battle and allowed them to assume leadership roles, laying 
the basis for the transformation of a women’s role and position in struggle: they 
are drawn in to defend their terrain, but in so doing, are forced to move beyond 
narrowly conceived notions of their roles (cited in Cherry, 2007: 301).
Writing about women’s role in securing their communities in the violence in KZN, 
Bonnin (1997), cites a female participant, who articulated that women were “in the front not 
because each one is looking after her own child, but all children. It does not matter whose child, 
a woman assists a child no matter whose child it is” (Bonnin, 1997: 39).
Pamela Reynolds’s War in Worcester (2013), an ethnography of young men from the 
township of Zwelethemba in the Western Cape who participated in the anti-apartheid struggle 
the 1980s, argues that
in Zwelethemba, the young stirred conflict and were arrested in their 
community, held in police cells and prisons in the town, often released without 
charge, and returned to their community. Ground was not gained, battles neither 
won nor lost: at the beginning of the 1980s, most of them believed that they 
would defeat the apartheid regime within a few years, but it was only at the end 
of the decade that signs of change became palpable in Worcester (Reynolds,
2013: 31).
Making a point about the nature of the confrontation between the security forces of the 
regime and the youth in Worcester, she argues that the urban nature of the violence in the
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townships makes it a “different from the kind of guerilla warfare, in which surprise attacks could 
be launched in the countryside” (Reynolds, 2013: 31-32). Furthermore, on the character of the 
war, those who participated against the state, “there was no security in identification by uniform, 
badge, or base with the protection that in formal wars, as recognized [sic] by the Geneva 
conventions, are supposed to be accorded a soldier” (Reynolds, 2013: 32). Cock (1989) estimates 
that in the 1980s, about 10 000 people were detained without trial by the security forces. The act 
of detention without trial made lawful in the 1960s, merely escalated.
Similarly, Matthew Kentridge in his book, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in 
Pietermaritzburg (1990), defines the killing of two thousand residences in the Natal Midlands 
between 1987 and 1990 as a war. He notes that while members of the UDF and Congress of 
South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) who were allies in the conflict with Inkatha offered 
different accounts of the causes of the war, all three described the violence as a war. He further 
notes that in the townships where this war took place
the people who actually have to live through it all talk with natural ease about ‘being at 
war’. They have no political or ideological brief -  they use the word because it fits their 
experience. The people here have adapted their lives to the demands of the war 
(Kentridge, 1990: 17)
In her doctoral thesis on the township of KwaZakhele in Port Elizabeth, Janet Cherry 
(2001) argues that while most townships had been contained by the state by late 1977 following 
the Soweto 1976 uprising, to emerge again after the formation of the UDF in 1983, in the Port 
Elizabeth-Uitenhage townships, there was the emergence of civic organisations such as the Port 
Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO), formed in 1979, and its allied organisations, Port 
Elizabeth Women’s Organisation (PEWO), Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) and 
Congress of South African Students (COSAS). Cherry (2001) argues that “when the township 
revolt began in September 1984, residents of KwaZakhele were ready to play their part in the 
historic drama that was about to unfold” (Cherry, 2001: 90).
Meanwhile, in her case study of Diepkloof, Soweto, Monique Marks (2001) points to the 
fact that schools became a terrain between young people and the state. She notes that:
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[m]ost township youth who joined political organisations in the ’80s, were at 
school, and many of the leaders of these organisations were still at school. This 
was a nation-wide phenomenon.schools provided a base for a common 
experience and also a geographical space for meeting and organising (Marks,
2001: 49).
Marks (2001) notes further the period from 1984 to 1989 came with high levels of state 
repression. She notes that “people in townships who joined political organisations during this 
time were aware of the severe consequences associated with this decisions” (Marks, 2001: 49). 
The residents knew that “they risked detention, arrests, harassment and even death” (Marks, 
2001: 49).
In her article about political widowhood in South Africa, Mamphela Ramphele (1996) 
writes about how funerals became sites of political contestation that were used to show the 
international community the gravity of apartheid brutality. She makes an interesting point 
regarding the use of English at the funerals where the mourners were largely illiterate. Making an 
example of a mass funeral in the township of Gugulethu, Cape Town, in 1985, she argues that
[t]he political theatre of mass funerals was not primarily intended for the 
audience in physical attendance, but for national and international audiences.
The latter audience assumed greater importance in the message being 
communicated, because of the potential action they could mobilise in support of 
the cause. The bereaved families became an incidental part of the audience to 
this political theatre (Ramphele, 1996: 107).
In her doctoral work about lived and embodied suffering of mothers and daughters in 
Chesterville township in KZN, Nthabiseng Motsemme (2011) argues that studies on the violence 
in townships in the 1980s and 1990s are “conceived and characterised as largely public- 
political”, in the sense that the violence is theorised as “wholly political in nature” and it is often 
populated by predominately hollow male political and protesting subjects, who appear as though 
they are without cultures and souls” (Motsemme, 2011: 2). In this sense, township-centred 
studies situate the township resident as primarily a political subject, engaged in the public sphere,
43
which in this case is the site of the protest or the march (Motsemme, 2011). She argues that what 
these studies hide in their portrayal of township life under apartheid, as inherently public- 
political, is that apartheid’s “effects on families, and in particular women and children, was 
simply ignored” (Motsemme, 2011:9). In Chapter Four, I extend the discussion on some of the 
methodological limitations of these township-centered studies. The point to be made here though 
is that the violence contaminated everyday life for black township residents. While it is 
important to also discuss the ways in which black residents found strategies of survival under 
repression, as Motsemme (2011) urges, the point of these studies is to show the extent to which 
township residents, country-wide, did not have a choice but to opt out of the violence from a 
state that perceived itself to be under threat.
Bonnin terms the violence in KZN as a “post-modern war”, which destabilised “fixed 
categories of war and peace, home and front, combatant and civilian” (Bonnin, 1997: 29), 
articulating the composite nature of the anti-apartheid struggle, which produced multiple 
protagonists, many of whom were women and young people.
What is examined below are the forms of resistance that residents in the rural country 
side used to contest apartheid and the methods, such as banishment, that the state used to silence 
activists in the countryside. It is shown that Poqo, the PAC’s armed wing, found most of its 
support in rural areas.
2.2.2 Poqo and revolts in the countryside
Wena Matanzima, usisigebengu uthengisa ngabantwana base Afrika... 
ubulala abantwana base Transkei” [You, Matanzima, are a criminal. You 
are selling out the children of Africa... you are killing the children of 
Transkei]
(Mayibuye Choir, n.d.)
In his book about banishment under apartheid, Saleem Badat (2012) correctly notes that the 
archive on the anti-apartheid struggle tends to be centered on the violence in the urban setting
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and the forms of resistance used by the national liberation movements. In this regard, “the iconic 
and celebrated figures of the national liberation struggle have tended to be political activists who 
had cities as their theatres of action and struggle” (Badat, 2012: xxi). Luli Callinicos (2007) 
argues similarly that “scholars in the 1980s -  with few exceptions -  tended to focus on the urban 
challenge and to discuss the potential and relative merits of the liberation and labour 
movements” (p. 154). Badat (2012) notes further that “it is not so much that the rural militants, 
and their activities and courageous struggle against oppression, exploitation and injustice, have 
been by and large forgotten. In large part, they are still to be fully written about and to enter 
popular consciousness” (p. xxii).
In The Peasants’ Revolts (1964), Govan Mbeki describes the “Bantu homelands”, which 
consisted of “260 small and separate areas scattered throughout the country”, as
.S ou th  Africa’s backwaters, primitive rural slums, soil-eroded and 
underdeveloped, lacking power resources and without developed communication 
systems. They have no cities, no industries, and few sources of employment.
They are congested and permanently distressed areas where the inhabitants live 
on a narrow ledge of starvation, where a drought, as experienced recently in the 
northern areas, leads inevitably to famine. They are areas drained of their 
menfolk, for their chief export is labour, and while the men work on white- 
owned farms and in mines and industry, their women-folk and old people pursue 
a primitive agriculture incapable of providing even subsistence. The 
‘homelands’ are mere reserves of labour, with a population not even self­
sustaining, supplying no more than a supplement to the low wages paid on the 
mines and farms (Mbeki, 1964: 13).
As Badat (2012: 36) notes, rural residents did not passively submit to the encroachment 
of the state in their lives, as many resisted as the “existence of anti-dipping movements and the 
role played by independent church and chieftaincy movements in reserve-based resistance” 
against betterment schemes and other forms of state control on land and rural life, well before the 
formal introduction of apartheid in 1948. The introduction of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 
was the first legislation introduced by the National Party in its attempts to implement its policy 
of separate development. Under the Act, the Minister of Bantu Affairs appointed Chiefs and
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Headmen as the new Tribal Authorities, which the Minister could remove any time according to 
his discretion (Mbeki, 1964). The Chiefs and Headman became responsible for the “allocation of 
land, the welfare and pension system and development” (South African History Online, 2016: 
n.d). The Act robbed rural residents of any opportunity to participate in the appointment of 
authorities who ruled over them as the “Minister and his officials had strict control over the 
membership of the Authorities; and members of the general public could be excluded from their 
meetings” (Mbeki, 1964: 45). As Mbeki (1964) argues, apartheid only exacerbated life for black 
people in the countryside:
. f o r  all the years after the Nationalist government came to power, it had 
brought only hardship to the African people: the tightening up of the pass laws, 
the introduction of inferior education, the 44 banning and banishing of political 
leaders; the growing ferocity of the police. The people were becoming 
increasingly bitter and hostile (Mbeki, 1964: 43- 43).
The rising “hostility” of rural residents was articulated in the various revolts of the 1950s 
and 1960s, such as in 1957 in the Northern Transvaal and Witzieshoek opposition of the 
introduction of pass to women, the uprisings in Sekhukhuneland in 1958, in Thembuland in the 
late 1950s and on the Natal south coast and in Mpondoland in the 1960s (Badat, 2012: 37).
The “banishing” that Mbeki (1964) refers to is a method of punishment used by the state 
that was “directed specifically at opponents of the state” (Badat, 2012), who were all exclusively 
African. Banishment involved the uprooting of political activists from a particular locale and 
their expulsion to specifically designated areas, usually completely foreign to them, within the 
national boundaries” (Badat, 2012: 33). According to Badat (2012), banishment had its roots 
from the Natal Code of Native Law of 1891, which gave the governor the power to remove any 
“native” from one part of the colony to another. The Administration Amendment Act of 1956, 
under the National Party, allowed the state to banish a person without prior notice (Badat, 2012:
31).
According to Badat (2012), the total number of banished people between 1948 and 1982 
(the last year of legal banishment), is 160. Banishment was highest in the 1950s, at the height of 
“peasant revolts”. The largest number of banished people, 23 (eighteen men and five women)
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came from GaMatlala, a rural town then known as Pietersburg (currently Polokwane). The 
residents of GaMatlala militantly resisted “betterment, Bantu Authorities, Bantu education and 
passes for women, and the state’s attempt to impose unpopular, pliant chiefs” (Badat, 2012: 38).
One of the key figures that Badat profiles is Makwena Matlala, an acting chieftainess of 
GaMatlala, who directly opposed the government when the location was declared a betterment 
area without consent. In 1950, Matlala was banished to Hammanskraal by the Department of 
Native Affairs in Pietersburg, because her presence in GaMatlala was “inimical to the peace, 
order and good government of the Natives” (Badat, 2012: 42). After refusing banishment, and a 
brief stay in Atteridgeville in Pretoria, in 1951 she was eventually forcibly banished to Zwelitsha 
Township in King Williams Town in the Eastern Cape, far away from her family and supporters 
in GaMatlala and Atterdgeville, in a place where she did not even speak or understand the local 
language. Helen Joseph visited Matlala in King Williams’s Town in 1962, and observed that 
although Matlala was a chieftainess, because she was “a black woman she could be insulted, 
slapped and stripped. From that humiliation she had gone to her banishment” (Badat, 2012: 45). 
Her banishment order was only withdrawn in February 1966.
Banished people were not only separated from their communities of support, they were 
often sent to remote areas that plunged their lives into extreme economic and social depravity 
(Badat, 2012). As Badat’s work shows, banishment was a forceful tool to silence rural activists. 
It was then extended as a method of suppression to activists in townships in the 1970s, the most 
well documented banishments being those of Winnie Madikizela Mandela, banished from 
Soweto to the North West town of Brandfort, and Mamphela Ramphela, who was banished from 
King Williams Town to Lenyenye location in Tzaneen, both in 1977 (Badat, 2012).
In terms of organised resistance, the PAC’s military wing had its strongest support among 
rural residents, who were frustrated by the state and traditional authority. Following the 
Sharpeville massacre and the banning of the PAC and ANC, the PAC was the first to adopt 
armed strategy with the formation of the para-military Africanist Task Force, which was the 
followed by the formation of the party’s official military wing, Poqo (used interchangeable with 
APLA, although APLA came into being in 1968), in February 1960. As noted by Lodge (1983), 
the word poqo in isiXhosa can be translated as alone, or pure. It is said that “the word was used 
sometime in the Western Cape in 1960 by PAC spokesman to describe the character of their
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organisation in contrast to the multiracial dimension of the Congress alliance” (Lodge, 1983: 
241). In his book that details the history of the PAC, Kwandiwe Kondlo (2009) argues that Poqo 
was formed “on the idea that the armed struggle was a necessity in order to mobilise the rural 
poor who the PAC regarded as the peasantry, into a conscious political force which could not 
only overthrow the government but also seize and mold the country’s political economy to meet 
their own ends” (p. 237). He argues that the military objectives of the PAC differed from those 
of the ANC, where the “armed struggle was a tactical bargaining stance and was thrust upon the 
organisation, [a] political solution remained the preferred route”; whereas for the PAC, “the 
armed struggle was an indispensable condition for liberation”, because the “PAC believed that 
they could not achieve objectives without war” (p. 237- 238).
According to Lodge (1983: 241), Poqo’s PAC was “considerably more violent and 
involved rather greater numbers” than did MK’s sabotage campaign. Poqo relied on strategies 
that were defined as “indigenous methods of fighting” (Lodge, 1983: 241). Kondlo (2009) cites 
an address by the PAC’s Administrative Secretary, Joe Mkhwanazi, addressing the International 
Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa in Arusha, Tanzania in 1985, where he 
Mkhwanazi traces the decision about the armed struggle and the weapons that the PAC chose to 
use. Mkhwanazi noted that
in 1961, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania took up the thread of armed 
struggle left behind by our great forebears. We took the decision to challenge the 
regime militarily. Necessity dictated that we should start with what we could 
afford. Thus emerged a weapon known as the panga. The nearest meaning 
attached to it by white liberals is that it is a butcher’s knife. But it is not (p. 233, 
emphasis added).
Kondlo (2009) also cites another PAC member, who noted that “Poqo warriors, we 
decided to fight the Boers because we inherited the fight from our ancestors” (p. 233). The most 
notable support for Poqo was in the Western Cape, from male migrants from the Eastern Cape. 
This contributed to a large PAC/Poqo following in the Eastern Cape. Lodge categorises 
PAC/Poqo violence during 1962-3 as targeted to different actors, which included the “defensive 
murders of suspected informers and policemen in Langa and Paarl”, targeted killing of white 
people, as well as assassination attempts “mounted on the lives of Transkeian chiefs and their
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supporters”, and failed attempts at a general uprising in places such as Paarl, King Williamstown 
and East London, until most of the party leadership was either arrested or escaped the country to 
operate in exile.
Kondlo (2009) makes an interesting comparison between Poqo and the Mau Mau 
movement in Kenya, which occurred in 1952, nine years before the formation of Poqo. He notes 
that even though it is not clear whether Poqo consciously drew from the Mau Mau experience, 
“the two movements shared common aspects with respect to organisation and strategy” (p. 238). 
For Kondlo (2009), when it came to the Mau Mau and Poqo:
[b]oth movements operated underground and drew their support from the rural 
areas.. .Members of both movements were bound by an oath of secrecy and their 
targets were similar, i.e. black collaborators, the police, as well as white civilians 
(p. 238).
Included among the women interviewed for this research, are women who participated in 
Poqo campaigns to take back the land in Jixeni village of Mqanduli in the former Transkei, in 
1963. The next section examines the ways in which the liberation movements mobilised outside 
of South Africa to attack from outside and to galvanise the international community to sanction 
and make the apartheid regime a pariah state. It also demonstrates how the state pushed back the 
challenge of its power through overt and covert cross-border attacks that proliferated throughout 
Southern Africa and beyond.
2.2.3 The international front
2.2.3.1 The liberation movements
In terms of policy, the ANC defined its battle against the apartheid state in terms of “four pillars” 
at the 1969 consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania. These four pillars constituted: mass 
mobilisation; the establishment of underground structures; the armed struggle; and the 
mobilisation of the international community to support the struggle of the South African people 
and to isolate the apartheid state.
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According to Barrell (1991: 69), the ANC and its ally, the SACP “were influenced by a 
number of revolutionary struggles -  among those in Algeria, China, Greece, Vietnam and 
Yugoslavia. But none seems to have been quite as influential as the Cuban revolution.” The 
founding document of MK reports that a “general uprising leading to direct military struggles” 
against the South African “white state” was “unlikely”. Instead, the founders of MK noted that 
“rather, as in Cuba, the general uprising must be sparked off by organized [sic] and well prepared 
guerilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people will be drawn and 
armed” (Operation Mayibuye, 11 July 1963).
For Legassick (2002:12), it was both Cuba and Algeria who were “the model[s] for 
armed struggle in Southern Africa”. Algeria was so because the success of the FLN at the time, 
“was the only African example of guerilla movement that had won independence” and led to the 
acceleration of the independence of French colonised countries in Africa (Legassick, 2002: 12). 
Legassick (2002) argues that the taking up of armed struggle in South Africa was followed by 
similar decisions by the FNLA and MPLA in Angola (1962-63), by SWAPO in 1962, by 
FRELIMO in Mozambique (1963-64), and by Zimbabwe African People’s Union and 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1964. Thus, this “southward thrust of 
decolonization [sic] through West and East Africa, and to Zambia and Malawi had reached its 
limits by the means of non-violent mass struggle” (Legassick, 2002: 11). Hence, Legassick 
insists that
by 1967, it was possible to describe a guerilla front across Southern Africa from 
the Indian Ocean to the Atlanti... the ‘Unholy Alliance’ of [Ian] Smith, [John]
Vorster and [Antonio] Salazar.. .has been forced to draw its battle-lines roughly 
along the Zambezi: the whole of Southern Africa has now become a single 
theatre of struggle (Legassick, 2002: 11).
The first operation from outside South Africa by MK was a formal military alliance with 
Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under their guerilla army, 
Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which culminated into the Wankie and 
Sipolilo campaigns of 1967-68 (Cherry, 2011). The objective of the campaigns was “to create a 
passage through Rhodesia into South Africa by fighting with ZIPRA against combined 
(Edlmann, 2014) Rhodesian and South African forces” (Cherry, 2011:37). As Cherry (2011)
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notes of this, due to the high number of casualties and combatants who were captured by 
Rhodesian forces, it became clear that infiltrating combatants into South Africa was going to be 
very difficult. In the 1970s, one of the modes of infiltration adopted by MK was to establish 
“forward areas” in Swaziland, Lesotho, along South African borders from which “MK units 
entered the country, setting up underground networks and laying the basis for military operations 
(Cherry, 2011: 49). The likes of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were placed in the Swaziland 
“forward area”.
2.2.3.2 “The forward areas” and the underground
Thula Simpson (2009:105) notes that “Swaziland and Mozambique were part of what the ANC 
described as the ‘Eastern Front’ of the liberation struggle”. According to Simpson (2009), the 
Eastern Front extended into South Africa, including areas such as KwaZulu-Natal, present-day 
Gauteng, Limpopo and Mpumalanga. Within the ANC, Maputo was given the code name 
“Harbour”, while Swaziland was coded the “Bay”, and South Africa the “Ocean” (Simpson, 
2009: 105). In terms of the distribution of responsibilities, Simpson notes that Maputo “served as 
the Eastern Front’s planning centre for operations. These Mozambique-based units in turn 
established sub-units in Swaziland to implement policy” (Simpson, 2009: 105). The sub-units in 
Swaziland were responsible for overseeing political and military work in rural and urban areas in 
Natal and eastern Transvaal (Simpson, 2009).
Barry Gilder, who served in the ANC’s underground unit in Botswana and was a member 
of the party’s Regional Political Military Committee (RPMC) there, notes that
[e]ach of the forward areas had responsibility for sectors of the country at home, 
although this was relatively elastic. Botswana had responsibility for the western 
half of the country, including Western Transvaal, Northern Cape, Orange Free 
State, and Western Cape. We all shared responsibility for the urban 
conglomeration that was then called PWV -  Johannesburg, Pretoria and the 
many towns and townships that surrounded them (Gilder, 2012: 169-170).
Timothy Gibbs (2011) examines the kinship networks in the Transkei that Chris Hani 
exploited while heading the MK underground unit from Lesotho, which entered the country 
through the Transkei. The forward area of Lesotho was responsible for attacks in the Cape
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region. Gibbs (2011) argues that Hani’s main contacts were young men and women who, like 
him, went to elite missionary schools such as Lovedale College, and St. Johns College in 
Umthatha. He further points to a tension that existed within the ANC/MK camps, with some 
accusing Hani of privileging elites from the Transkei (Gibbs, 2011). Some notable recruits who 
came from this network include Pumzile Mayaphi, who admitted guilt to the April 1986 
bombing of the Wild Coast Sun Casino in Mzamba, Transkei, as well as Oyama Mabandla, who 
worked under Hani in Maseru, later co-writing the book “Comrades against Apartheid: The 
ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile” (1992), under the alias of Tshepo 
Sechaba, with Stephen Ellis. Gibbs (2011: 689) further notes that the coup by General Bantu 
Holomisa which saw him take over the Transkei from Prime Minister George Matanzima, 
provided a “liberated zone for the ANC”. Following the unbanning of the national liberation 
movements,
Transkei provided a transit point for ANC exiles repatriating to South Africa. It 
was a sanctuary for the ‘high risk’ cadres, such as Chris Hani, who were briefly 
refused return by the apartheid government, and it was a refuge for victims of 
political violence in neighboring Natal. Members of Self Defence Units came to 
Transkei from all over South Africa for training... De Klerk’s government went 
further, saying that MK was using Transkei as a springboard from which to 
attack Natal. The South African Police claimed that 22, 000 tons of weaponry 
had been moved from Angola to Namibia and Transkei (Gibbs, 2011: 689).
Elias Masilela in Number 43 Trelawney Park: kwa Magogo: Untold Stories o f Ordinary 
People Caught Up in the Struggle Against Apartheid (2007) chronicles the involvement of 
Solomon Buthongo Masilela and Rebecca Makgomo “Magogo” Masilela’s family in the 
activities of the ANC and the PAC at their home in Number 43, Trelawney Park in Manzini, 
Swaziland. Masilela argues that “almost every ANC and PAC activist who went through 
Swaziland used the Number 43 in one way or another in carrying out their various activities.it 
was the principal base launching the armed struggle against South Africa, particularly in the 
period after 1982, when King Sobhuza II died” (2007: xx). Amongst those who used the 
Masilela house to hide and for military strategising were John Nkadimeng, who served both in 
the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) and Revolutionary Council, Siphiwe “Gebuza”
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Nyanda, Jabu Shoke, Welile ‘Satane’ Nhlapo, Xolani Humphrey Mkhwanazi, Theophilus Sidima 
‘Viva’ Dlodlo, and Glory ‘September’ Sedibe. Mkhwanazi and Sedibe were arrested by Swazi 
police on 12 August 1986, while staying at Number 43. Two days later, under the command of 
Eugene de Kock, Sedibe was kidnapped by South African security forces from the Swazi police 
station. He was severely tortured by the apartheid security officers to disclose information about 
ANC military activities, leading to his defection from ANC and MK to become an apartheid state 
agent. In 1988, he served as the key state witness in the trial against Ebrahim Ishmael “Chota” 
Ebrahim, Simon Dladla and Mandla Acton Maseko, his former MK counterparts (Dlamini, 
2014).
Amongst the key military activities that were “finalized [sic], launched, received and 
celebrated from Number 43” included the “gunning down of the notorious police officer, Hlubi, 
in Soweto (1978), the Venda police station attack (1981), the Vootrekker army base attack 
(1981), the Tonga army base operation (1982), the Hectorspruit fuel depot operation (1982), the 
Pretoria Church street bomb blast (1983) -  and many more” (Masilela, 2007: xxi).
Emphasising the importance of house Number 43, Masilela quotes Nyanda, who stated 
that “Number 43 was a haven mainly for people operating in the eastern front, like similar 
houses in Botswana and Zambia. It was the centre of the ANC’s military operations” (Masilela, 
2007: 105). Masilela goes further, to compare the significance of Number 43 to that of Liliesleaf 
Farm in Johannesburg. The farm, as previously mentioned, was the underground headquarters of 
the South African Communist Party, the safe house and a central meeting point for key figures of 
the ANC, and the MK High Command. In post-apartheid South Africa, Liliesleaf Farm has been 
recognised as a heritage site, due to its significance to the ANC and SACP. Masilela argues that 
“while Liliesleaf housed the high command of the ANC of that time, Number 43 was the de facto 
operational base of the ANC high command in Swaziland” (Masilela, 2007: 18). He argues 
therefore that “while Liliesleaf Farm had political significance, Number 43 had a major practical 
significance, owing to the number of military operations launched from there” (Masilela, 
2007:18).
Masilela’s narrative of his parents’ home as the center stage for MK military activity 
following the banning of the ANC, SACP, PAC and other national liberation movements, 
demonstrates the nuances of what Mao Tse-tung defines as “guerilla warfare” in the ways in
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which all categories central to conventional warfare are blurred. To define both house Number 
43 and Liliesleaf Farm as important sites of military strategy goes against conventional logic of 
what constitute a battleground versus civilian ground. The narrative also underscores the 
transnational nature of the armed struggle, which engulfed countries and homes in Southern 
Africa and beyond.
Conny Braam’s account of her role as the then-chairperson of the Anti- 
Apartheidsbeweging Nederland [Anti-Apartheid Movement Netherlands] is important for 
understanding the various strategies the liberation movements mobilised beyond Southern 
Africa, and how they relied on the human and material support of individuals across the globe. 
This conversation between herself and Ronnie Kasrils in Lusaka, Zambia in 1986, is useful in 
illustrating these different strategies that liberation movements had to utilize to access South 
Africa:
‘We need your help,’ he began. ‘We’re very pressed now. It’s getting more and 
more difficult to operate from the front-line states. The Boers are trying to drive 
us further north, so contact with our people inside South Africa is becoming 
almost impossible.It’s been especially hard recently for people like Chota and 
me; and we need friends who can provide safe hiding places, who are prepared 
to operate as fronts for u s .A n d  we need them urgently,” Ronnie continued,
“people who can organize [sic] safe houses -  a house where a comrade can live 
inconspicuously, a safe place we can work from.. .It has to be someone prepared 
to take a job in one of the front-line states, and to live as normal a life as possible 
there, with friends, hobbies, everything. Most importantly, this person of ours 
must always be able to justify being where he is, with a good cover story, be 
prepared for any question (Braam, 2004: 25-26).
In the conversation above, Kasrils is requesting Braam to assist in the ANC’s Operation 
Vula, the last military operation by MK. At the time, Kasrils was the Head of Intelligence for 
MK. Also present during this conversation is “Chota”, real name Ebrahim Ishmael Ebrahim, 
another senior MK member. Just months after this conversation in Lusaka, Ebrahim was 
kidnapped by the South African security forces in Swaziland in December of 1986, and 
sentenced to 20 years in prison. Braam’s book, Operation Vula (2004), chronicles the strategies
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that she used to approach and convince several Dutch nationals, including a Belgian couple, to 
suspend their lives in the Netherlands, to move to various countries such as Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe, so that they could acquire jobs and live believable livelihoods that would enable 
them to be seen as legitimate expatriates, who would be able to secretly harbour MK combatants 
there, without drawing suspicion. In addition to this function, these individuals also hid MK 
weaponry, and some of them infiltrated weapons, money, passports, and computer disks inside 
South Africa. In order to ensure that all actors played their parts properly, without being caught 
by the South African security forces, Braam worked closely with Kasrils, Mac Maharaj, Ivan 
Pillay and Siphiwe “Gebuza” Nyanda, all of whom were senior members of MK. In his memoir, 
Ronnie Kasrils (2004) notes that it became clear that MK could not operate in overt ways in the 
Frontline States, but rather in an “undercover manner”, which relied on utilising “a score of safe 
houses [rather] than base camps” (p. 146).
It was Maharaj who would explain to Braam, in her home in Amsterdam late in 1986, 
that “a decision was taken some time ago that the ANC leadership should go into South Africa, 
underground, to unite the resistance and give political leadership” (Braam, 2004: 37). Maharaj 
further explains that the implications of such a mission would entail known figures of the 
ANC/MK, including himself, to disguise their appearance and “not just a quick change of 
moustache, but a thorough disguise to change him completely, and which he would be able to 
use for a long time -  years maybe -  with no danger of being recognised” (Braam, 2004: 37). 
Maharaj explained that “the South Africa security services have a certain image of an ANC 
guerilla.A  smart businessman doesn’t fit their impression of a dangerous terrorist” (Braam, 
2004: 40). From 1986 to 1990, Braam’s key duties for the MK leadership was secondly to host 
various MK members in her home in Amsterdam, who would be disguised by professional 
make-up artists in order to completely alter their appearance. Amongst those intricately disguised 
were Nyanda, Catherine Dipua “Minor” Mvelase, and Totsi Memela-Khambule. It was Memela- 
Khambule, dressed as a Swazi woman, who successfully infiltrated Maharaj and Nyanda, who 
were dressed as farm labourers, into South Africa from Swaziland in 1988 (Braam, 2004: 147­
152).
Operation Vula became public knowledge in 1990, following the arrest of Nyanda, 
Mvelase, Raymond Lalla and others. Amongst the formally accused for participating in
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Operation Vula when its protagonists were put on trial on 29 October 1990, were Maharaj, 
Nyanda, Lala, Mvelase, Susan Tshabalala, Pravin Gordham, Ivan Pillay, Marten Vis -  a Dutch 
national recruited by Braam and the Belgian couple, Daniel and Sylviane (surnames not stated in 
public accounts).
Both Braam and Masilela’s narratives illustrate the extent to which the struggle against 
apartheid was a highly transnational process. The case of the Masilela family is but one example 
of the multitude of families and individuals across the region that supported the South African 
liberation movements, putting themselves at the risk of being attacked by the apartheid security 
forces. The fight against apartheid and the response by the apartheid state thus troubles the 
category intra-state war, as many of the casualties of apartheid violence can be found across 
Southern Africa and beyond, where the response by the apartheid state in turn traversed national 
boundaries. Raymond Suttner has also argued regarding the ANC, that there were no “stark and 
sharp” differences “between various decades and forms of struggle” because there was 
“substantial continuity within ruptures [and] ruptures within continuities and blurring of periods” 
(2008:165).
2.2.3.4 The apartheid state response
I’ve been in all of these wars. The only thing I haven’t been involved in is 
conventional warfare. I mean, I was close to it as you can get, but I can tell 
you that the dirtiest war you can ever get is the one fought in the shadows. 
And I was there in the middle of it. There are no rules except to win, there 
are no lines drawn to mark where you cannot cross. So you can go very low 
-  I mean very low -  and it still doesn’t hit you.
(Eugene de Kock to Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003: 20)
The quote above is an exchange between former TRC Commissioner and Psychologist, Pumla 
Gobodo-Madikizela and Eugene de Kock, the former head of the apartheid counter-insurgency 
unit, Vlakplaas. This conversation is from Gobodo-Madikizela’s book, “A Human Being Died 
That Night: Forgiving Apartheid’s Chief Killer” (2003). In 1996, De Kock was sentenced to two
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life sentences and 212 years for murder, culpable homicide, kidnapping, assault and corruption, 
amongst many charges. He was granted parole in March 2015 after serving 20 years in prison.
In this conversation with Gobodo-Madikizela, Eugene de Kock describes himself as a 
“cross-border machine” for the National Party government (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003: 54). De 
Kock, who joined the police in 1968, served an estimated ten to eleven tours in Rhodesia 
between 1968 and 1972 (Ellis, 1998). In 1979, co-founded Koevoet in Oshakati, Namibia, a 
murderous counter-insurgency unit tasked to attack South West African People's Organisation 
(SWAPO) (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003). Ellis (1998) argues that the impact of the South African 
police officers who participated in the wars in Rhodesia and Namibia influenced the nature of the 
counter-insurgency unit inside South Africa. De Kock founded Koevet with Hans Dreyer, who 
had also served in Rhodesia (Ellis, 1998). While Theunis Swanepoel, who led the violent 
suppression of the 1976 student uprisings, “had taken part in the first counter-insurgency 
operations against SWAPO in northern Namibia ten years earlier” (Ellis, 1998: 269). Terence 
Ranger argues similarly that “South African police officers returned home after an instructive 
period of service in Rhodesia, where they learnt how to ‘turn’ guerillas into reliable instruments 
of state terror... the Rhodesian war provided them with a laboratory for learning and 
experiment” (Ranger, 1992: 700).
Ellis (1998: 266) notes that Minister of Justice and Police, B.J. Voster, who took over in 
1961, “transformed the Police by equipping them with extensive powers to detain and virtual 
immunity from prosecution. He points to this in order to bring attention to the fact that the 
Bureau of State Security (BOSS), which was established in 1969, was dominated by “officers 
transferred from the Security Branch of the Police” (Ellis, 1998: 266). In this regard, while the 
conventional jurisdiction of the police is usually limited to the domestic, the National Party 
subverted this logic and relied on both the SADF and a high-powered police security branch, 
whose ambit went well beyond its national borders in its defense of the perceived threat of 
African nationalism (Ellis, 1998). De Kock was moved from Namibia to head a unit that was 
headquartered 20 kilometres from Pretoria in a farm called Vlakplaas. Although there are no 
exact figures regarding the budget that was allocated to the Vlakplaas unit, Gobodo-Madikizela 
(2003: 31) argues that millions of unaccounted for Rands were used “to pay off local and 
international informants and assassins and to pay for weapons, cover-up operations, and overseas
57
cross-border trips”. The main methods of the unit involved kidnapping, poisoning, assassination 
and execution. This unit was notorious for raiding alleged ANC units in Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Mozambique and Zambia. In his memoir of life as an MK soldier, James Ngculu (2009) notes 
that in the May 1990 meeting between members of MK, SADF and Citizen Force in Lusaka, 
Zambia, one of the participants argued that “the conflict had been between MK and the SAP 
[South African Police]” therefore suggesting that discussions about a ceasefire at the time ought 
to be between MK and SAP (p. 210). This further illustrates the central role of the SAP played in 
the armed struggle well beyond its domestic ambit.
One of its main strategies was to infiltrate the ANC and PAC by using Askaris. Askaris 
are former members of the liberation movements who were captured by this unit, and often 
tortured to the point of agreeing to work for the state under duress. Glory Sedibe, whom Masilela 
writes about and is the subject of Jacob Dlamini’s book, Askari (2014), is but one example of 
person who had been part of a liberation movement, but then ended up working for the 
Vlaakplaas death squad. Sedibe is linked to several deaths of ANC members in Swaziland 
(Dlamini, 2014; Masilela, 2007). Bischoff (1988: 470) recounts a number of the incursions by 
SADF into Swaziland, which escalated in the mid-1980s, forcing the Swazi government to 
publically condemn Pretoria’s destablisation, despite a largely “accomodationist” foreign policy 
framework towards Pretoria. Stephen Ellis (2012) and Paul Trewhela (2009) also discuss the 
levels of infiltration and the paranoia that the apartheid state caused within the liberation 
movements, including SWAPO in Namibia.
By 1974, the SADF was physically present in Namibia instead of supporting the colonial 
South West African Police (SWAPOL) fight against SWAPO’s People’s Liberation Army 
(PLAN) (Dale, 1993). Also in 1974, the SADF intensified its presence southeastern Angola 
following a coup in Portugal that left the apartheid state unable to rely on Portuguese support in 
Angola (Dale, 1993). The SADF wanted to prevent SWAPO’s entry through the Angolan border 
to Ovamboland, and had established a joint command with the Portuguese in Cuito Cuanavale, 
which they used for troop support and reconnaissance (Dale, 1993). The “roughly 600 000” men 
conscripted into the SANDF mostly participated in combat in Namibia and Angola, as well as 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Edlmann, 2014: 3). These were the so-called “Border Wars”,
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“fought against the perceived communist threat to the apartheid state, and consisting] of both 
conventional and counter-insurgency measures” (Edlmann, 2014: 3).
South Africa’s violent presence in the region is referred to as “destabilization” (sic) 
(Cock, 1991). According to Cock (1991: 22)
This policy of destabilization (sic) has wrought havoc, destroying social and 
economic life, and causing widespread death and social dislocation. It is 
estimated that about 1.5 million people have died as a direct or indirect result of 
Pretoria’s undeclared wars of destabilization against neighbouring states. While 
the damage inflicted on the economics of region states between 1980 and 1988 is 
estimated to be not less that R90 billion.
The Vlakplaas unit, together with other units such as the Special Forces, and auxiliary 
units such as the 32 Battalion, “became specialists in covert or clandestine warfare” (Ellis, 1998: 
270). Ellis (1998) argues that it was these specialists units, which hunted the national liberation 
movements across Southern Africa, forming the core basis for what became known as the Third 
Force, which was responsible for engineering state violence inside South Africa in the 1990s 
during the period of transition, almost plunging the country into a full-blown war.
Below, it is shown that this complex canvas of the anti-apartheid struggle falls into the 
tradition of guerilla warfare. This is not only because the national liberation movements 
described it as such, but also because the military objectives constituted one aspect of the anti­
apartheid struggle in the combination of multiple methods of struggle. In this regard, a 
combination of violent and non-violent struggles led to the defeat of the apartheid state. There 
was a recognition similar to guerilla wars elsewhere that armed confrontation although 
important, “alone [was] incapable of producing the decision” towards victory (Mao Tse-tung, 
1961: 50). It is this recognition of the nature of guerilla war that is it defined as unconventional 
war.
2.3 An unconventional war
The definition of war is at issue because it determines who is recognized as 
a legitimate fighter... The nature of the fight was amourphous, one might
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say organic, in its origins, growth and spread. It was multipronged, and it 
was difficult to designate which efforts contributed significantly to the final 
achievement of its goal (Reynolds, 2013: 9).
In the text, On War, Clausewitz (2009: 24) defines war as a “real political instrument, a 
continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means”. For Clausewitz 
(2009), power lies in the conception of combat, which directs the destruction of the enemy. 
Clausewitz’s conception of war confines the activity of war as that which takes place between 
two or more states, who seek to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty from an outside 
threat. In this context, “combat” is defined as the “activity of armed military engagement with 
the enemy” (Gear, 2002: 2). This conception of military activity creates sharp distinction 
between the soldier and civilian. While a key distinguishing factor of “late twentieth century” 
wars has been the blurring of the distinctions between the combatant and civilian, as Gear (2002: 
2) points out, in these wars “combat is not a homogeneous experience” as it includes “those who 
are not in the frontline” (Gear, 2002: 2).
Ellis (1998), in defining the war in South Africa, evokes Thomas Hobbes’ definition of 
war in that, as Hobbes argued, “warre, consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting; but in 
a tract of time, wherein Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently k now n .” (p. 264). He makes 
this argument in order to point out that those who were at the center of the contestation between 
the state and the liberation movements “did not doubt that South Africa was indeed at war 
between early 1960s and the early 1990s” (Ellis, 1998: 264). Booth and Vale (1995) define 
South Africa’s actions in Southern Africa as emblematic of a realist discourse “that left more 
than a million of the region’s people dead” (p. 286). Within the binary logic of the Cold War 
discourse of the time, the apartheid state represented itself as the “bastion of Western 
civilization” within the region and continent, and legitimised the plunder of the majority people 
within its borders, as well as outside (Booth and Vale, 1995). The authors argue that the all- 
encompassing nature of the war was such that even academic institutions that should have 
involved in research dealing with conceptual logic of the war, such as the University of 
Pretoria’s Institute for Strategic Studies, could not be relied upon to provide such intellectual 
work, as they “enjoyed a close relationship with the apartheid regime” (Booth and Vale, 1995: 
289). This was also in context in which the would-be independent think-tank Institute for
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Defence Policy (currently the Institute for Security Studies), was staffed by former officers of the 
apartheid security forces (Booth and Vale, 1995).
Even though the state used the Total Strategy to articulate its counter-insurgency while 
the liberation movements called for a People’s War, there is little contestation on both sides of 
the fact that the nature of the fight was unorthodox, erasing lines that may ordinarily be drawn 
between the civil and military spheres. The ANC and the SACP explicitly termed the anti­
apartheid struggle a guerilla war.
What has been defined as guerilla warfare -  in contrast to what Mao Tse-tung terms 
“orthodox war” -  should be understood as “a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military 
equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation” (1961: 42). Mao Tse-tung, 
who was writing in the context of Chinese colonisation by the Japanese (with a superior military 
and resources), argues that “there is in guerilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is 
nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defense that characterizes [sic] orthodox war” (Mao 
Tse-tung, 1961: 52). Moreover, Mao Tse-tung argues that guerilla strategy constitutes “one 
aspect of the entire war” which, although important, “alone [is] incapable of producing the 
decision” (Mao Tse-tung, 1961: 50). In these terms, it means that the success of war relies on the 
combination of other forms of struggle acting in concert. This is because guerilla warfare is 
“revolutionary in character”, meaning that military strategy is used towards a political end and 
not for purposes of proving military superiority. Guerilla warfare should, hence, be understood as 
“military strength organized [sic] by the active people and inseparable from them” (Mao Tse- 
tung, 1961: 50).
According to Simpson (2016), Mao Tse-tung was also acutely aware that guerilla 
strategies must depend on a specific context. He notes a December 1961 meeting between Mao 
and representatives of the ANC, Joe Gqabi, Raymond Mhlaba, Wilton Mkwayi, Andrew 
Mlangeni, Abel Mthembu and Nandha Naidoo. After a briefing on the South African situation by 
Raymond Mhlaba, Simpson (2016) notes that Mao’s comment was that “everything changes, 
including Marxism and communism. The South Africans’ policies should be based on a study 
and understanding of their own situation” (p. 46).
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Similarly, with reference to the Cuban revolution, Che Guevara (1997: 52) argued that 
the “combatant in guerilla warfare” comes against a “group composed of the oppressor and his 
agents, the professional army, well-armed and disciplined” while the “guerrilla band is an armed 
nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people”. Guerilla warfare “was adopted in Africa as 
elsewhere as the most effective means of defeating the highly organized [sic] and heavily armed, 
but also cumbersome and alien armies of the major industrial powers and their local allies”, 
where in many ways, this form of warfare “may be regarded as the normal form of warfare in 
societies without powerful states” (Clapham, 1998: 2).
As shown in the sections above, although MK and the APLA did involve official military 
training, the lines of combat were obscured by the fact that military operations depended on an 
intimate cooperation with the civilian population inside and outside South Africa. Joe Slovo, 
quoted in Legassick (2002: 11), argued that “...the guerilla fighter is a political fighter, a 
member of an organized revolutionary force, who uses the struggle itself, the actual physical 
conflict, as an instrument of agitation and mobilization. He aims to raise the level of popular 
participation to the point at which revolutionary aims become general” (sic).
As Macmillan (2013: 12) argues, ultimately, the destruction of apartheid “was due not so 
much to its military activities as to a wide variety of efforts in the field of diplomacy, propaganda 
and culture”. Cherry also argues that,
[t]he ‘struggle’ was conducted by millions of ordinary South Africans, without 
weapons or military, who joined trade unions, refused to carry passes, boycotted 
their local councillors, refused to vote in apartheid elections and, in a myriad of 
ways, undermined the apartheid system and made it unworkable. It was not 
military operations that caused apartheid to implode (Cherry, 2011: 142).
It is in this context, that the armed struggle ought to be understood within the ‘tradition’ 
of unorthodox warfare, which blurred the lines, not only in terms of inter-state borders, between 
violent and non-violent strategy by both liberation movements and the apartheid state. If this 
complex context is taken seriously, it makes it possible to discuss women’s roles in combat in a 
more nuanced manner that helps us to depart from the narrower conceptions of the term 
combatant. In doing so, examining women’s participation in the demobilisation process implies
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paying attention to the ways in which that process accounts for the women and men who 
participated at the centre of “struggle” in conventional and unconventional ways that were both 
local and transnational.
2.4 Women and guerilla warfare
‘If I were to ask you what the single most important thing to know is to best 
understand this country, what would you say?’ I asked Mia, a nurse in Kuito, 
Angola, in November 2001. ‘You need to understand death,” she said. 
“Everyone here is on intimate terms with death; everyone has lost someone they 
love to the war -  death walks everywhere with people’.
(Nordstrom, 2004: 59).
Enloe (1983) argues that the link between soldiering and masculinity is embedded in the fact that 
the definition of state security is largely determined by the ability of the state to be a protector. 
Enloe (1983) argues that “the military, even more than other patriarchal institutions is a male 
preserve, run by men and for men according to masculine ideas and relying solely on manpower” 
(p. 7). For states, the “protection myth” has been critical in their ability to recruit men into the 
military as they play on men’s social construction as protectors of the vulnerable (particularly 
women and children). This in turn is used to legitimise the need for states to use aggression to 
attain this national security and is usually expressed through excessive militarism (see Enloe, 
1983, 1989, and Tickner, 1992, 1997).
The literature on the use of women and feminism to legitimate the war in Afghanistan 
and Iraq by the United States and its allies is the latest example of the “protection myth” (Khan, 
2008; Rostami-Povey, 2007; Maira, 2009; Allison, 2013). As Elaheh Rostami-Povey (2007) 
argues in the case of Afghanistan, “women in Afghanistan have long been portrayed as passive 
victims awaiting liberation. Following the attacks on New York on 11 September, Washington, 
supported by London, used this as partial justification for a bombing campaign against 
Afghanistan” (Rostami-Povey, 2007: 1). Decontextualised images of veiled Afghan women were 
used to construct a justification for war (Khan, 2008). Maira (2009) argues that “the logic of the 
War on Terror is embedded in the gendered politics of colonialism, nationalism, and liberalism” 
(p. 632). She argues that “the ‘Muslim Woman’, especially the veiled woman, is a foundational
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trope for Orientalism and colonialism” (p. 632). The literature on women and the war on terror 
also show that feminists in the Global North can also collude with the patriarchal manipulation 
of feminism when white feminists perceive their form of liberation as universal while 
disregarding the contexts and preferences of women in the Global South. These “imperial 
feminisms”, as Maira (2009) terms them, “assumes that it is the United States or Western culture 
that must bring ‘freedom’ to certain areas in the world, even if paradoxically via a military force 
another case of white men (and white women) trying to save brown women from brown men” 
with “little sympathy for the Afghan (and now Pakistani) women and children bombed by the US 
and US backed forces, for girls who were raped and murdered by US soldiers in Iraq, or for 
Palestinian women who live under an illegal occupation funded and supported by the United 
States” (p. 641 -  642).
According to Mama (1998: 4), the relationship between militarism and hegemonic 
masculinity is that “the military man exemplifies the masculine ideal”. This is because “through 
combat, the man affirms his role as protector and defender” hence the exclusion of women is 
“essential for maintaining the ideological structure of patriarchy” (Cock, 1991: 192). Bayard de 
Volo (2012: 415) has argued as follows in this regard:
Feminist theorists of war advocate a methodology that makes us both alert to 
and suspicious of the familiar binary divisions of militarization [sic]: 
strength/weakness, toughness/tenderness, protector/protected, action/passivity, 
independence/dependence, and masculinity/femininity.The first component of 
each pair draws on an ideal type of masculinity. These particular qualities vary 
across time and culture, but they have the effect of reinforcing gender inequality.
They also reinforce the power of dominant groups more generally, as 
subordinate classes and racial groups are often represented as lacking the 
idealized [sic] masculine qualities.
In this context, women’s access to combat has been a central aspect of women’s struggles 
to attaining full citizenship rights. Yuval-Davis (1997:20) argues that women’s access to combat 
is important, because it is linked to women’s capacity to access citizenship, where it is believed 
that “once women share with men the ultimate citizen’s duty -  to die for one’s country, they
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would also be able to gain equal citizenship rights to those of men”. As noted by Pettman (1996: 
147), this liberal-feminist argument states that “women’s continued exclusion from the right and 
responsibility to risk their lives for their country [has] reduced them to the status of second-class 
citizens” and seeks women’s “equal admission to the state and an end to the male monopoly on 
legitimate violence”. Feminists have argued that IR theories and practice is “encoded as 
masculine territory”, where “the soldier, the citizen, the political subject, and the state are 
gendered male” (Pettman, 1996: viii). Therefore, war offers a “site for rudimentary change in 
relations between women and men” (Enloe, 1983:70).
As argued in Chapter One, some of the ways in which feminists have located women’s 
varied roles in wars has been to focus on the transformation of war itself, specifically the 
blurring of roles between combatants and non-combatants. This is due to shifts in the number of 
civilian casualties. For instance, in World War I, soldiers constituted 80 percent of the casualties, 
in World War II, 50%; while the war in Vietnam, civilians constituted an egregious 80% of the 
casualties, and in most contemporary wars since, civilians have constituted up to 90% of war 
casualties (Pettman, 1996: 89). For such reasons, feminists move beyond the effort to locate 
women in spaces of combat, broadening attention to how war dramatically reconfigures all 
spaces of social life in ways that affect men and women gender-specifically, both during and 
after wartime. In this fashion, feminists have argued that war is gendered, and peace is gendered 
(Hendricks, 2011). Enloe’s work, in particular, that looks at the different roles of women from 
women in combat to military wives, to the role of prostitution during wartime, expands the 
discourse beyond access to conventional combat in order to reveal the ways in which war 
ultimately reconfigures all aspects of social life in gendered ways. The landmark, and 
unanimous, adoption of UN Resolution 1325 is in 2000 represents a significant triumph for 
feminist scholars and activists who have long called attention to women’s varied roles in wartime 
and in the aftermath. As Carol Cohn (2004: 2) argues, UN1325 “not only recognizes that women 
have been active in peace-building and conflict prevention, it also recognizes women’s right to 
participate as decision-makers at all levels -  in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace­
building processes.”
In the context of guerilla warfare, women in Africa, Asia and Latin America have been 
thrust into battle on the side of national movements fighting against colonial occupation. This is 
unlike women in Europe and United States, who battled for access into combat within state
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forces. For women in the Euro-American sphere, access to combat has been read as claiming 
equal citizenship with men, first and foremost. For women in the Global South, their claim to 
combat has often prioritised national self-determination for the colonised people, as well as 
claiming equal rights to bear arms with male counterparts. Nationalism, in anti-colonial struggles 
and in the aftermath, has been argued to have contributed to the continued construction of 
women’s identity as that of “bearers of the nation” who are “denied any direct relation to 
national agency”, which constrains the extent to which they can make claims as citizens to the 
state (McClintock, 1993: 63). The perception that women in the Global South have prioritised 
aims of nationalism than those of achieving gender equality, has led to bitter and complex 
contestations between feminists across the Global South and North. I want to argue here that 
these conceptual tensions have shaped the ways in which women’s roles in guerilla warfare are 
understood.
Alison (2003) writes about the involvement of women as combatants in the Sri Lankan 
organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), arguing that the LTTE women she 
interviewed “referred to ideas of freedom for the Tamil nation, self-determination, land and 
rights of Tamils as part of or as the main reason for them joining the movement” (Alison, 2003: 
39-40). She argues that Western dominated feminist discourse needs to take seriously that 
women involved in nationalist struggles make visible the reality that a “commitment to the 
perceived needs of one’s perceived nation or ethnic group is viewed as just as important, or more 
so, than one’s needs ‘as a woman’” (Alison, 2003: 52). Pointedly, Alison (2003) goes on to argue 
that “nationalist sentiment” that underscores the ideological foundation for women to join 
guerilla war should be seen as
A sort of meta-reason for enlisting; [because] beneath this ideological 
motivation there also more specific, more personal factors operating. One such 
factor, intertwined with nationalist ideology, is the communal perception of 
suffering, oppression and injustice. Sometimes this is related to personal 
experience; in other cases it has been received as part of the Tamil narrative of 
oppression and suffering, made tangible by witnessing the experience of friends 
and neighbor [sic] (2003: 40).
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In the case of women’s participation in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) for 
independence from Ethiopia, Bernal (2000) points out the EPLF “advocated for gender equality 
and regarded the advancement of women in its own ranks and in the liberated areas of the 
country as a significant achievement”, where the third of the party members is composed 
women, who participated with men in all capacities except the top ranks of leadership (Bernal, 
2000: 61). Unlike many nationalist movements, the EPLF is seen to have been “extremely 
successful in mobilizing [sic] women politically for the nationalist cause”, emblematic in the 
movement’s image of the woman fighter with the gun and the baby on her back (Berdal, 2000: 
66).
Bernal, however, critiques the EPLF for interpreting gender equality as the erasure of the 
social constructed notions of femininity, which was contingent on women “being able to behave 
as if they were men”, particularly while “there was no comparable erasure of masculinity” 
(Bernal, 2000: 67). Similarly, with the regards to women combatants in the Fueraz Armadas 
Revolucionarios Colombianos -  Ejercito del Pueblo (FARC-EP) in Colombia, for women to 
succeed in senior commanding positions, they had to “out-perform men to be taken seriously” 
(Herrera and Porch, 2008: 618).
In her work on the representation of Palestinian female self-martys (shahidas), Caron 
Gentry (2009) shows that they are often represented as “driven to kill themselves and others 
because their dreams for marriage and children have been destroyed” and “very little mention is 
made of the women’s political reasoning -  instead their actions tend to be defined by their 
expected gender role as mother” (p. 232). Gentry (2009) defines this as a “twisted” use of 
maternalism that is imposed on women’s actions that use violence to deal with their supposed 
failure to achieve socially accepted roles as mothers, even though “in martyrdom videos, in 
interviews with the media or in statements by families, women who trained to become shahidas 
have political reasons that do not highlight any maternalist dissapointments or humiliations” (p. 
247 emphasis original).
In the case of Nicaragua, Molyneaux argues that this imagery of the armed mother, which 
is related to, and in opposition to the dominant image of the ‘moral mother’, is symbolic of the 
“combative motherhood” of the female guerilla fighter (Pettman, 1996: 133). Enloe (1983) has 
stated that the representation of the female guerilla in ways that demonstrate her willingness to
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die for the nation, while also evoking her role as a mother, points to the precarious role of the 
female guerilla in the aftermath of the war. More explicitly, Enloe says that it is not a 
coincidence that the female guerilla is presented within the frame of motherhood, even as she 
carries her rifle, because in the aftermath, it is expected that “as soon as the ‘war is over’ [that] 
the woman in the picture will put down the rifle and keep the baby” (Enloe, 1983: 165). She 
asks, “where is the picture of the male guerilla holding the rifle and the baby?” (p. 170). In this 
regard, Enloe (1983) argues that “women’s efforts to make the liberation war itself a site of 
rudimentary change in relations between women and men will be aided or undermined by the 
structural transformations that occur during the liberation war itself” (p. 170). Accordingly, 
despite the vast numbers of women participating in the liberation struggle, “‘peace’ often seems 
to see enormous pressure on those women to return ‘home’” (Pettman, 1996: 137).
Overall, the literature shows that the masculinist character of national liberation 
movements has contributed to the invisibility of female ex-combatants in the aftermath of war. 
Meintjies, Pillay and Turshen (2001) argue that this is because “gender roles brought about by 
the upheaval attendant on conflict are dramatic, but that the impulse to women’s social 
transformation and autonomy is circumscribed by the nationalist project, which constructs 
women as purveyors of community’s accepted and acceptable cultural identity” and therefore 
“the return to peace is invariably conceptualized [sic] as a return to the gender status quo, 
irrespective of the nontraditional roles assumed by women during conflict” (p. 9).
Below, I argue that the South African case is also illustrative of the bitter contestations 
between nationalist objectives and feminist orientations -  with South African women seen as 
playing a predominately maternal role within national liberation movements. Even though the 
literature gestures towards capturing the varied roles of women in wartime, it continues to place 
emphasis on the narratives of the trained guerilla, where women are judged on their ability to 
compete in the domain of combat with their male counterparts, in both conventional and 
unconventional war. It is argued that the danger with this emphasis is that it risks obscuring the 
ways in which most women participated in armed struggles, particularly in the ways that were 
central to the specific conditions of guerilla combat (which require different skills to those of 
“orthodox” combat).
It is suggested here that a feminist framework, although not uncomplicated, is useful for 
analysing the South African case of women’s roles in the armed struggle, because it allows for
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an examination of ways in which the context of a war of national liberation allowed women to 
participate in “conventional” combat preparation and execution. More importantly, a feminist 
framework allows one to pay attention to the wide-ranging ways in which women participated in 
violent forms of struggle, in both terms that include those with, and those without military 
training. Therefore, it is argued that framework expands and complicates the category of 
“combatant” beyond the criteria of military training, and makes visible the ways in which 
physical location, time and age allowed women to participate in the armed struggle in varied 
ways.
2.5 Women and the national liberation movements in South Africa
2.5.1 Motherism versus feminism: “I’m a guerilla because I’m a mother”1
It was only in 1943, thirty-one years after the formation of the ANC, that women were officially 
recognised as full members of the party, with the ability to vote and stand for office. Though 
women participated in the organisation, it was the 1913 women’s march against passes in 
Bloemfontein that led to the formation of the Bantu Women’s League of the ANC in 1918 which 
preceded the Women’s League (which was formed much later in 1943). On the other side, the 
PAC, which was formed in 1959 by members who broke away from the ANC, came to form the 
PAC’s African Women’s Organisation only in 1986.
McClintock (1993) argues that “from the outset, women’s organized [sic] participation in 
African nationalism stemmed less from the invitation of men, than from their own politicization 
[sic] in resisting the violence of state decree” (p.74) and as a result, “even under [a] State of 
Emergency, women have everywhere enlarged their militancy, insisting not only on their right to 
political agency, but also on their right of access to the technologies of violence” (p. 75). In this 
fashion, it can be said that “black women’s relation to nationalism has thus undergone significant 
historical changes over the years” which eventually led to the recognition of the need for 
women’s liberation and destruction of patriarchy as something that cannot just be conflated with
1 Thandi Modise (cited in Cock, 1991: 153)
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national liberation, but as a goal on its own (McClintock, 1993: 75-76). Shireen Hassim argues 
that although the ANC Women’s League claimed its autonomy from the main body:
The place of the league was clear within the nationalist movement. The 
Congress was a political family and it replicated the hierarchical form of a 
patriarchal institution, with the exclusively male National Executive Committee 
acting as the paternal head of the movement, the Women’s League playing the 
lesser, maternal role and the Youth League treated as a space of radical 
militancy needing the guidance of the parents. Women’s political roles were to 
be defined through the mode of maternalism, acting on behalf of their husbands 
and children (Hassim, 2014: 29).
There has been a long and contested debate within South African feminist discourse 
regarding the participation of women in the anti-apartheid struggle in the capacity of 
motherhood. Like Hassim, scholars such as Wells (1991) and Walker (1995) have argued that 
women did not participate as autonomous citizens in the national liberation movements, but did 
so under this guise. The source of contention in this debate lies in ascertaining whether the 
maternal role that women occupied in the liberation movement had transformative feminist ends. 
One of the oft-cited interventions on the tensions between motherism and transformative feminist 
discourse is the work of historian Julia Wells. In Maternal Politics in organising black South 
African women: The historical lessons (1991), Wells analyses the resistance of black women to 
pass laws in May 1913 in Bloemfontein, which led to scores of women arrested, and the 9 
August March of 1956 by the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), as examples of 
“motherist” movements where women “are not fighting for their own personal rights as women 
but [rather] for custodial rights as mothers” (p. 253). Wells notes with regards to motherist 
movements that they:
(1) .. .arise in situations in which women perceive their roles as mothers -  ensure 
on the survival of their children -  to be threatened by socially illegitimate force, 
often government actions.
(2) They bring women into the public sphere in a way which is highly unusual 
for the particular place and time; conventional roles as homemakers are
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temporarily abandoned as women take part in demonstrations or other forms of 
collective action.
(3) They challenge government policies on the moral grounds that their capacity 
to function as good mothers has been jeopardized.
Wells’s (1991: 253) primary argument is that “maternal politics are clearly not to be 
confused with feminism”. Wells insists that even though women are able to gain political clout 
by using their maternal roles to make political claims, she concludes that “these movements must 
be recognised as limited in scope, duration, and success in achieving their goals and, above all, 
should not be mistaken for political maturity”. Walker (1995) similarly argues to Wells that due 
to black women’s organising around their identity as mothers in the national liberation 
movements, “the formal commitment to women’s emancipation was overshadowed by practices 
and ideas that could only be described as patriarchal.”
Kimble and Unterhalter (1982) argue that is important to realise the manner in which 
both family and motherhood are conceived differently in the West and in Africa. They argue that 
“whereas women in the West have identified the family as a site of women’s oppression, women 
in South Africa point to the destruction of ‘normal family life’ as one of the most grievous 
crimes of apartheid” (p. 13). They argue that in order to understand the ways in which women 
participate in struggles it is important to ask: what are the conditions necessary for women to 
organise and defend their interests, as they define them, in relation to the broader struggles in 
their society?” Furthermore, they argue that “whereas in the case of Afrikaner nationalism, 
motherhood has been conceived of as home-centred and as essentially [a] passive activity, within 
the African National Congress motherhood has been conceptualised and mobilised as a militant 
liberatory force -  ‘a dynamic force for change’” (p. 422). In similar vein, Magubane (2010) 
suggests that:
[r]ather than dismiss these women as being hopelessly deluded by their own 
collusion with the patriarchs of the national liberation struggle, as other scholars 
have done, we should instead try to understand how the women in question 
conceptualise the multitude of issues and challenges they are facing. Given their 
material circumstances, how did they define the relationship between women’s
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emancipation and national liberation?...Oftentimes when black South African 
women appeared to be rejecting feminism or North American and/or European 
theoretical models, their choice on the grounds that it was ‘white’ or ‘western’, 
rather than reflecting their careful analysis of the different political, social and 
economic situations faced by women in Europe and America versus those faced 
by women in South Africa (p. 982).
For example, Emma Mashinini (2012) describes the multiple ways in which black 
women workers faced different challenges to white workers in general, and to white women 
specifically. She posits that:
It is all the menial jobs, all the lowest jobs in the workplace that are the jobs of 
the black workers. And as a black worker, if I speak about a transport problem I 
am speaking about a different transport problem anything the white worker will 
have to suffer. We have these very long distances to travel, and we have the 
poorest possible transport facilities, and our problems concern the pass laws and 
schooling, and hospitals, exhaustion and poor diet. And while whiter mothers 
have problems of their own, such as having to see one of their boys leave to 
fight on the border, we can understand them, because we also must lose our 
children -  to the security forces, or to fight against apartheid. But what white 
mothers in this country do not have to suffer over what we call breadline 
problems. There is no other word for them. Breadline problems are questions of 
who will care for the children when the grandmother or friend cannot come one 
day and the mother must stay home, even though she is not paid enough to be 
able to afford to lose that one day’s money? Who will pay when she has to spend 
a day at the hospital waiting for an appointment? No. Our problems are not the 
same (Mashinini, 2012: 45).
Miller (2009: 70) has also argued that in the context of apartheid South Africa, the
.iconography of militarised motherhood offers a different vision of what it 
meant to be a political mother. Rather than reinforce the more narrow 
understandings of motherhood that were previously described, these
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representations suggest a more nuanced political role for women. They depict 
women as mothers, who are concurrently active participants in a revolutionary 
struggle, and who are concerned not only with the welfare of their children, but 
also with widespread social change.
Gasa (2007: 214) also argues that the reduction of black women’s activism to maternal 
politics creates a “Berlin Wall between blackness and liberation struggle on the one hand and 
feminism on the other”, binaries that are “completely unnecessary and do not make sense of 
black women’s experiences”. More poignantly, Gasa (2007: 214) challenges Wells, Walker and 
Hassim by asking
“[w]hy is the defence of the family seen as deeply conservative? Is this taking 
the context into account? Young children of school-going age, who were 
harassed and raided for resident permits, were these women’s children. How 
does feminism clash with the protection of one’s children? Does it have to?”
In her work on women and the TRC process, Fiona Ross (2003) points out how the 
women who came to testify about gross violations of human rights often testified about violence 
against their husbands and children, instead of the violence that happened to them personally. 
Showing how women articulated the effect of the violence within the intimacy of their homes, 
she notes how
[m]any women testified about their losses using metaphors drawn from their 
domestic roles. It seems that women used domesticity, a space over which 
women usually have more control than other spheres, to map the interpolations 
of violence in their lives (Ross, 2003: 42).
Patricia Hill-Collins (2000) argues similarly that “this type of thinking sets up a hierarchy 
of feminisms” by assigning the political work of black women “a secondary status, and fails to 
recognize [sic] motherhood as a symbol of power. Instead, the activist mothering associated with 
Black women’s community work becomes portrayed as a ‘politically immature’ vehicle claimed 
by women who fail to develop a so-called radical analysis of the family as the site of oppression 
similar to that advanced within Western feminism” (p. 209). As Oyewumi (2002) also argues, for 
women in the Global South, feminist discussions “have focused on the necessity of paying
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attention to imperialism, colonization [sic], and other local and global forms of stratification, 
which lend weight to the assertion that gender cannot be abstracted from the social context and 
systems of hierarchy” (p. 1-2).
The debates on maternal politics and feminism need to be understood within a broader 
debates on women and peace, particularly the argument that is forwarded by Sara Ruddick in her 
text, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics o f Peace (1989). At the core of Ruddick’s claims is 
that mothering, which is “work” done by both men and women, is a commitment to non­
violence. Ruddick (1989) argues that states can learn key lessons on strategies of non-violence 
by taking seriously “maternal practice” as serious political work. Thus, although the conduct 
maternal work is structured by differences in geography, race, ethnicity, class, culture and sexual 
orientation, all maternal work is committed to the “preservation of life, nurturing and social 
training”, which fundamentally rely on a commitment to non-violence. Writing elsewhere about 
the use of motherhood by the women who supported the counter-revolutionary forces known as 
the Contras in Nicaragua in 1980, Cupples (2006: 86) argues that in contexts of revolution and 
counter-revolution, that women are forced to “negotiate both gender and political identities” 
which complicates “the notion of female subjectivity”, which should be seen as at best “fluid, 
partial, and always in process”. Cupples (2006: 96) concludes that the “political manipulation of 
motherhood in Nicaragua means that gender and political identities are mutually constituted and 
cannot be easily be separated”. Writing about the hunger strikes and protests of Kikuyu women 
whose sons were imprisoned under Daniel Arap Moi’s Kenyan African National Union, Tibbetts 
(1994: 45) argues “the Mamas expressed concerns in the language of loving and caring 
relationships and articulate concrete demands, but the mothers also made rights-oriented 
arguments and exhibited concern for abstract principles such as justice and freedom”.
2.5.2 Women and the multiple battlefronts
Men are not born, but made fighters, and women can perform, but not own 
fighter status.
(Weber, 2011: 363)
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When MK was formed in 1961, there was no representation of women in the MK High 
Command. Lodge (1983: 233) notes that Mandela’s testimony during the Rivonia Trial 
“suggested that the founding of this organisation [MK] was the work of ANC men alone”. This 
occurred in a context where there is evidence that women were involved in the early sabotage 
campaigns by MK inside the country, even if they were not officially informed that they were 
participating in MK activity. One of the participants in this study, for example, worked closely 
with Govan Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba as a courier in Port Elizabeth in 1961, and thus, while 
not directly in “combat”, still played a critical role in the daily operation of MK activity.
Cock’s study of women in MK and SADF, Colonels and Cadres: war and gender in 
South Africa (1991) remains the only work entirely focused on women’s formal participation in 
statutory and non-statutory forces. It examines the experiences of women in MK camps outside 
South Africa, in comparison to those of white women who were soldiers in the SADF. The 
numbers of women in MK in exile changed throughout the different periods, peaking in the 
1980s, and yet not much is written about women’s presence in the 1960s and their role in the 
first campaigns from outside South Africa (specifically in the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns). 
The numbers of women increased after the 1976 student uprisings in Soweto, where by 1991, 
women are said to have constituted 20% of MK membership (Cock, 1991; Hassim, 2014).
Cock’s study (1991) reveals that women were under-represented in positions of 
leadership and authority in MK. James Ngculu (2009) also argues that “the ANC was patriarchal 
in its outlook and approach” (p. 149). This under-representation of women was also visible in 
ANC leadership structures more broadly. This can be seen where “until 1991 there were only 
three women on the National Executive Committee and only one woman in a formally 
acknowledged leadership position within MK - the head of communications, Jacqueline Molefe, 
appointed in 1983 when her husband, Joe Modise became commander of the new MK 
headquarters” (Cock, 1991). Comparing MK to white women’s roles in the SADF, Cock argued 
that “most of the women in the SADF are confined to subordinate positions which reflect the 
sexual division of labour in the wider society. They are involved in telecommunications and 
signals, logistic, finance, administration, cartography, medical and welfare work, and 
instructional activity.” This is while women in MK were mostly deployed in intelligence, 
communications, transport, medical services and logistics. She points out that both women in the
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SADF and MK were excluded from “direct combat”, although women in MK emphasised the 
fact that they received the same military training as their male counterparts, while the women in 
SADF received training separately from the men. With that said, Cock (1991) also acknowledges 
that the notion of “combat” is problematic in a context of guerilla warfare, because “the 
boundaries between “front” and “rear” cannot be sharply demarcated.”
Suttner (2003), too, has argued against this emphasis on women’s exclusion from “direct 
combat”. He argues that “it is important that we do not fetishise a narrow conception of combat 
as meaning direct physical fighting” (Suttner, 2007: 243). In the publically available transcript of 
his interview with Totsie Memela-Khambule, who was responsible for infiltrating top ANC/MK 
leadership inside South Africa, such as Maharaj and Nyanda, this work is often not seen as 
critical part of warfare. Suttner uses Memela-Khambule’s reconnaissance work to argue that 
“everything that is part of achieving a military goal is part of a military action” (Suttner, 2003). 
In the chapter on Women in the ANC-led underground (2007), Suttner argues that
Totsie Memela’s work in reconnaissance, which may be the type of activity 
described as less ‘glorious’, appears to have been just as dangerous as the actual 
infiltration of the Vula group for which she prepared, having to ensure that every 
point at which they entered, every place where they would stay, was safe. In so 
doing, she tested the danger or otherwise of the various elements of the 
enterprise before the entered (p. 244).
Hassim (2014: 62) also notes that women in MK challenged MK leadership to send more 
women for underground activities by arguing that “it has been proven that the chances of 
survival in the underground for women are greater than for men.” Cock (1991) provides a 
compelling example of this by pointing to how Thandi Modise was called the “knitting needles 
guerilla”, because while she was operating underground “reconnoitering potential military 
targets, she tried to look as ordinary as possible” (p. 151).
While Cock’s (1991) study makes an important contribution, it does have its limitations 
that risks obscuring women’s contributions. There is a continuous tension in Cock’s (1991) 
argument about whether women’s contribution in MK should be seen as direct or indirect 
combat. While she recognises women’s role as couriers, surveillance and reconnaissance, she
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labels this work as women contributing “indirectly” to combat (p. 165). While in the very same 
page, she then argues that “if ‘combat’ is redefined to mean direct exposure to danger, then the 
acts of arson and sabotage performed by women MK cadres are part of ‘combat’” (p. 165). 
Ngculu’s (2009) chapter on women in the ANC and MK in his memoir also demonstrates a 
tension with how to define women’s combat contributions. While Ngculu (2009) praises women 
MK members for “being especially courageous” for enduring the difficulties of camp life, being 
subjected to the same training as their male counterparts who often patronised women 
combatants, he nevertheless puts into question women’s combat activities. He argues that few 
women were deployed in the front, like Modise, while others transferred weapons, ammunition 
and explosives. Although he acknowledges that many women were deployed as couriers and 
assisted in safe houses across the region, Ngculu (2009), like Cock (1991), does not qualify these 
roles as forming part of combat. I argue that this indecision over how to position women’s 
combat roles in the context of guerilla war contributes to the obscuring of women’s 
contributions. While it is clear that Cock (1991) and Ngculu (2009) aim to disrupt the dominant 
rigid definition of combat and battlefront, they nevertheless fall into the same trap, as they 
demand that women combatants perform battle tasks that hardly resemble the realities of the war 
being fought.
Kongko Makau’s (2009) dissertation on the experiences of ten MK women, meanwhile 
argues that “most of the people who joined MK were young, either attending secondary school or 
university, whose ages fell between 14 and 22 years. Only a few women over the age of 25 
joined MK” (p. 30). He argues that someone like Thenjiwe Mthintso, who joined MK at the age 
of 29, “was older than the average entrant when she joined in 1979” (p. 30). Ngculu (2009) 
argues in similar vein that most of the women who were part of the 1976 Detachment that he was 
a member of “were women in their late teens or early twenties” (p. 148). Makau (2009) notes 
that most of these young women were members of student organisations, such as South African 
Students Congress (SASCO), Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO), Azanian Student 
Convention (AZASCO), and COSAS; and that the heightened state behaviour after 1976 
prompted them to risk their lives “by crossing into Angola, to receive military training, and then 
return to South Africa to fight fire with fire” (p. 9). The discussion on “guerilla girls” in Chapter 
Five, builds on the importance of age and space in understanding women’s participation in MK. 
It takes the empirical realities of MK seriously in arguing that it was young women of girlhood
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age who participated as trained guerillas, while the majority of older and younger women inside 
the country did so without formal training.
In terms of the culture within MK, Hassim (2014: 58) argues that the presence of women 
“acted as a destabilizing [sic] factor in the most masculine of the ANC substructures”. Hassim 
further argues that the presence of women in the armed wing of the party “shaped the ways in 
which they responded to other more conservative forces within the ANC” (p. 58). Cock also 
argued that the participation of women in military training, which led to a “breakdown of normal 
male-female roles encouraged many women to discover new capacities within themselves”, 
resulting in the image of the female MK guerilla becoming “a popular mass image of the strong, 
liberated woman” (cited in Hassim, 2014: 59). Ngculu (2009) argues that the generation of 
women in MK who joined in the late 1980s helped to “revolutionalise the ANC and put the issue 
of gender on the agenda” (p. 149). Mentioning the names of women such as Thenjiwe Mthintso, 
Zou Kota, Nosiviwe Mapisa [Nqakula] and Miranda Ngculu, he argues that their previous roles 
in the Black Consciousness Movement and the Mass Democratic Movement inside the country 
meant that these women “accustomed to being vocal and assertive” (p. 149).
At the same time, there have been efforts to document the different risks that men and 
women experienced due to their gender, such as the sexual violence often at the hands of male 
superiors in the military camps, as well as the sexual violence that women faced at the hands of 
the South African police (Cock, 1991; Suttner, 2008; Van der Merwe, 2009). Even prominent 
women like Thandi Modise, Thenjiwe Mthintso and Mavis Nhlapho, have spoken out about the 
persistent sexual harassment in ANC camps in Angola, where men went unpunished by MK 
leadership for harassing women (Modise and Curnow, 2000: 39; Hassim, 2014). Other issues 
included the sterilisation of women headed off to “combat” training, while there were no similar 
attempts to manage male fertility. The women who became pregnant were removed from the 
camps in Angola to Tanzania. Ngculu (2009) also observes that the removal of pregnant women 
from camps “was generally viewed as a form of punishment for getting pregnant” (p. 152). MK 
women protested that during pregnancies “women were left with the responsibility to look after 
children, while male cadres either got on with their revolutionary work free of obligations, or 
became involved with new partners and had other children” (Hassim, 2014: 45; Ngculu, 2009). 
In cases of women who chose to abort their pregnancies, Ngculu (2009) notes that these women 
were “seen to have committed a punishable offence” (p. 152). This can be observed even in the
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post-apartheid context, where similarly, Tsampiras (2012) argues that while the ANC more 
broadly was concerned with managing unplanned pregnancies and the spread of HIV/AIDS in 
exile, she argues that “while the physical results of womyn’s sexual practices in terms of 
pregnancy often required the ANC to address the consequences of those sexual practices directly, 
there is little evidence to suggest that men’s sexual practices were similarly addressed” (p. 656).
Cherry’s paper on the role of women in the 1980s township uprising in the Eastern Cape 
unpacks the gender dynamics of the work of internal civic movements under the UDF as well as 
the role of the SDUs that are noted above. Cherry (2007) contends that “in the mid-1980s, the 
mass movement came increasingly into a violent confrontation with the apartheid state [in] what 
came to be described as the ‘township uprising’ [that] engulfed black communities in the period 
from 1984 to 1989” (p. 262). Cherry (2007: 262) states that in the vast literature on the ‘uprising’ 
of the mid-1980s, “there is scarcely a word written about the role played by women in this 
decisive period of struggle”. Instead, gender-blind categories as ‘the people’, ‘youth’, 
‘community’, ‘residents’ and ‘masses’ are used. When the gender dynamics of the time are made 
visible, it becomes clear that it is young males in the townships who are perceived as having 
taken “control of public space, while women were expected to provide shelter and guard their 
private space. Representations in writing, film and photography of the ‘young lions’ almost 
always portrays the aggressive and macho young men confronting the state” (Cherry, 2007: 291). 
Bonnin (2000: 309) further argues that in this period, “the street became reconstructed as a site 
of masculine power”. The image of this male youth is often juxtaposed with that of the older 
women whose role was to cook, provide safe houses, organise funerals, visit detained youth in 
jail bringing food and clothing, and so forth. As Bonnin (2000: 309) argues:
Women, in turn, extended their role of mother to incorporate these boys: a role 
extension that had two implications. First, ‘mother’ became socially rather than 
biologically defined, since, in situations of conflict, any boy became the son of 
any woman. Second, mothering happened across different sites, the street as well 
as domestic space. Mothering would include feeding and caring for the youth, 
accosting police who might be harassing them in the street, hunting for them at 
the police stations, supporting them in court appearances and finally, if the worst 
happened, burying them.
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While older women did play this role under organisations such as the PEWO, which was 
part of the PEBCO, little mention has been made about the role of young women at this time 
beyond also caring for the male youth as “little sisters” (Bonnin, 2000: 309).
Cherry (2007) notes that the role of young women who were members of the COSAS and 
PEYCO played a crucial in bridging the gap between parents and the youth. As Seekings (1991: 
81) argues, “younger women were motivated to join student and or youth organizations [sic] 
because of their specific concerns and experiences” such as conditions in school, while “these 
organizations [sic] did not have the same attraction to slightly older women who had left school”. 
Yet, beyond these specific needs, young women also laboured hard to bridge the gap between the 
young and old. They “would try to convince the ‘mothers’ about the importance of school 
boycotts, trying to explain the need for political organisation and resistance, and support for their 
children in the pursuance of political objectives” (Cherry, 2007: 285). With regards to increased 
state violence in the township from 1984 onwards, Cherry (2007: 300) argues that women are 
represented either as:
...the passive or innocent victims of male violence, or defenders of home 
and children. The reality of women’s experiences was more complex and 
varied than this, however. While it can be said that the response of the 
older township women to the escalating violence was primarily 
defensive.young women were in certain situations able to play the roles 
normally assigned only to men -  of aggressors or combatants. In addition, 
there were strategies adopted which blurred the line between offensive and 
defensive action, and introduced women to leadership roles as the conflict 
escalated.
The informal structures known as the amabutho in the Eastern Cape “played the role both 
of confronting security forces and coercing residents in support of campaigns.” Additionally, as 
Cherry (2007: 308) notes amabutho were also known for taking “brutal action against those 
deemed to be spies or collaborators” with the apartheid government. It is true however that fewer 
women than men participated in amabutho violence, “those few who did participate, adopted the
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male identity of young warriors. They were teenage girls, often high school students and COSAS 
members, and they had not yet begun to identify themselves as ‘mothers’ or in a nurturing or 
supportive role. Instead, they saw themselves as combatants, and were willing to adopt masculine 
identities and images to play an active role in the unfolding struggle” (Cherry, 2007: 308 
emphasis added). As Seekings (1991: 87) argues, “gender ideologies are highly contingent and 
fluid, and different roles for men and women will be sanctioned as political and social context 
changes”, because for Seekings (1991: 87), women participated “along different, more gendered 
structured lin e s . at different points of these processes”. The introduction of the category of “in- 
betweeners” in Chapter Five shines light into the actions and motivations of young women, 
many of them of girlhood age, who, unlike the guerilla girls, remained in the townships during 
the height of the call to make the country ungovernable.
As the findings of this thesis will show, the ways in which women participated in the 
struggle for national liberation, both violent and non-violent, were shaped by the different 
periods of struggle, and their physical location, whether inside and outside South Africa, which 
determined their ability to attain formal military training. It is argued that physical location, 
period of struggle and age, affected the choice of activism available to women.
2.6 Conclusion
The aim of the chapter was to show that the anti-apartheid struggle was waged along many fronts 
in the whole of Southern Africa and beyond. The chapter challenges the conventional framing of 
the armed struggle by demonstrating that the war against apartheid war produced unconventional 
combatants, who found themselves at the center of apartheid terror. Women, as combatants, 
fought the apartheid state from various spaces, but mostly from the community, home, schools, 
churches, prisons, work places and many others across the urban and rural spaces inside the 
country and across Southern Africa, where the violence was mostly felt and resisted. The chapter 
demonstrates that the subject of the trained, transnational female guerilla does not fully 
encapsulate the complex ways in which women were in fact thrust into and ensconced in combat. 
By locating the women in these different spaces, it may be possible to examine whether the 
state’s present commitment to supporting those who participated in combat, pays attention to the 
unconventional nature of the apartheid battlefront, in which what was at stake for these women 
might receive due attention. The discussion demonstrates that it is not only women’s contribution
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to fight for national liberation that is at stake in this new veterans framework, but rather, as 
shown Chapter Three, that there is a misrecognition of many others who risked their lives to 
fight back against apartheid violence in ways that may today not be recognised as legitimate.
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Ch a p t e r  Th r e e :
He r o e s  a n d  Mis f it s : Wo m e n  a n d  Dis a r m a m e n t , 
De m o b il is a t io n  a n d  Re in t e g r a t io n
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the demobilisation and reintegration process undergone by statutory and 
non-statutory forces following the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990. It is this 
process that led to the formation of the new SANDF and the Demobilisation Act of 1996, which 
framed the duties of the state in assisting individuals who would not become members of the 
SANDF, but who were instead going to be demobilised as military personnel and be reintegrated 
into civilian life. The chapter argues that the negotiations that led to the formation of the SANDF 
and the demobilisation was a top-down process, dominated by representatives of the MK and 
SADF. Few women participated in the process, and its design was such that most women could 
not participate. Only transnationally trained guerilla combatants were allowed to participate in 
the integration and demobilisation process, to the exclusion of the internally based combatants. 
The emphasis in the process on a narrow understanding based on the distinction between 
combatants and civilians meant that those who participated in the armed struggle outside of the 
formal non-statutory forces, most of them women, could not stand to participate in the process, 
and were therefore required to self-demobilise.
Firstly, this chapter locates debates on demobilisation and reintegration within a historical 
context. It is in the aftermath of World War II that the reintegration of soldiers becomes an 
important issue of social and security policy. Although states have historically taken 
responsibility for supporting the demobilisation of combatants into civilian life through access to 
pension, financial support for education, healthcare, housing, as well the access to psychological 
support for post-traumatic stress, it is after WWII that reintegration occupies priority in the 
reconstruction of society after war. The chapter draws largely on the experiences of the United 
States, and other cases from Europe, to make visible the ways in which veterans policies have 
evolved over time in terms of the public perception of the unique place occupied by former 
soldiers in post-war societies. The perception of former combatants as both heroes and potential
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threats runs through this discourse, and is also visible in the discourse on demobilisation in both 
national liberation wars and post-colonial wars in Africa. The chapter demonstrates that what is 
unique about the cases from Africa is the inclusion of the non-conventional combatant into the 
process of demobilisation and reintegration. Importantly, the chapter shows that women, as 
historical non-combatants, have been rendered invisible in processes of demobilisation. Women 
have largely been represented in the roles of supportive wives and partners for returning soldiers, 
especially in the US context. When women participate in demobilisation and reintegration 
processes, feminists have argued that the transition from military life to civilian life offers unique 
challenges to men and women, thus it is important for state assistance to reflect the needs of the 
demobilised combatant in gendered ways. The liberation wars and the post-colonial intra-state 
wars in Africa, such as those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and South Sudan, offer detailed insight into the different economic, political and social 
challenges that men and women face as they transition from military life to civilian life. It is 
argued that the literature on the challenges of the formally and informally demobilised 
combatants in South Africa has largely focused on the experiences of the male combatants in 
both statutory and non-statutory forces. These studies offer limited detail about the well-being of 
the demobilised female combatant.
3.2 ‘Do something for these soldier boys’: experiences from the United States
Mashike (2007: 3) notes that post-war civilian “reintegration refers to the process of facilitating 
the transition of former combatants to civilian life, which allows them to adapt economically and 
socially to productive civilian life”. State-assisted reintegration is “meant to provide an enabling 
environment for transition to civilian life” by offering them a “new identity that is compatible 
with peaceful development and sustainable growth” (Mashike, 2007: 3; Farr, 2003: 27). The 
experiences of post-war demobilisation in the United States, which has an extensive legislative 
framework for veterans, demonstrate a recurrent theme in terms of how former combatants are 
viewed by states, firstly as special citizens who have paid the ultimate price by putting their 
bodies in the line of fire for the protection of the state. In this sense, these ‘heroes’ are 
understood as ‘ultimate citizens’. Yet, secondly, these citizen-cum-heroes present another 
dilemma in the eyes of the state, where, if the state fails to support a post-war settlement, the 
former combatants are viewed as a security threat to the state whose sovereignty they protected.
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Due to their military training, the “returning” soldier presents a moral dilemma, where the state 
is obligated to pay dues to the heroes in the aftermath of war, while also recognising that if the 
dues are not paid, the heroes may undermine the integrity of the state with their access to tools of 
violence. Mettler unpacks this “double-edged sword” as follows:
veteran status has been crucial to the definition of citizenship status and 
stratification in the polity. Interestingly, its power operates as a double-edged 
sword: on the one hand, it has served to delineate who is included and who is 
excluded as honored and rights bearing citizens; on the other hand, it has 
provided a powerful tool for expanding the bounds of the citizenry (Mettler,
2012: xii).
Mettler (2012) writes about the evolution of state policies in the United States from 
individuals who participated in various wars, including the civil war in America of 1861 to 1865, 
the two World Wars, to those who participated in more recent wars. As Mettler (2012:xii) notes, 
“in the democratic ideals central to the nation’s identity, military service represented a central 
obligation of masculine citizenship, and the protection of the nation by ordinary citizens rather 
than standing army was regarded as essential for self-governance”. As she argues further, the 
citizen who is willing to offer their body in defense of the state, is in turn recognised as an 
honourable citizen. Respect and honour take particular forms in terms of policies, followed by 
the formation of “institutions, resources and political affiliations” that shape the direction of 
state-assisted support for those making the transition from military life to civilian life (Mettler, 
2012: xiii). In this regard, the citizen-soldier carries a particular civic identity, writing of the 
American context, Mettler states that:
the common person who served this nation became endowed with status and was 
viewed as the legitimate bearer of claims on his government, and acquired a 
political identity that was a source of collective action and mobilization [sic].
Such dynamics raised the resources for channeling benefits for veterans. In 
every era from the post-Revolutionary period down to the present, the question 
of how the nation should fulfill its obligations to its veterans has assumed a 
central role in American politics (Mettler, 2012: xii).
85
Skocpol (1992: 142) argues that it is important to recognise that the “U.S Civil War 
pensions (and other forms of public help for veterans and dependants) were not conceptualised in 
socioeconomic terms at all”, instead, “they were understood in political and moral terms”. By 
this, Skocpol (1992: 149) posits that state assistance of veterans saw the Civil War pension as 
“justly due to the righteous core of a generation of men (and survivors of dead men) -  a group 
that ought to be generously and constantly repaid by the nation for their sacrifices”. This 
sentiment was reflected in the declaration by the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, in 
September 1943, referring to World War II returning soldiers: “we are going to have to do 
something for these soldier boys when they come back.. .They’re fighting this war for us, and 
we’re not going to put them on the street corners selling apples when they get back here” 
(Young, 2012: 199).
World War I presented the greatest challenge to the state’s ability to offer public goods to 
returning veterans as “the demobilisation of some four million American soldiers at the end of 
World War I occurred simultaneously with widespread social unrest, rising unemployment, and 
economic hardship characterised by frequent labor strikes”, amongst others (Ford, 2012: 119). 
Theodore Roosevelt, speaking to the vast challenges of assisting soldiers transition into civilian 
life after the First World War, noted that the difference at that time was that “after the Civil War 
we still had a frontier. We absorbed a great many of the restless people of the frontier. We have 
no frontier now” (Ford, 2012: 122). According to Ford (2012), for the returning WWI soldiers, 
the US War Department played a crucial role in the drafting of reemployment strategies for 
returning soldiers, which included specialised employment services, creative publicity 
campaigns, citation awards, and public works projects. In order to propel the resettlement of 
returning soldiers forward, the War Department went to great lengths to encourage businesses to 
“put fighting blood” in their business by employing returning soldiers. Media campaigns painted 
soldiers as more disciplined than “civilian” employees. As a reward, “patriotic” employers who 
“took back former workers seeking reemployment after being discharged from the military 
received a ‘War and Navy Department Citation’” (Ford, 2012: 132).
Another central motivation to assist returning soldiers included the fear of Bolshevism, in 
which state-assisted integration was seen as “the key to locking out radicalism” (Ford, 2012: 
125). As the chapter will demonstrate, beyond the “moral” reason for the state assistance of 
veterans for their perceived sacrifice, a key motivation for states to support veterans is connected
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to a fear that returning soldiers may pose a security threat to the state, should they find 
themselves marginalinised economically and otherwise. Ford (2012: 125) quotes a US General 
who defined returning soldiers as “potential reds”, because many of them “sick, physically and 
mentally, and waiting with nothing to do and finding on every hand radical orators only too 
willing to sow seeds of discontentment”. In this regard, state support for former soldiers, the 
General noted further, meant “industrial peace to our country” (Ford, 2012: 131). The view was 
that “former soldiers -  low in rank, poorly educated, and accustomed to obeying orders -  some 
argued, had lost the capacity to think for themselves” (Gerber, 1994: 547). Putting pressure for 
support for WWII veterans, Eleanor Roosevelt warned that marginalised veterans represented a 
potential “dangerous pressure in our midst” (cited in Elder, 1987: 460). Writing about the 
civilian integration of disabled veterans after WWII, Gerber (1994: 546) argues similarly that 
there is a “divided consciousness” in the public perception of veterans:
on the one hand, the veteran’s heroism and sacrifices are celebrated and 
memorialised and debts of gratitude, both symbolic and material, are paid to 
him. On the other hand, the veteran also inspires anxiety and fear and is seen as 
a threat to social order and political stability. The second, less officially 
acknowledged response is based on a plausible, though greatly exaggerated 
projection: remove young men from the restraining influences of educational 
institutions, employment, and family; provide them with advanced weapons 
training, and send them off on a violent adventure; expose their minds and 
bodies to horrific injuries; and then attempt to return them speedily to the life 
they had previously known, and you have a prescription for individual and social 
chaos.
It is the perception that that “a significant portion of the early Nazi cohort” was formed 
by “bitter, unreflective men”, who fought for Germany in WWI (Gerber, 1994: 547). Bessell 
(1988: 29) contests this claim about the German ex-soldiers, arguing that employers in Germany 
“made great efforts to comply with demobilisation decrees stipulating that ex-soldiers be offered 
their old jobs back. And it appears that most of the returning veterans were able to find work 
rather quickly”.
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The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (informally known as the G.I. Bill), 
represents the most extensive state policy in US veteran policy history. The G.I. Bill was directed 
towards the needs of returning sixteen million veterans from World War II and their dependants. 
The Bill’s definition of a veteran was a “person who served in the active military, naval, or air 
services, and who was discharged or released therefore under conditions other than dishonorable 
[sic]” (Moulta-Ali, 2014: 2). It is also important to note that in the US, the veteran “does not 
have to have served in an actual combat zone, but during the specified periods of war serving 
ninety consecutive days, of which one day occurred during a period designated as war time” 
(Moulta-Ali, 2014: 2). Amongst the varied benefits for veterans, the G.I. Bill covered education 
benefits which included full tuition and living expenses, low-cost mortgages, loans to start 
businesses, and one-year unemployment compensation payment (Boulton, 2012). Boulton 
(2012: 244) argues that the 1944 G.I. Bill “made World War II veterans among the most 
rewarded of any sent into the field”.
Both Skocpol (1992) and Mettler (2012) point to the fact that the public support for war 
veterans has also played a unique role in American history in the ways in which early veterans 
policies that were implemented at the height of institutionalised social division in terms of race 
and gender, played a unique role of extending these benefits to groups with limited civil rights, 
such as African American veterans. In this regard, African American “veteran status served as an 
opening wedge for rights, helping to give momentum to the civil rights movement” (Mettler, 
2012: xii). Writing about African American WWI veterans, Keene (2012) demonstrates that 
although these veterans were meant to benefit, like their white counterparts, in the economic and 
social programs due to ex-soldiers, they did face difficulty in accessing the benefits such as fair 
treatment in hospitals where veterans could access healthcare for free, access to colleges, 
vocational training, and more importantly, being able to secure employment, where businesses 
that were willing to follow the pressure of the War Department to employ veterans were often 
unwilling to employ African Americans. Keene (2012: 150) points to the extent to which the 
state, under pressure from civil rights groups, was pushed to address issues faced by African 
American veterans in accessing benefits in a highly segregated society, “with the number of 
black veterans mounting, federal employment agencies contacted thousands of firms with letters, 
telephone calls, and personal visits urging them to employ black ex-servicemen.” In this context, 
Keene (2012: 166) concludes that “rather than viewing [black veterans] as a special group with
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unique problems to overcome, the civil rights movement linked the disabled veteran struggle to 
the obstacles that every person of color [sic] faced in the United States”. It is in this regard that 
Mettler (2012) argues that policy provisions made for veterans in the United States provided an 
opening to challenge the state to expand citizenship rights in terms of race, class, gender, and 
more recently, sexuality, with the 2011 repeal of the so-called ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy, 
devised as a formal denial of homosexualilty amongst members of the military. In this regard, 
the evolution of veteran’s discourses is shaped by context. The cases from several African 
countries demonstrate unique demobilisation processes that resemble the local contexts of war. 
This thesis argues that the South African demobilisation process ought to have reflected its 
context in determining the criteria of those who could participate in the process.
It is also important to note that the treatment of veterans in US history is also informed by 
the public perception of each war, in terms of it being seen as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ war, respectively. 
Boulton (2012: 242) notes that while the G.I. Bill of 1944 received much public support, and was 
“revered as a fitting tribute from a grateful public to the nation’s men who had gallantly set off 
the dark forces of European fascism and Japanese militarism”, the G.I. Bill of 1966, which aimed 
to address the needs of the veterans of the Vietnam War, was not as enthusiastically supported or 
generous in the benefits it offered to veterans. Seen as a ‘bad war’, the G.I. Bill of 1966, 
“provided scant reward for soldiers sent to fight in a cause that many American people -  and 
some of the soldiers themselves -  had come to question by the early 1970s” (Boulton, 2012: 
242). A key point of protest against the 1966 Bill was the equal treatment of soldiers who had 
served in combat, to those who had served at home during the war, as well as the lowering of 
educational benefits compared to those of the 1944 Bill.
In Rats and Resentment: the Demobilization o f the Red Army in Postwar Leningrad, 1945 
-  50, Dale (2010: 115) points out that the demobilisation of “eight and a half million soldiers by 
end of 1948” in Russia was fraught with tensions connected to the public perception that 
veterans were “a privileged stratum of society”. The return of soldiers to a Leningrad that had 
been severely destroyed by the war, made it difficult to frame the needs of the ex-soldiers as 
much more important than those of other citizens whose livehoods had been destroyed during the 
war. Dale (2010: 122) argues that although Soviet propaganda went to great lengths to portray 
the civilian integration as successful, many former soldiers “were deeply resentful of the
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treatment during and after demobilisation”. For one thing, many soldiers had to wait months and 
sometimes years in military units before being released. Furthermore, upon integration, the 
veterans found navigating the bureaucracy required in order to access “work, housing, food, 
clothing pensions and healthcare required seemingly endless form-filling” (Dale, 2010: 124).
The section below shows that post-war demobilisation in Africa differs markedly from 
the US, and some European experiences, as the participants in the process include both 
conventional and unconventional combatants. Muggah and O’Donnell’s (2015) first wave, 
second generation and next generation DDR have been highly influenced by African cases of 
demobilisation, which now has important implications for future demobilisation processes in 
countries such as Syria and Libya.
3.3 DDR in Africa
The conception of demobilisation processes in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa is shaped by 
the above-mentioned global debates about the place of veterans in postwar societies, in particular 
the periods following the two world wars of the twentieth century. The civil war cases largely 
seen in Africa and Latin America reshape the conception of demobilisation in dramatic ways, 
because the majority of the fighting forces belong within the same state that had opposed each 
other in the war. This stands in contrast to the cases of inter-state war, where the soldiers that are 
demobilised fought on opposing sides. In the context of intra-state conflict, the process of 
disarming, demobilising and integrating combatants into either civilian society or security 
institutions such as the military or police, “forms part of peace negotiations” as part of “a wider 
peace settlement” (Cilliers, 1995:4). The discourse on the civilian integration of former 
combatants in Africa is similar to experiences in Europe and North America, where there seems 
to be a general “agreement that ex-combatants are a key target group for preferential state 
assistance to facilitate their reintegration into sustainable civilian post-war livelihoods” (Dzinesa, 
2009). As Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) have recently noted, “no fewer than 60 separate DDR 
initiatives were fielded around the world since the late 1980s” (p. 2). They note further that these 
programmes “are not reserved to Sub-Saharan Africa alone, but span the Americas, North Africa 
and the Middle East, South and Eastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia, and the South 
Pacific” (p. 2). And indeed,
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Most of these programs [sic] were originally designed and implemented in the 
wake of violent international and civil wars. These armed conflicts tended to end 
following the definitive victory of one of the parties, or as part of an 
internationally mandated peace support operation. By the late 1990s, DDR 
assumed a kind of orthodoxy in the peace, security and development 
communities, especially amongst representatives of the United Nations agencies, 
the World Bank and a number of bilateral aid agencies (Muggah and O’Donnell,
2015: 2).
The 1993 seven-country case study by the World Bank (encompassing Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Uganda, Chad, and one non-African country, Nicaragua) was 
amongst the earliest studies exposing the potential security dangers of not assisting ex­
combatants into civilian life, especially those with limited education and professional skills. The 
study concluded that “the success of demobilisation and reintegration programmes appears to be 
tightly linked to the specific political, economic and security climate faced by each of the 
countries studied” (World Bank, 1995: 24). Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) argue that even 
though this study emphasised the importance of context, the “modus operandi” of these 
processes was “comparatively straightforward” in the sense that “whether soldiers or rebels, it 
was generally clear who was eligible for reinsertion and reintegration assistance (and who was 
not)” (p. 2).
In the case of Zimbabwe, Musemwa (1995) argues that a neglected vulnerable sector of 
veterans can easily become a serious political problem. The increasing militant protests of 
Zimbabwe’s veterans, noted since the early 1990s, and further illustrated by their violent 
participation in the land reform programme, the 2000 parliamentary elections and presidential 
elections have been noted by a number of authors to have greatly contributed to Zimbabwe’s 
economic and political collapse (as noted in Sachikonye 2002; Rupiya 2003; Dzinesa 2007; 
Chitiyo 2009). In the case of Namibia, Metsola (2006:1120) notes that “ex-combatants have been 
seen as both as heroes and as a threat”. The making of the nation’s People’s Liberation Army 
(PLAN) following Namibia’s independence from South Africa included fighting forces from the 
SWAPO estimated at 50 000 including returnees, the South West African Territorial Force 
(SWATF) estimated at 25 000 and a paramilitary police unit, Koevoet, SWATF and Koevoet
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(both had been creations of the South African apartheid state security forces who fought against 
SWAPO) (Metsola, 2006). The new army and police absorbed 10 000 ex-combatants, while the 
rest were to be integrated into civilian life. As in the cases outlined above, Metsola (2006: 1123) 
argues that in Namibia, too, that state assisted integration has been framed as a “moral issue at 
the centre of the nation’s historical identity”. As elsewhere, Metsola (2006: 1123 - 1124) sees the 
nationalist rhetoric on veterans as both “a form of recognition and containment” in the sense that 
the recognition also limits the agency of ex-combatants because, in the end, “the only form of 
agency that ex-combatants have is that of potential social disruption if left on their own”.
Metsola (2006) also discusses how the category of “veteran” has expanded from “only 
those who had actually been waging war” to also include “all unemployed former exiles” as 
beneficiaries. This expansion of veteran benefits “brought more gender balance to reintegration, 
as the exile division of labour placed women mainly in supportive functions and not in actual 
combat” (Metsola, 2006: 1129). As noted in the previous chapter, the Namibian 2008 Veterans 
Act (cited in Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013: 33) defines veteran as “any person who was a 
member of the liberation forces who consistently and persistently participated or engaged in any 
political, diplomatic or underground activity in furtherance of the liberation struggle, or was 
arrested for such activities.” Moreover, the author argues that the framing of veterans as rights 
bearing citizens with special claims to the state, in a context of pervasive poverty, ‘veterans 
issues’ have become “objects of competition and a means of securing political influence”, which 
plays itself out in the interplay between “personalized [sic] and bureaucratic power” seen in the 
convergence between state capacity and patronage politics (Metsola, 2006: 1130). In the end, this 
form of inclusion and exclusion has broader consequences for those excluded from accessing 
public goods due to a lack of a particular claim to liberation history.
Grouped together with El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia and Mozambique, South Africa 
is placed amongst the “first wave” of DDR experiments by Muggah and O’Donnell (2015: 3). At 
the bare minimum, they argue that the processes “contributed to preventing the recurrence of 
armed conflict” (p. 3).
The cases of Liberia and South Sudan fit into the category that Muggah and O’Donnell 
(2015) describe as “second wave generation DDR” (p. 3). The point is that DDR processes have 
evolved from being a peacekeeping component with short term goals, to forming an instrumental
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part of a peace building process, explicit in the UN’s 2006 Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) 
framework. As Munive (2013) points out, “DDR is, in fact, the largest intervention in nearly all 
of the UN’s on-going large-scale peacekeeping missions and it is ascribed key importance as the 
area in which peace building makes a direct contribution to restoring public security, law and 
order” (p. 587). Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) argue that by the late 1990s to early 2000s:
The second wave of DDR programs [sic] were especially common following the 
wars in West and Central Africa, the Balkans and Southeast Asia. Many of these 
settings were experiencing rolling internal conflicts, where soldiers, rebels and 
civilians were conflated during wars, but also in their aftermath. The lines 
between what constituted a ‘combatant’ and ‘civilian’ were increasingly blurred, 
with implications for how to construct a fair and durable post-conflict peace 
settlement. (Muggah and O’Donell, 2015: 3).
In Liberia, a country that experienced 14 years of one of the most deadly civil wars, the 
2003 DDR programme led by the United National Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), demobilised 
101, 495 ex-combatants by 2005 (Jaye, 2009). Of this number, 10, 972 of the demobilised and 
disarmed were children associated with the various fighting forces, where of this number, 8, 532 
were boys and 2, 440 were girls. In this process, women as a category, constituted 22, 370 of the 
demobilised, including the numbers of demobilised young girls.
Jairo Munive, in Context Matters: The Conventional DDR Template is Challenged in 
South Sudan (2013), reiterates that despite the multiple and complex dynamics that inform intra­
state wars, a “central assumption in DDR programmes is that combatants can be distinguished 
from civilians in a straightforward manner during the disarmament phase” (p. 588). In this 
regard, DDR programmes “centre around the identification and verification of combatants” 
(Munive, 2013: 588, emphasis original). The settlement of the 21-years-long war between the 
South and North Sudan goes well beyond the fighting between the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) and the Khartoum government under Omar al-Bashir. Although the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan 
(GoS), by 2005, “there were no fewer than 18 so-called ‘other armed groups’ (OAG) in the 
South that were not party to the agreement” (Munive, 2013: 590). After all, as Arnold (2007) 
argues, “the sad truth of the second Sudanese civil war in the south is that the war was largely
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fought between southerners...the war has often been described as ‘civil wars within civil war’” 
(p. 492).
Arnold and Alden (2007) write about one of the OAGs, the White Army Militia, which 
they describe as “grouping of armed civilians, mostly youth, which during the course of the long 
civil war, notably during the 1990s, coalesced into village-level formations” that were active in 
the Upper Nile and Jonglei states, even after the signing of the CPA. The UN estimated that the 
members of the White Army Militia were between 20-30 000 (Arnold and Alden, 2007). They 
show that due to long-standing hostilities between the SPLA and the White Militia, the SPLA 
could not single-handedly be made responsible for demobilising members of this group as there 
was no trust between them. Rather, the successful demobilisation process in eastern Jonglei was 
due to the participation of multiple actors, mostly the encouragement of the community, NGOs 
and the UN’s symbolic presence (Arnold and Alden, 2007). One of the major tasks of the DDR 
process in South Sudan was to unite all these different and competing forces into one army. For 
the SPLA, this meant removing some of its long-serving members in order to make room for 
members of enemy structures, such as the GoS aligned South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). 
Munive (2013) argues that due to the continued fragility of conditions in the South in terms of 
the recurring violence, neither of the parties had the incentive to reduce their military 
capabilities. Arnold (2007) writes that the SSDF continued to operate as “a standing armed force 
until the 2011 referendum’s outcomes were known” due to its mistrust of the SPLA (p. 497). As 
a result, out of an estimated number of 90 000 targeted ex-combatants, from 2009-2012, only 
12,525 ex-combatants had been demobilised (Munive, 2013: 593).
Using the case of the DDR programme in Torit State, the state from which the civil war 
started in 1983 between the SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as an example of the 
complexities of defining the combatant and civilian in a decades-long civil war, Munive (2013) 
shows that the programme managers had difficulty making the distinction, and thus gave power 
to the SPLA commanders to identify combatants. In this vein, commanders were noted to include 
their family members and relatives of deceased SPLA members who were known to them 
personally. Munive (2013) argues that the Sudanese case challenges the notion that former 
combatants have special needs compared to the rest of their community. In this regard, Munive 
(2013) argues that “on the ground it seems difficult to disaggregate the reintegration needs of ex­
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combatants or special needs groups from the general needs of the population” (p. 598). It seems 
that women and young people became the biggest beneficiaries of this DDR participation, by 
proxy.
Thus, the South Sudan demobilisation process represents the complexities of a long war 
with multiple protagonists that needed to be included in the process for the country to have a 
chance at peace. The involvement of multiple fighting forces and multiple combatants reflected 
the nuances of the war itself. In this regard, due to the “unorthodox” nature of intra-state warfare, 
the demobilisation processes in Africa differ markedly in terms of the individuals who 
participate in them, compared to those in Europe and North America whose core criteria for 
inclusion in demobilisation processes is a formal membership in the state’s military, whether in 
war or peace time. Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) argue that the next generation of DDR will 
even be “more all-encompassing than its predecessors”, because unlike other DDR processes, it 
takes place while the conflict is still underway (p. 5). Making examples of Somalia and Libya, 
they argue that new generation DDR is beginning to precede the peace process, and is “also 
targeting groups that may not be explicit parties to an eventual peace agreement”, which is the 
case with transnational rebel and terrorist groups (p. 5). The context of ISIL in the wars in Syria 
and Iraq imposes new conditions for future demobilisation processes. The section below on 
gender and demobilisation demonstrates that even though the women and girls participating in 
state and armed non-state formations have largely been formally recognised in demobilisation 
processes, the implementation of such processes have been implemented in gender-blind 
frameworks, and in many cases, have been revealed to respond more urgently to the “threat” of 
male ex-combatants. More broadly, demobilisation processes have also made visible the extent 
to which, in the aftermath of war, women who participated in fighting forces face pressure to 
undermine their combat history, in order to return to the private sphere, thereby foregoing the 
symbolic and material benefits that veterans stand to access in postwar society.
3.4 Women and DDR
What happens to a liberation army or guerilla force after the war, if it 
manages to topple the old state? Does the revolutionary ‘post-war’ era deal 
with gender any differently to conventional ‘post-war’ eras? Is the 
demobilisation of women an integral part of post-war transformation? In
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state-building, state defending process, do women lose the status they 
enjoyed during the war of liberation?
(Enloe, 1983:160 emphasis original)
In Heroes and Misfits: The Troubled Social Reintegration o f Disabled Veterans in The Best 
Years o f Our Lives (1994: 550), Gerber notes that in the aftermath of WWII in the US, beyond 
the extensive hand of the 1944 G.I. Bill, the state went to great efforts to frame the civilian 
integration of returning soldiers as the “restoration of the status quo antebellum in gender 
relations”. Gerber (1994) notes that in the absence of men, participating in the battlefront in 
Europe, many (white) American women, who had previously not worked, became confident and 
self-sufficient through wartime employment. But, in the aftermath, (white) women were placed 
under pressure “to give up their employment and their independence and to devote themselves to 
the domestication of the returning men” (p. 550).
Feminist literature on demobilisation also shows that women face social pressure to 
undermine their combatant status. This is because there is a tendency to sideline female ex­
combatants in the aftermath of wars, as “again ‘soldier’ comes to mean male, and unemployed 
soldiers are seen to take precedence over married women (even where they are ex-soldiers 
themselves, or war widows and heads of households)”. Mazurana (2004) argues that the numbers 
of women and girls within all fighting forces are routinely underestimated. This occurs in part 
because heavy emphasis on their roles as “wives,” “sexual slaves” and “camp-followers” 
obscures the multiple and diverse roles they play in conflict. According to Mazurana, Raven- 
Roberts and Parpat (2005: 2-3) women are “largely absent at the peace tables and levels of 
decision making within foreign affairs, defence, or international relations bodies”; this despite 
the evidence of increasing numbers of women who have fought in conflicts such as Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, East Timor, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, 
South Africa, Sierra Leone, Sudan and elsewhere.
In the case of Zimbabwe, Lyons’ in Guns and guerilla girls: women in the Zimbabwe 
liberation struggle (2004: 229) argues that “most women did not benefit from post-independence 
rehabilitation programs [sic] designed to integrate women ex-combatants into society”. Instead, 
women were often “labeled as prostitutes and thus not deserving of demobilization (sic) pay-
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outs” (Lyons 2004: xxi). Musemwa (cited in Lyons, 2004: 223- 224) also noted that “while ex­
combatants generally faced problems of rehabilitation, female ex-combatants faced problems 
associated with conservative traditional customary belief about the social and marital position of 
women in Shona society”. Many of the female ex-combatants found social reintegration into 
civilian life particularly difficult, as they were seen by their communities as “too strong to be a 
female” and “too independent, rough, ill-educated and unfeminine to be good wives” (Musemwa 
quoted in Lyons, 2004: 223- 224).
In her comparative study between women’s post-war constructions in the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELPF) and the SPLA in South Sudan, Weber (2011) argues that there is a need 
to interrogate the “trope of the fighter as highly gendered construction of perfomative images of 
masculinity, accessible to men, but with restrictions for women and idealized [sic] fighter as the 
imagined core identity blueprint for post-conflict citizenship” (p. 359). She argues that although 
women composed 40% of the fighting force in the ELPF which had an explicit ideological goal 
of social, economic and political reform, yet in the aftermath
“The admiration, support, and legitimization [sic] of female fighters, of women 
in arms was quickly devalued after demobilization [sic]. The emergency phase 
of war was over, now the reconstruction of state and society needed women to 
become normal, feminine, obedient members of society again, so that the society 
would not feel alienated and would continue to support the struggle despite 
hardships” (Weber, 2011: 363).
Weber (2011) further points to the high rates of divorces between the “male and female 
fighters in post-war Eritrea, with the men marrying non-fighter women instead” as an example of 
the “retraditionalisation” of society in post-war societies, which places pressure women to 
perform a specific kind of femininity (p. 361). With regards to the SPLA, she notes that social 
transformation during the war did not encompass an important component of the SPLA, as they 
were more concerned with winning “territory than hearts and minds” (p. 361). Women composed 
only 7% of the SPLA, and in the aftermath of the signing of the CPA, “hardly any women are 
listed on the SPLA payroll and therefore eligible for a proper DDR package, a pension, or 
continued employment in the armed forces” (Weber, 2011: 362). Furthermore, while women’s
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role as “mothers and helpers is applauded...their active role involvement in the struggle goes 
unrecognized [sic]” (p. 363).
In the DRC, Baaz and Stern (2011) argue that the DDR process privileged “only 
combatants carrying a gun [to] qualify for this process” (p. 569). They point out that
Since many of the women in the armed groups do not possess a firearm of their 
own (often sharing with others, or performing duties other than active combat), 
they have been largely ‘auto-demobilized’ [sic] and do not reach the 
DDR/military intergration centres at all, or leave them without completing the 
DDR process. Moreover, many commanders also do not consider women as real 
combatants and have not encouraged/brought them with them in the process 
(assuming that many women in the ranks would not enhance their status and 
power within the new military structure). Hence, the ways in which the 
processes of military integration and DDR have been designed have resulted in a 
steady decrease of women’s participation in the armed forces (Baaz and Stern,
2011: 559).
In Liberia, although provisions were made for female ex-combatants such as “separate 
care centres in cantonment sites, reproductive health, counseling and training on women’s rights 
and sexual training support”, and apart from transport issues and other logistical challenges, “it 
became apparent that women combatants were not showing up” at the sites were former 
combatants were assembled, because “for these women, the risk of exposing their links with 
rebel groups presented a security risk which no sum of money could compensate” (Clarke, 2008: 
62). Jaye (2009: 16), however, notes that when some young female combatants show up at these 
sites, they sold themselves as prostitutes “because of the perception that there are no other 
options for survival”. Halim (1998: 96) notes that the “change of the role of the men from 
breadwinner to a combatant entitles him to more rights”, while the “change of the role of the 
woman from a housewife and mother to a combatant causes further decline in her status”.
In the case of female combatants in Angola, Farr (2003: 31) argues that the exclusionary 
nature of the demobilisation process was “as if women [had] been completely forgotten”. Shikola 
(1998), writing about the life of a demobilised female ex-combatant in Namibia, also points to 
the unique conditions that women face when reintegrating into society, especially women who
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return from combat with children, who are often fathered by different fathers during the war. 
Women are socially ostracised for returning with children with different fathers, and also face 
the challenge of providing economically for their children.
Feminists have argued that the invisibility of women’s role in military discourses in IR 
has contributed to the privileging of the needs of male ex-combatants in postwar adjustment 
interventions (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). The cases above demonstrate the need for 
states to expand DDR programmes to reflect the actual dynamics of the conflict context.
The next section considers the South African case, with its gendered dynamics of 
demobilisation. It shows that in South Africa, the context of demobilisation did not depart from 
these international trends, as discussed above. Like in other countries, the narrative of ex­
combatants, as both heroes and potential security threats, is visible in South African discourse on 
the success and challenges of demobilisation. South African (male) ex-combatants have been 
accused of participating in armed robberies, as well as participating in various wars in and 
outside Africa, as mercenaries. This section shows that the literature on the demobilised ex­
combatant offers little details on the wellbeing of the demobilised female ex-combatant.
3.5 South African demobilisation process
3.5.1 The formation of the SANDF
Following the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990 and the announcement of the end 
of the armed struggle, and the negotiations between the National Party and the liberation 
movements, military negotiations occurred parallel the political negotiations. As part of the 
Multi-Party Negotiating Forum of 1992 and 1993 between the NP government and the liberation 
movements, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was guided by the TEC Act of 
September 1993, “whose task was to oversee the process of transition”, sub-councils for different 
state sectors were formed in order to manage and direct the manner in which these institutions 
would be reformed to accommodate the needs of the would-be democratic and inclusive state 
(Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 112). There was the Intelligence, the Law Sub-Council and the 
Defence Sub-Council, all charged with managing “managing security issues during the 
transitional phase” (Mokolobe, 2001: 63). The Sub-Council on Defence was tasked with 
overseeing the “military transition process at the political level” by planning and outlining the
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“integration of all armed formations represented at the negotiations” with a view to designing a 
“military for South Africa that would be affordable, effective and legitimate” (Motumi and 
Hudson, 1995: 113). The committee responsible for handling the details of military integration 
was the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC), consisted of representatives from all 
the participating armed forces, statutory and non-statutory.
Those defined as the statutory forces included the “SADF and the armed forces of the 
nominally independent homelands of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei 
(TBVC)”, while the non-statutory forces composed of MK and APLA (Motumi and Hudson, 
1995: 113). As noted by Motumi and Hudson (1995: 113), APLA “only joined the negotiations 
towards their conclusion, shortly before the April 1994 elections, whilst the IFP did not form part 
of the military negotiations, although the IFP has argued that it has a list of 6000 persons who 
should be eligible for integration into the SANDF”. It is also worth noting that even the initial 
informal military negotiations that took place at the ANC 1990 Lusaka Conference only involved 
the stated parties, MK, SADF, and TBVC army officers (Mokolobe, 2001: 62).
The first step to implementing the integration of the defence force and demobilisation, 
between 1993 and 1994, involved statutory and non-statutory forces being requested to “submit a 
list of their personnel to a centralized [sic] list called the Certified Personal Register (CPR), 
which was administered by the Department of Defence” (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 12). The 
new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) “subsequently came into existence at 
midnight on 26/27 April 1994” (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 114). Members forming the new 
SANDF were all the personnel of the identified forces who, “in terms of the TEC Act”, had 
submitted a CPR, thus, by midnight on 27 April, “automatically became members of the new 
force” (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 114).
As noted by Van der Merwe and Lamb (2009: 10) the “CPR-based SANDF integration 
and demobilised process was integral in defining who constitutes South African “ex­
combatants”. Amongst those excluded were the paramilitary formations that operated inside 
South African townships, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party’s (FP) Self Protection Units and the 
SDUs (Gear 2004; Mashike, 2007; Cherry 2011). There is a view held by some members of 
these groups that they ought to have been offered the opportunity to disarm, integrate and 
demobilise. These same formations are excluded again by the 2011 Veterans Act.
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Following the completion of the CPR list, the integration process was composed of four 
other stages (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 13; and Mokalobe, 2001:74):
1. former combatants were regionally mustered and then assembled at certain military 
bases (that is, at Wallmansthal, Hoedspruit and De Brug);
2. then appearing before a placement board that consisted of different armed forces and 
the British Military Training Team (BMATT), where those without formal military 
training or sufficient military qualifications did not undergo integration, and were 
released from the military; where
3. if required, former combatants were provided with bridging training and orientation; 
and
4. were placed in different arms of service.
According to Mokalobe (2001: 74), “there were eight intakes of former MK combatants 
and a few former APLA female combatants” who were received in Wallmansthal and Hoedspruit 
between 1994 and 1995, while “in the De Brug Base, there were five intakes of former APLA 
combatants”. The final mass intake was in April 1997, when 721 former combatants were 
integrated into Wallmansthal Base. Overall, about 11 727 former MK combatants and 4 901 
former APLA combatants were integrated as uniformed members of the SANDF (Mokalobe, 
2001:75). It was reported that “more than 2 000 [sic] MK and APLA soldiers who reported for 
integration were excluded from the SANDF because their names had not appeared on the CPR” 
(Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 14). At certain points in time, ex-combatants also left military 
bases to protest, and there were strikes that took places in Durban and Cape Town due to 
disgruntlement with the integration process, which compelled President Nelson Mandela to offer 
symbolic guarantee that the former combatants would be addressed (Mashike and Mokalobe, 
2003).
According to Motumi and Hudson (1995, 114, also cited in Motumi and Mckenzie 1998; 
Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van der 
Merwe and Lamb 2009; Heinecken and Bwalya 2013; Lamb 2013), the numerical breakdown of 
those registered in the CPR list was as follows:
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T ab le  O ne: T h e con ten t o f  th e certified  p erson n el reg ister
Armed Force No.
Statutory forces
Former SADF (excluding part-time forces) 90 000
Former TBVC defence forces 11 039
Subtotal 101 039
Non-statutory forces
MK 27 801
MK Non Formal CPR 1 087
APLA Name List 6 000
Subtotal 34 888
GRAND TOTAL 135 927
It is noted that BMATT was invited to assist in the integration because the British government 
had assisted in similar process in other countries in the region, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Motumi 
and Hudson, 1995). The role of BMATT was to:
-  assess the criteria against which individuals are to be evaluated prior to placement in the 
SANDF;
-  certify the agreed upon criteria before evaluation and screening test;
-  observe and oversee the screening done by the evaluation teams made up of 
representatives from the constituent forces of the SANDF;
-  evaluate SANDF training in relation to international standards and to make 
recommendations on improvements where necessary;
-  assist in evaluating an individual’s competency and qualifications;
-  advise on the type and nature of bridging and orientation training, as well as any other 
training assistance required; and
-  adjudicate where necessary the ranking and placing of members of the constituent forces
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(cited in Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 118).
Furthermore, as part of integration, individual participants were required to “submit proof 
of educational (and or military) qualifications for eligibility as members of the SANDF” 
(Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 118). The members who did not posses these qualifications were 
then required to undertake assessments tests designed to measure potential on a scale of 
Categories 1 to 10. Those whose assessments was in the Categories 1-3 did not qualify for 
acceptance into the new SANDF, while Categories 4-6 were accepted if they demonstrated a 
potential to become non-commissioned officers, whilst those who qualified for Categories 7-10 
qualified to be accepted as officers (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 119). In terms of placement, 
candidates were either assigned to join the army, the corps such the artillery, technical assistance 
(mustering), or receive rank e.g. rank of sergeant placement was determined by a board that 
composed of representatives from statutory and non-statutory forces and BMATT (Motumi and 
Hudson, 1995: 119). The Demobilisation Act of 1996 also made provision to extend 
demobilisation to former combatants who chose not to integrate into the SANDF due to 
dissatisfaction with rank placement, or choose not to continue due to age, health, or education.
Some of the major criticism pointed to the integration process with regards to the state’s 
disregard of reports of racial tensions between members of the former SADF and those of MK 
and APLA. For one, former combatants were resentful of the fact that it was only them who had 
to undergo the Potential Tests and orientation into professional military training, most of which 
was administered by former SADF members “who sometimes behaved with prejudice towards 
former MK and APLA combatants” (Mokalobe, 2001: 76). Combatants also had complaints 
about the ranking system itself, which they felt that many deserving combatants were placed in 
much lower rankings than they deserved, where, as a result, many of them chose demobilisation. 
It is also important to note that “instead of enlisting in the SANDF, some combatants chose to 
join the South African Police Service or other government departments” (Rupiya, 2003: 264).
Even BMATT reported to the state that during the integration process, warning that 
“attitudes had hardened” among SADF members towards their new MK and APLA colleagues 
and went on to state that these tensions may have “far-reaching” implications (cited in Mashike 
and Mokalobe, 2003: 15). One of the incidences that shone light to the gravity of difficult 
relationships within the new force happened on the 9th of September 1999, when Lieutenant
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Sibusiso Madubela shot dead six white SANDF members, including a white civilian woman at 
the Tempe Military Training base in Bloemfontein (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 15). Other 
shootings also took place at the Phalaborwa 7 SA Infantry Battalion, where a platoon 
commander, Lieutenant Harry Ntoagae, shot and killed his white senior colleague; and in 
Simon’s Town Naval Base in Cape Town, where a junior black officer, Wiseman Mchunu, shot 
dead his white colleague (Mokalobe, 2001: 79).
For Motumi and Hudson (1995: 119), the integration process succeeded in “identifying 
former non-statutory force members who qualify for acceptance into the SANDF and those who 
do not”, while it has been “less impressive in catering adequately for the needs of those who do 
not meet the requirements for entry into the military, nor has it catered in terms of 
demobilization [sic], for those who are acceptable to the SANDF but refused the offer of 
employment made by the SANDF.”
3.5.2 Demobilisation and reintegration
The Demobilisation Act of 1996 also made provision to extend demobilisation to former 
combatants who chose not to integrate into the SANDF due to dissatisfaction with rank 
placement, or choose not to continue due to age, health, or education. Joe Modise, the first post­
apartheid Minister of Defence, announced the demobilisation process for non-statutory forces on 
21 August 1995, after months of delays, due to the inability of the leadership to decide on how to 
manage this process (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 120). The Act defines demobilisation as “the 
disbanding of members of the former non-statutory forces, who do not enter into agreements for 
temporary or permanent appointment with the South African Defence Force” (Demobisation Act, 
1996). It further defines “non-statutory forces” as the “armed forces not established by any law 
and known or formerly known as the Azanian People’s Liberation Army and uMkhonto we 
Sizwe”. 2
The process involved the provision of a once-off gratuity to a member depending on their 
years of service in MK and APLA. A total of 3 770 soldiers were formally demobilised from the 
SANDF (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 14). The gratuity was divided as follows (cited in 
Motumi and Hudson, 1995:120):
2 Demobilisation Act 27 November 1996, available from: http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/da1996154.pdf
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T ab le  T w o: G ratu ity  for d em o b ilised  com b atan ts
Group Period of Service Years of service Amount
One 1 January 1961 to 31 December 1972 22-23 years R42, 058 (US $11, 
491)
Two 1 January 1973 to 31 December 1976 18-21 years R34, 313 (US $9, 375)
Three 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1982 12-17 years R28, 721 (US $7, 847)
Four 1 January 1983 to 31 December 1989 5-11 years R20, 201 (US $5, 519
Five 1 January 1990 to 26 March 1994 0-4 years R12, 734 (US $3, 479)
Furthermore, the state announced that members who qualified for the once-off gratuity 
pay-out, referring to the members who were disqualified from integration who belonged to the 
Categories 1-3; those who were medically unfit to join the SANDF; and “the vulnerable” and the 
“veterans”, who were too old to join the new defence force, also qualified to receive the monthly 
special pensions. The Special Pensions Act of 1996, passed in terms of Section 189 of the South 
Africa’s Interim Constitution, identifies the beneficiary as:
a) persons who made sacrifices or who have served the public interest in 
establishing a democratic constitutional order, including members of any armed 
or military force not established by or under any law and which is under the 
authority and control of, or associated with and promotes the objectives of, a 
political organization; or
b) dependants of such persons
The allocation of the Special Pension funds is a sensitive issue, as many applications 
have not benefitted from the provision. According to the report by the Minister of Finance to the 
Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans, “of 2 000 [sic] applicants, only 2 000 
[sic] have been approved and a great deal of controversy remains in terms of how this is 
administered” (Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013: 35).
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The state also offered the Service Corps to individuals who were being demobilized, 
which was composed of 18 months of skills training, conversion course, and career profiling 
(Gear, 2002). The 18 months was divided into three months of literacy training and adult life 
skills training, three months of vocational training, which was facilitated by the Department of 
Labour, and 12 months of practical experience (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 123). Very few of 
the thousands of the demobilised members took the opportunity to join the Service Corps. The 
Corps were criticised for failing to conduct adequate research to identify the needs and 
aspirations of the demobilized, and instead choosing to offer a blanket approach to the menu of 
skills that were offered (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 124). The state also offered participants just 
two weeks of personal counselling. In Chapter Five, one of the participants of this study, who 
was part of the conceptualisation of the Service Corps programme, offers a scathing critique of 
what she perceives as the failure of the SANDF to design a programme that responded to the 
socio-economic realities of the South African political economy.
Furthermore, the process of demobilisation, the SANDF “initiated a process of 
downsizing or rationalization [sic] in which it sought to reduce its personnel numbers by an 
additional 20, 000 to a total force of 70, 000” (Lamb, 2013: 11). The process of rationalisation 
entailed voluntary retrenchment or severance packages, combined with Service Corps training. 
According to Lamb (2013: 11; see also Everatt and Jennings 2006), by 2006):
it was estimated that the total ex-combatant population in South Africa was 
80,000.. .however, poor record-keeping by the ANC and PAC of information on 
their combatants, combined with a lack of consensus over the definition of a 
combatant, particularly with regards to non-statutory forces, has made it 
impossible to verify this estimated figure.
In this regard, the politically fragile circumstances of the intergration and 
demobilisation process that were characterised by an atmosphere of mistrust between 
members of the statutory and non-statutory forces, did not allow for easy recording of 
the numbers of the combatant community. Furtheremore, the exclusion of other non­
statutory groups, who are still fighting for legislative recognition, does not make it 
possible to have an empirical and socio-political sense of combatants in South Africa.
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3. 5. 3 L itera tu re  on th e d em o b ilised  S ou th  A fr ica n  ex -com b atan t
There have been several studies conducted on the integration of former combatants into civilian 
life in South Africa since the 1990s, some more substantial than others. The literature includes 
contributions by Cock (1993), Libenberg and Roefs (2001), Mokalobe (2001), Gear (2002), the 
Centre for Conflict Resolution (2003), Everatt et al. (2006), Maringira and Brankovic (2013), 
and Heinecken and Bwalya (2013).
Cock’s 1993 survey study sampled 180 MK ex-combatants during the informal 
demobilisation process during the period of transition, concluding that a majority of ex­
combatants were unemployed due to poor education, lack of skills and experience, and that most 
of them stated that they suffered from psychological problems.
Liebenberg and Roefs’ 2001 questionnaire based study of MK ex-combatants, was a 
sample of 307 all-black, male ex-combatants. In the study, 60% of the respondents had not 
completed their high school education, and more than 60% of respondents were not employed. 
More than 90 percent of the entire sample claimed that the SANDF had not provided them with 
sufficient reintegration assistance. Women comprised 13% of this sample.
The CCR use a representative sample of 410 MK and APLA. The study found that few 
ex-combatants have a matriculation qualification or higher, which makes it difficult for them to 
transition into other sectors of formal employment. This has resulted in the majority of veterans 
remaining unemployed, with little financial capabilities to attain new skills from other sectors. 
Women, who made up 12% of the study population in the CCR study, reported facing additional 
psychological challenges, where apart from exposure to war-related violence, some were the 
victims of sexual abuse by their commanders.
Mokalobe’s 2001 dissertation sampled 35 former MK and APLA combatants, using 
semi-structured interviews (p. 164). The study also shows that “due to inadequate planning and 
implementation of the demobilisation programme, reintegration of former combatants was not 
successful in addressing their human security” (Mokalobe, 2001: 164). Furthermore, the study 
concludes that “although it was expected that the failure to provide for their human security 
would translate into instability, this did not happen. Some former combatants did engage in 
criminal activities, but this did not threaten the stability of South Africa” (Mokalobe, 2001: 164).
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The author does not offer a gender aggregation of the respondents to this study, and only two 
female ex-combatants are cited in the interviews.
Gear’s (2002) study used in-depth interviews and focus groups of former MK, SADF, 
APLA, and Self Defence Unit from Thokoza (SDUs) and Inkatha-aligned Self Protection Units 
(SPUs). With exception of one APLA female ex-combatant, all ex-combatants in the study were 
male. Gear’s study is the only one that includes SDUs and SPUs in its sample under the category 
of “combatant”. Her study notes that difficulties with integration has led many ex-combatants 
turn to crime, or that they experience considerable pressure to do so. Gear (2002: 119) argues 
that mechanisms by the SANDF to assist in civilian integration (through skills training, 
conversion courses and career profiling) are apparently “either inadequate or failing”.
Everatt et al (2006) present a survey of 1, 200 ex-combatants, interestingly, SDUs 
composed the majority of the survey, or 41%, MK 33%, and the rest represented by APLA and 
SPUs. Women composed 21% of the sample, mainly from Azanian National Liberation Army 
(AZANLA), MK and SDUs. The study finds that 80% of the sampled group was unemployed, 
and that many combatants knew of ex-combatants who had engaged in criminal activities to 
make a living. The study also points to a high number of ex-combatants living with HIV/AIDS. 
Like others, the study also points to deep psychological problems faced by former combatants.
In a much smaller study, Maringira and Brankovic (2013: 1- 13) conducted individual life 
histories interviews with 11 APLA former combatants as well as focus groups with 17 APLA ex­
combatants. The all-male sample of 28 participants, points to the prevalence of a “gun 
syndrome” amongst the former combatants, who remained militarized [sic] at both an individual 
and a collective level in post-Apartheid South Africa”.
In another smaller study by Heinecken and Bwalya (2013: 44), composed of focus group 
interviews of 48 participants, 12 MK and 36 APLA, only six were female former combatants. 
The study also paints a picture of destitute veterans, who have a capacity to organise as a 
collective and have capacity to use violence. The authors also point out that ex-combatants who 
lived in exile see themselves as less advantaged than their counterparts inside the country. They 
argue that those who were inside South Africa were able to continue with their education, while 
they had to forsake the pursuit of education when they joined the armed struggle.
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Elsewhere, Cock (2004:5) has noted that there are at least three ways military veterans 
are not contributing to stability:
firstly, a number of the South African mercenaries that are involved in wars in 
the continent are ex-SADF soldiers [particularly in Angola and Sierra Leone and 
even Iraq]; secondly, a number of demobilized [sic] soldiers are now employed 
in private security firms; and thirdly, numerous press reports have pointed out 
that many of the widespread armed robberies in South Africa are being done by 
highly ‘professional’ bandits with military backgrounds.
Despite the concerning picture drawn from these various studies about the marginality of 
combatants, it has taken the government a long time to respond to challenges that are faced by 
combatants.
3.6 Women and demobilisation
None of the major case studies conducted in South Africa since 1994 provide any detailed 
analysis of the plight of the demobilised female soldier. This is despite the fact that even during 
the official integration process “women faced additional integration challenges” as many of the 
“integration sites did not have adequate sanitation and accommodation facilities for women, 
there was a shortage of women’s uniforms and there were a number of allegations from women 
of sexual harassment by their male counterparts”, which might have contributed to even fewer 
women being integrated to the new defence force and thus opting to re-enter civilian life (Van 
der Merwe and Lamb, 2009: 13).
Furthermore, the absence of female ex-combatant participants in these studies does not 
make explicitly clear the intersection between crime and poverty. Since men and women in the 
frontlines received equal military training, are female ex-combatants as likely to be seduced into 
using their military experience for criminal activities when faced with difficulties of civilian life? 
For Mashike and Mokalobe (2003:34),
“the specific ways that poverty and socio-economic insecurity affect them as 
women need to be considered. This will help to properly identify the 
concomitant challenges they generally face with reintegration vis a vis those
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specifically related to women and development in the South African context. 
Generally, in this regard, it cannot be assumed that female former combatants’ 
experiences of poverty, unemployment and access to healthcare, shelter, 
assistance with childcare and other opportunities are the same as for male former 
combatants.”
The South African DDR process reflects a ‘modus operandi’ (Muggah and O’Donnell, 
2015; Baaz and Stern, 2011; Munive, 2013) that involves an assumption about the clear 
distinction between combatants and civilians. The 34 888 members of MK and APLA that 
formally participated in the process do not account for the multitudes of people who fought in the 
armed struggle inside and outside the country. The irony of this process was that those who 
dominated it were the members of the SADF to the exclusion of those who fought against the 
SADF in order to end apartheid. This narrowing of the sense of the word combatant in the DDR 
process contributed to the only small number of women who were able to participate in this 
process. It ought to be noted that this South African case is much different to others in the rest of 
the continent, such as in Liberia and South Sudan, whose respective DDR processes reflected the 
different conventional and unconventional combatants that were foundational to the war.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter traced the DDR process as a fundamental part of post-war reconstruction, with a 
focus on several countries including South Africa. The chapter shows in the aftermath of war, 
combatants are presented as warrior citizens, whom the state is duty bound to support in their 
transition back into post-war life. It has been shown that this duty from the state is also grounded 
in the belief that, if not supported, former combatants have the ability to use their military 
training to undermine the stability of the very states that they served. Importantly, the chapter 
makes visible that even when women participate as combatants in war, their identities as 
combatants is threatened in the aftermath, as there is pressure for them to retreat into private 
space, and not to claim the material and symbolic benefits that are indeed due to them according 
to their legitimate role in the war as combatants, understood more broadly and with greater 
degree of nuance. The cases of DDR in various African countries offers a markedly different 
version of the process, as these cases have included historical non-combatants, such as women
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and children. In spite of this, even in these cases, women are often excluded because they are not 
perceived as gun-holding combatants.
The South African experience of the DDR did not account for the various actors who 
participated in the armed struggle. The emphasis on the trained guerilla by non-statutory forces 
contributed to the exclusion of women in this process. The process itself was not conceived in 
ways that took seriously the gender implications of demobilising, where, as in other cases, most 
women simply ‘auto-demobilised’ (Baaz and Stern, 2011).
Chapters Five casts women combatants in a greater relief, by exploring the different 
methods they used to fight against apartheid along its various contours. Chapter Six details the 
experiences of the women who participated in the official demobilisation and reintegration 
process as a whole. The objective is to demonstrate how women navigated the various stages of 
demobilisation, and the reasons that determined their decision not to join the SANDF, for those 
who had the option not to do so. The study also examines women’s experiences of the state 
programmes that are designed to assist them in the transition to civilian life. The experiences of 
the women who did not participate in the official demobilisation process, but who see themselves 
as deserving of benefiting from reintegration packages, pensions and the programmes of the 
military veterans department, are also explored. These are the experiences of the women who 
participated on the side of the SDUs, which were not recognised in the demobilisation act, as 
well as the current Military Veterans Act. Chapter Seven argues for the ways in which the 
recently founded Department of Military Veterans can address the failures of the DDR process 
and include the various combatants who were left out of the initial process, especially women.
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Ch a p t e r  Fo u r
“Th in g s  Lo o k  Dif f e r e n t  Fr o m  Be l o w ”: 
Lif e  His t o r ie s  a n d  Th e m a t ic  An a l y s is
4.1 Introduction
This chapter accounts for the use of the life histories interview method in the data collection 
process of this research. It demonstrates the ways in which a life history approach has been 
historically suitable for accounting for women’s experiences in qualitative research. It 
contextualises the life history method within the narrative approach, and goes on to demonstrate 
the ways in which narrative approaches are useful for feminist researchers. It also locates 
qualitative research that privileges women’s experiences of war, as an important methodological 
tool in feminist IR. Feminists in IR have argued that although discussions on war are the 
mainstay of the discipline, it seems ‘unprepared’ both ideologically and methodologically to 
include ordinary people in the analysis. In this regard, feminists have challenged mainstream IR 
“to pay more attention to war as experience” on the grounds that “war cannot be fully 
apprehended unless it is studied up from people” and that means centering human bodies as 
“units that have war agency and are also prime targets of war violence and war enthusiasms” 
(Sylvester, 2012: 484).
Chapter One demonstrated the ways in which both the literature on the anti-apartheid 
struggle as a guerilla war and feminists debates on women’s participation have obscured the 
foundational nature of women’s role as combatants of that war. Chapter Two showed that the 
framing of the demobilisation process, which privileged transnationally trained combatants, 
contributed to a further obscuring of the multifaceted ways in which women participated as 
combatants, and excluded most women from participating and benefitting in the state-led 
demobilisation process. This methodology chapter seeks to show that dominant social science 
methods analysing the anti-apartheid struggle have excluded women in their data sampling and 
analysis. It is argued that taking women’s contexts seriously implies that research does not 
merely seek to ‘prove’ accepted categories through the lived experiences of participants, but 
rather offers a space to expand social categories in ways that speak to these realities, thereby
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creating a space for new categories to emerge. The chapter draws on the life history work of 
Bozzoli (1991) and Motsemme’s (2004) work on black women’s silences in the TRC, and 
Motsemme’s important doctoral work on lived and embodied suffering and healing among 
mothers and daughters in Chesterville Township, KwaZulu-Natal (2011), as examples of 
narrative approaches for documenting black women’s experiences of apartheid and post­
apartheid life. In doing so, it is argued that the exclusion of women from what is conceived of as 
the “public political” (Motsemme, 2011) in examining the limits of apartheid violence, has 
created a methodological vacuum, which makes it difficult to locate women’s role in anti­
apartheid violence and to then examine the ways in which they have transitioned from an 
‘ everydayness’ of violence in post-apartheid life. Therefore, centering women’s coping strategies 
after war means that one must first unmask the seemingly ‘private political’, without, as 
Motsemme (2011) warns, totalitising the political nature of women’s subjectivities.
The chapter then focuses on the design of the study with regards to sampling techniques, 
the interview process, and locates the positionality of researcher of this study. It concludes by 
discussing thematic narrative analysis as the interpretive tool for this research.
4.2 Narrative research
Creswell (2009: 4) defines qualitative research as a “means for exploring and understanding the 
meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social problem”. In this regard, qualitative research 
centres the subjectivities of the participants and the ways in which they relate and make sense of 
society. Sandelowski (1991: 161) argues that “one mark of the turn away from positivism and 
toward interpretation in the behavioral [sic] and social sciences has been a renewed attention to 
the human ‘impulse to narrate’”. She further notes that social scientists under the influence of 
interpretive traditions such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, symbolic interactions, and feminist 
and cultural criticism, have developed a “literary consciousness” which sees them “assuming 
standpoints and employing techniques once distinctively associated with literal analysis and 
criticism” (Sandelowski, 1991: 161). Connelly and Clandinin (1990: 2) argue that “the study of 
narrative, therefore, is the study of the ways humans experience the world.” In this regard, the 
researcher assumes that, as these authors have noted, “people by nature lead storied lives and tell 
stories of those lives, whereas narrative researchers describe such lives, collect and tell stories of
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them, and write narratives of experience” (ibid.). For Riessmann (2000), narrative methods 
permit the expression of human agency and imagination in the sense that:
with narrative, people strive to configure space and time, deploy cohesive 
devices, reveal identity of actors and relatedness of actions across scenes. They 
create themes, plots, and drama. In so doing, narrators make sense of 
themselves, social situations, and history (Bamberg and McCabe, 1998, cited in 
Riessmann, 2000: page number).
As Sandelowski (1991: 162) reminds us, “narrative assumes many forms”. Narratives are heard, 
seen and read; they are told, performed, painted, sculpted and written...they are international, 
trans-historical and transcultural”. Time and place consistently reconfigure the meanings that are 
given to narratives, therefore, narratives are not considered to be static because “narrators are 
socially positioned to tell stories at given biographical and historical moments, under the 
influence of prevailing cultural conventions of narrative and the audience for a telling”. For 
Sandelowski (1999: 162)
[n]arratives are understood as stories that include a temporal ordering of events 
and effort to make something out of those events: to render, or to signify, the 
experiences of persons-in-flux in a personally and culturally coherent, plausible 
manner.
Stephanie Taylor (2006) defines the stories that inform people’s identities as “discursive 
resources” (p. 94). She argues that people’s narratives about themselves are constantly 
negotiated because “in constructing a life narrative, a speaker will not be starting anew but 
presenting a version of what has been said before, albeit one shaped to do work in the particular 
circumstances of the telling” (p.98). In this regard, Taylor (2006) argues that “a life narrative can 
therefore be considered as a construction which is resourced by previous constructions which 
aggregate over time” (p. 98).
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Raymond Suttner (2008) in The ANC Underground, points to the disjuncture of the 
narrative that Thandi Modise provides Jacklyn Cock (1991) regarding power relations between 
men and women in MK camps, and a later narrative that Modise gives to Robyn Curnow (2000). 
In the earlier narrative to Cock (1991), Modise emphasises that relations between MK men and 
women were equal, that women were not subjected to constant sexual harassment, nor did they 
undermine their positions of authority. But a decade later, in an interview with Curnow (2000), 
Modise cites a pervasive patriarchal culture within MK. She narrates that women combatants had 
to prove themselves to their male comrades, where, she notes, “we said we wanted to be treated 
like everybody... so we dug the trenches and the men would sit there and smoke and we dug!” 
(Curnow, 2000: 38). The sentiments about the patriarchal culture within MK were also expressed 
to me by Modise, when I interviewed her for a documentary project on women in the security 
sector in 2010. At the time, I was working as a consultant in the security sector governance 
programme of the Institute for Security Studies, primarily under Professor Cheryl Hendricks, 
who was leading projects on women, peace and security in Africa. I co-produced with Hendricks 
a documentary on women in the security sector in South Africa, the aim of which was to track 
the journeys of key women in the South African security sector, i.e. how they became involved 
in the sector, what the challenges were that they had to confront, what they saw as their major 
contribution to facilitating gender equality in the security sector, and what lessons they could 
share from their experiences. We did this by profiling three women, Thandi Modise, who was 
then the deputy-secretary general of the ANC, Major-General Ntsiki Memela-Motumi, who was 
then Chief Director Transformation Management in the SANDF, and Mala Singh, the former 
South African Police Service Deputy Commissioner, who was in 2010 the Executive Director of 
Human Resources at the University of South Africa (UNISA). Modise detailed life in Nova 
Catengue camp in Angola. She echoed the anecdote shared in her interview with Curnow (2000) 
that women combatants faced the burden of proving themselves as equal soldiers to their 
counterparts by taking on more tasks than their male comrades.
In reconciling the disjuncture in Modise’s narrating of gender politics with MK a decade 
apart, Suttner (2009) postulates that the timing may have something to do with how much
“I f  extraordinary had a face”: women in the security sector in South Africa. August 2010. 
Produced by Cheryl Hendricks and Siphokazi Magadla. Institute for Security Studies and Orange 
Orbit Productions.
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Modise could reveal to Cock, where Cock’s interview took place at a politically fragile time of 
the political transition, where the liberation movements, especially the ANC, were obliged to 
appear as representing a united front. The interview with Curnow (and subsequently that with 
Hendricks and Magadla in 2010) takes place when the ANC had firmly cemented its power in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The different contexts then permitted a different telling of the same 
story, which allowed Modise to reveal some details about gendered differences that would not 
compromise the political context of the present time.
Although Modise is not a narrative researcher, the example shows that narrative 
researchers ought to be aware that the narrative scripts that research participants are able to 
reveal at particular moments, are shaped by the contexts within which the narratives are being 
shared. Context and time determines what can be revealed and what remains hidden. It is also the 
case that because of time and space, Modise’s own ideas about gender may have changed over 
time giving new meaning to her interpretation(s) of life at the MK camps. As Riessmann (2000) 
points out, researchers ought to be aware that act of narration is a configuration of space and time 
by individuals, where, narratives are not static, but instead, are ever-changing.
In the case of Zimbabwe, Lyons (2004) also notes that it was close to fifteen years after 
the fall of Rhodesia that the women having participated in the liberation movements on the side 
of ZANU and ZAPU, began to narrate their experiences of unequal power relations between 
themselves and male combatants. One of the key moments that led to a public discussion about 
sexual politics in the liberation movements in Zimbabwe was cultivated by the release of the 
1995 film, Flash, which documented the experiences of women in the training camps, and their 
suffering in post-independence Zimbabwe, because their war efforts remained unrecognised. The 
film and the legacy of sexual violence in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was evoked again 
in August 2016 following a news report “alleging that former vice-president Joice Mujuru, then a 
teenager, slept with a commander during the liberation struggle”, igniting a “debate on how 
women were abused during the struggle” (Zhangazha, 2016:n.d). A response by a Zanu PF 
official to the report noted that the treatment of “young girls during the war” remains an “untold 
story of the liberation struggle” (Zhangazha, 2016:n.d).
As Duff and Bell (2002: 208) argues, narrative researchers are cognisant of the fact that 
“people make sense of their lives according to the narratives available to them, that stories are 
constantly being restructured in the light of new events, and that stories do not exist in a vacuum
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but are shaped by lifelong personal and community narratives”. As Plummer (in Riessman, 2000: 
cited page in Riesmsman) notes, all narratives are relational in that for them to “flourish there 
must be a community to hear. ..for communities to hear, there must be stories which weave 
together their history, their identity, their politics”.
Feminist researchers have used life histories as a methodological tool to move away from 
methods that depart from the general view which that “we already have knowledge about the 
culture in general against which individuals can be evaluated” (Geiger, 1986: 337). By doing so, 
feminist research makes visible the continued failure of “traditional social science research to 
encompass women’s experiences and perceptions”, and in this regard, “women’s life histories 
provide concrete substantiation for our claims that these cultural generalizations [sic] and models 
of social life are typically androcentric” (Geiger, 1986: 337). Furthermore, feminists have used 
life histories to also challenge dominant notions of objectivity expected from social research, 
which often function to silence the different interests and power dynamics that shape all 
processes of research. According to Geiger (1986: 338):
“.fem inist scholars have revealed that notions of objectivity themselves are 
androcentric and that higher levels of abstraction assumed to present a ‘true’ 
picture of ‘reality’ often represent neither truth nor reality for women. From this 
vantage point, it is evident that precisely because they are subjective documents, 
life histories exhibit integrity: they do not claim ‘ungendered point-of- 
viewlessness’ ”
Sangster (1994) shows that it is not only the South African case where women often do 
not place their own narratives in the center, even in cases where they have the space to articulate 
their roles in movements, as was the case with the women who testified in front of the TRC 
(Ross, 2004). She notes that even in narrating their histories, “women are less likely than men to 
place themselves at the centre of public events; they downplayed their own activities, 
emphasizing [sic] the role of other family members in their recollections” (Sangster, 1994: 7). 
The work of Motsemme (2004, 2011) below shows the multiple and complex ways in which 
women’s silences can be understood in social research and why silence is a language-in-itself.
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The next section locates the ways in which feminist scholars in IR have recentered 
women’s role in war by centering the physical body as an important object of analysis. Feminists 
IR scholars have challenged “malestream” IR’s silence on women’s experiences by making 
visible the different guises that women appear as protagonists in war time. In this way, women 
appear in different roles, beyond those of victims and perpetrators, but in complex ways that 
sustain the political economy of wartime.
4.3 “In the shadows of IR people dwell”: IR writing women in war
What if we think of war as experience, as something ordinary people 
observe and suffer physically and emotionally depending on their locations?
To date IR has been operating comfortably in a world of theoretical 
abstractions -  states, systems, power, balances, stakeholders, decision­
makers -  tacitly leaving people and war to journalists, novelists, memoirists, 
relief workers, anthropologists, women’s studies and social history to flesh 
out.
(Sylvester, 2012: 483-484)
It is noted in Chapter Two that the study of IR was founded as a response to the devastation of 
WWI (Carr, 2001; Tickner, 1992). According to E.H. Carr, “the war of 1914-18 made an end to 
the view that war is a matter which affects only professional soldiers, in so doing, dissipated the 
corresponding impression that international politics could safely be left in the hands of 
professional diplomats” (2001: 3). As noted by Tickner (1992), the founding objective of the 
discipline became the desire to prevent the occurrence of another war. In the article, War 
Experiences/War Practices/War Theory (2012), Sylvester presents a hard-hitting critique of the 
discipline of IR’s failure to examine war as experience, rather as a contestation of power. In this 
obsession with power balances, Sylvester (2012) argues that IR theories are not only mute on 
war as a bodily experience, but that the discipline seems “unprepared” to include ordinary people 
in the analysis. In this regard, she challenges the field “to pay more attention to war as 
experience”, on the grounds that “war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from 
people”, by which she means centering human bodies as “units that have war agency and are also 
prime targets of war violence and war enthusiasms” (Sylvester, 2012: 484).
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Sylvester’s (2012) critique of mainstream IR’s analysis of war with the absence of actual 
experiences of individuals has been at the core of the critique of feminist IR, whose departure 
point is to understand the varied ways in which women and men are thrust into war. It is for 
these reasons that feminist IR has reconfigured debates on war in the discipline by insisting on a 
fieldwork-based analysis of war.
Tickner (2005) notes that “IR feminists have used a variety of methods, most of which 
would fall into methodological frameworks that have variously been described as post-positivist, 
reflectivist, or interpretivist” (p. 2). Indeed, Tickner (2005) posits that most IR feminist work 
“has been situated in critical, constructivist or post-modern rather than empiricist frameworks” 
(p. 3), which privilege objective truths. Like Sylvester (2012), Tickner (2005) argues that “the 
questions that IR has asked since the discipline was founded have typically been about the 
behavior of states, particularly powerful states and their security seeking behavior [sic], given an 
anarchical international environment” (p. 5). Whereas, for Tickner (2005):
Most IR feminists have asked very different questions and used different 
methodological perspectives within which to provide their answers. While they 
may seek to understand state behavior, they do so in the context of asking why, 
in so many parts of the world, women remain fundamentally disempowered in 
matters of foreign and military policy ...moreover, the questions that feminists 
deem important are typically not adequately answerable within a conventional 
scientific framework. Feminist questions challenge the core assumptions of the 
discipline and deconstruct its central concepts; many of them are constitutive 
rather than causal (p. 6).
In the chapter in the volume edited by Naeem Inayatullah, Autobiographical 
International Relations: I, IR (2011) Narendran Kumarakulsingam reflects on his difficulty in 
theorising violence in Sri Lanka, where he realised that “violence fractures theory .it bends, 
distorts, breaks.your/my theory” (p. 36). This volume has been followed by another edited by 
Inayatullah and Dauphinee, Narrative Global Politics: Theory, History and the Personal in 
International Relations (2016), opening up a space within IR where they “seek to bind together 
theory, history, culture and the personal into a differentiated and vibrant whole”, in order “to
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move the field of International Relations towards greater candidness about how personal 
narratives influence theoretical articulations” (2011: 6).
Noted war anthropologist, Nordstrom (2005) argues that going into the frontlines of 
warzones has enabled feminists to fundamentally challenge the conception of frontlines and the 
conception of combatant and non-combatants. In this sense, it is through qualitative methods, 
‘speaking from the data’ as it were, that has informed feminist IR to move beyond a mere 
dogmatic understanding of war, and insist on contextual and realistic responses to the material 
and symbolic realities of war.
For Nordstrom (2005) talks about how conducting research in the warzones in Sri Lanka 
and Mozambique forced her to challenge conventional understanding of what constitutes the so- 
called ‘frontline’:
“...I realized [sic] that the whole discussion about women serving in the military 
is moot, and it is dangerous. In war, women are serving whether they are in a 
recognized [sic] military unit or not. They carry out primary functions of war; 
they are central targets, they are tortured and killed in numbers as great as, and 
often greater than, males...and they are generally unarmed. There is a profound 
irony in this: women in many locales are denied access to military combat 
positions because, ostensibly, it is too dangerous. This leaves them vulnerable to 
attack without weapons, training, and backup. My focus rests with a world today 
where the majority of battle deaths are civilians, and wars rage across 
community centers [sic], not remote battlefields. In such a world, the unarmed 
are the frontlines (Nordstrom, 2005: 402, original emphasis).
In the case of women and the war in Zimbabwe, O’Gorman (2011) meanwhile argues that
“[t]he analysis of life histories acknowledges women as agents in war, rather 
than simply as victims, and validates civilian experiences of war. The notion of 
voice is thus important in representing women’s differentiated experiences of
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war to generate a more inclusive rendering of resistance in a revolutionary
setting” (p. 8).
In Chapter Three, the literature shows that the cases of demobilisation in Africa differs 
markedly to North American and European cases, where women and children are drawn into the 
epicentres of the war, as Nordstrom has noted above. In Girls with Guns: Narrating the 
Experience o f War o f Frelimo’s ‘Female Detachment, West (2000) points out that, although the 
national liberation movement in Mozambique, The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), 
claimed that the women combatants who joined FRELIMO were eighteen years and older, the 
oral histories gathered “suggest that from quite early in the war, FRELIMO guerilla commanders 
systematically recruited (and sometimes armed) girls as young as ten year-of-age to assist the 
guerillas, although the training given such recruits was, at first, often minimal” (p. 183). From 
the oral histories, the women who were then young girls forming the female detachment, 
recounted that FRELIMO deployed them in the “advanced war zones” where the party was 
struggling to win support (West, 2000: 187). They pointed out that women were chosen because 
“as unfamiliar outsiders, they attracted less attention than men” (West, 2000: 187). Even further, 
the FRELIMO combatants argued that they were “effective in encouraging women to prod their 
husbands into joining the cause, and boasted that, simply as their example as women who had 
taken up the struggle, they often shaped men into joining FRELIMO” (West, 2000: 187).
The work of Mama and Okazawa-Rey (2012) examining the different ways in which 
women participated in the war economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, is an example of feminist 
work that is informed by women’s experience, instead of imposing established categories on 
their realities. It is from taking the experiential seriously that Mama and Okazawa-Rey (2012) 
argued that “‘war and ‘peace’ are no the discrete, opposite conditions and 
circumstances...especially for women, the boundary between conflict and post-conflict is not so 
clearly demarcated” (Mama and Okazawa-Ray, 2012: 117). Enloe’s pioneering work (1989), 
which was also informed by qualitative research that took women’s personal narratives seriously, 
contributed to an important shift in feminist IR, the focus of which until then had been on 
recovering women as soldiers and guerillas warzones. Enloe’s contribution made visible the 
reality that women indeed participate in warzones in all kinds of roles, as soldiers, nurses, cooks, 
sex workers, wives and much more. Enloe (1989) showed that to understand the political
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economy of war means taking seriously all the different ways in which women participate in its 
maintenance, so as to think creatively about the ways in which to undermine and move beyond 
the systematic violence. As Sylvester (2012: 495) argues, “feminist IR research foregrounds 
experience -  the lived experiences of women mostly, because these are less commonly credited 
with historical importance.”
The section below shows that writing women into the anti-apartheid archive, across 
disciplines, has constituted an insistence by feminists in these disciplines on the writing of 
women’s lived experience that often challenge the ‘public political’ (Motsemme, 2011) 
theorisation of life under apartheid and beyond.
4.4 Gender and struggle writing: silence as resistance
The Speed of Life
Now that our one-to-one TRC is done,
no cameras, counselors, note-takers, translators and the archbishop 
I thank you for asking that we speak.
Now as we speed away in different directions, again
without cameras, counselors, note-takers, translators and the archbishop,
I ask for silence.
I cannot bear the piercing echoes:
I  am sorry 
I  didn’t know
I  simply don’t understand how I  could have been so self-absorbed 
I t ’s so out o f character 
It feels so long ago, so unclear
I just wish to pace through my journey at the regular speed of life, 
forever
with no cameras, counselors, note-takers, translators and the archbishop.
Makhosazana Xaba (2008: 8)
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It is important that I acknowledge that in locating work that centres on gender in writing about 
the apartheid, I have drawn heavily from the work of sociologists. From Jacklyn Cock, this 
particular section draws on sociologists Belinda Bozzoli, Debby Bonnin and most extensively, 
on the work of Nthabiseng Motsemme. As Tickner (2005) also acknowledges,
unlike conventional social science IR, which draws on models from economics 
and the natural sciences to explain the behavior of states in the international 
system, IR feminists have used sociological analyses that begin with individuals 
and the hierarchical social relations in which their lives are situated (p. 7).
Sangster (1994) also argues that oral histories in feminist research “not only redirects our 
gaze to overlooked topics, but it is also a methodology directly informed by interdisciplinary 
feminist debates about our research objectives, questions, and use of the interview material” (p. 
6). Bozzoli’s Women o f Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migration in South Africa 
1900 -  1983 (1991) contains twenty-two life histories of black African women from Phokeng in 
the former Bantustan of Bophuthatswana. Declaring that “things look different from below”, 
Bozzoli (1991:3) argues that “conventional sociological methods -  the structured attitude survey, 
the questionnaire, or the rigid interview -  are poor tools for understanding this elusive force” of 
how individuals come into consciousness. Bozzoli’s study shows that to study consciousness 
through the lives of black women living under apartheid, alerts the researcher to the various 
intersections that shape women’s lives, and the language they use to articulate their 
consciousness. Taking the intersections of race, class and gender into account, means 
understanding that even the conception of ‘hegemony’ by sociologists:
should in fact be modified to cope with the fact that the women of Phokeng are 
and were not simply the objects of the policies of white government and 
industrialising power-brokers -  but they were affected by the policies of their 
own black chiefs and elders as well, so their oppositional visions contained 
within them contradictory forces. Opposition to one’s parent’s choice of a 
marriage partner might well entail an embracing of the individualism offered by 
the new society, while resisting the imposition of passes upon women may be
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cast in terms of a preindustrial ideal vision of the family. The complexities 
involved in understanding the terms ‘resistance’ or ‘opposition’ are considerable 
when one perceives people as being intricately enmeshed in different types of 
domination such that opposition to one type may involve collaboration with 
another.
Taking women’s contexts seriously implies that the research does not merely seek to 
“prove” accepted categories through the lived experiences of participants, but rather offers a 
space in which to expand social categories in ways that speak to these realities, thus creating a 
space for new categories to emerge.
As pointed out in Chapter Two, Motsemme (2011:2) argues that studies on the violence 
in townships in the 1980s and 1990s are “conceived and characterised as largely public- 
political’. She notes that Bonnin’s work (1997, 2000 discussed in Chapter One) on women, 
township space and political violence in KZN “marks a significant departure” from the dominant 
“positivist and deterministic political-economy studies” (Motsemme, 2011:9). For Motsemme 
(2011: 10), Bonnin’s contribution “demonstrates how understanding of the historical, sexual and 
gendered nature of violence was important to grasp in order to reveal the layerdness and depth of 
the violence that overtook township life in the 1980s”. Motsemme (2011), however, criticises 
Bonnin for minimising the voices of African women in her work, in favour of centering her 
theoretical concepts, as well as for reproducing stereotypical binary images of African women 
as:
heroic figures on the one end and stoic figures on other end of the spectrum, thus 
missing an opportunity to conceptualise them as complex and contradictory 
mothers, daughters, sisters and aunts who are also attempting to carve lives of 
dignity amidst economic scarcity and violence (Motsemme, 2011:13).
Motsemme, in The Mute Always Speak: On Women’s Silences at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (2004), examines the ways in which the TRC process relied heavily 
on a verbal account of the human experiences of violation during apartheid. She argues that the 
TRC did not offer its participants the required tools with which to articulate their experiences 
beyond spoken language, for those who discovered that their experiences remained
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“unspeakable” (Motsemme, 2004: 915). She asks, “what happens when those who have been 
denied the occasion to tell their stories, and those whose bodies and cultures have been 
systematically violated and dehumanized, discover that there are things that remain 
unspeakable?...are these bodies simply forgotten in history?” (Motsemme, 2004: 915). She 
argues for social science methods that are able to comprehend the language of silence, including 
those devised by feminism.
Motsemme (2004: 916-917) acknowledges that “within feminist and women’s writings, 
the importance of speech for women to articulate their story, which has often been distorted or 
suppressed, is well established” in the sense that feminist project “seeks to give those who have 
been previously silenced the occasion to speak and to allow their feelings, thoughts, and actions 
to come to full view”. She notes that in much of feminist work, “breaking silences is viewed as a 
gesture of defiance” while silence is often “seen as giving someone else the permission to 
inscribe and dominate you” (Motsemme, 2004: 917). She points out that silence under apartheid 
was a matter of life and death, where women’s narratives revealed the extent to which their 
ability to keep silent served the protection of “loved ones or fellow comrades who were hidden in 
the house, neighboring towns, or had crossed borders and the state or from vigilante groups who 
were hunting them down” (Motsemme, 2004: 918). In this case, she argues that “through acts of 
refusal to submit to the state’s invasive harassment to reveal the whereabouts of sons and 
husbands, ordinary women were simultaneously voicing their awareness of their sociopolitical 
situations” (Motsemme, 2004: 919). She argues further that the disruption of family life and the 
normal nature of violence saw women resorting to silence in order to avoid discussing the 
violence almost as if to wish it away. More precisely, Motsemme notes that
For example, gunshots and running footsteps just outside one’s yard would 
awaken households in the quiet of the night. However, when families woke up in 
the morning, it was life as usual -  porridge to be prepared for breakfast; 
uniforms to be ironed; baths to be timed; and other last-minute preparations for 
school and work. There might be a vague, or more commonly not a single 
utterance about what everyone had witnessed and heard during the night...This 
silence, which women’s narratives echo, is one which attempts to compensate 
for the loss of innocence for children who lived in a violent everyday in which
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women had, and continue to have, little power to change (Motsemme, 2004:
921).
Motsemme (2004) points out that often women’s use of silence as a coping strategy is 
interpreted as their strength, in the sense that it is read as women’s capacity to withstand high 
levels of pain and physical and mental violation. She argues that the “strong woman” myth has 
contributed to a limited understanding of “women’s notion of pain, suffering, humiliation and 
joy remain limited within the social sciences” (Motsemme, 2004: 924). In her doctoral work on 
township women’s subjectivities during apartheid, Motsemme (2011:17) argues that
[w]nether intended or unintended, what emerged from [these] kinds of framing 
of townships and township subjectivities, was a systematic erasure of resident’s 
subjective experiences and voices, and how this violence had intimately folded 
into their everyday lives and become a source of embodied existential suffering 
as well as bases to act creatively.
Motsemme’s analysis (2004) is important for this analysis in that in the process of this 
research, I became suspicious of the narrative that women veterans have not participated in post­
apartheid criminality, like their male counterparts, because they are “stronger” than men 
mentally. As Motsemme (2011: 116) explains,
[t]he stoic figure is, of course, a very common one in African women’s 
iconography. A stoic person is basically someone who appears unaffected by 
emotions, and is generally admired for showing patience in the face of 
adversity...themes of resignation, endurance, and grief so memorably embodied 
in women’s stoic bodies, are strong themes in surviving oppression and poverty.
In this sense stoicism is then strongly associated with performing dignity in the 
midst of hardship (original emphasis).
As discussed in Chapter Five below, the imposed and self-ascribed notion of women’s 
strength is the un-articulated but accepted assumption in the literature regarding why, for
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instance, women have not used their military training to pose a security threat to the state or their 
communities after 1994. It is important to point to these silences in the narratives provided by the 
women and the ways in which they reveal the extent to which women “cope” with the transition 
to civilian life, as well as how this same narrative of strength poses the danger of obscuring 
women’s need for assistance with the process of reintegration, both materially and 
psychologically. One can imagine that the virtues of stoicism becomes amplified when one is a 
combatant. The historic image of the sacrificial soldier and the sacrificial mother may indeed 
become intertwined, leaving little room for women to articulate their personal challenges and 
their need for state assistance. Chapter Five reveals the various challenges that women 
combatants face, as the majority of the women interviewed for this study are the heads of their 
households, and often also assist their extended families.
The opening poem to this section, by Makhosazana Xaba, is the first of a series of her 
poetry used in this thesis, as a way of accepting Motsemme’s (2004) challenge that the social 
sciences ought to begin to use alternative tools to reflect on women’s experiences. Xaba is a 
former MK combatant, and a participant in this study. The quotes from songs that have been 
used in previous chapters also serve the same purpose.
Further illustrating women’s invisibility in post-apartheid writing of the anti-apartheid 
struggle, Unterhalter in The Work o f the Nation: Heroic Masculinity in South African 
Autobiographical Writing o f the Anti-Apartheid Struggle (2006), notes that while 
autobiographical writing in the Euro-American world “has been a generative form for women’s 
voice and creativity”, South African autobiographical writing of the anti-apartheid struggle 
departs from this trend, where it is men who dominate this narrative form (p. 160). Of the 66 
texts that Unterhalter examines, 42 are written by men, with an over-representation of white men 
and a gross under-representation of black African women. She categorises the writing into three 
categories, firstly, “prison autobiographies”, which describe the physical and emotional 
consequences of political imprisonment. The second category is termed “journey 
autobiographies”, which catalogue “the movement from oppression to liberation, from exile to 
home, from exclusion to belonging”. The third category is that of “adventure autobiographies”, 
in which “the struggle is often portrayed as exciting and where politics, or living on a politicised 
terrain, is a matter of fast-paced narration -  the political picturesque” (Unterhalter, 2006: 161).
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She contrasts the autobiographical writing of Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo to that 
Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Ruth First, in order to demonstrate the ways in which men and 
women made sense of the sacrifices necessitated by political struggle, and how they wrote about 
their private lives. In the case of Nelson and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, she argues that the 
former’s writing describes home life as the conventional “soft” world that is contrasted with the 
hardness of life in prison in that:
his wife is associated with the soft world of outside prison. This is a world of 
silk dressing gowns, care of children, family connections, a feminine presence.
Mandela describes his wife subject to stress, wounded by the abruptness of the 
guards, or just surviving under the skin of her smart clothes.. .Winnie’s own 
account, however, of her life after her husband’s arrest is not of anything ‘soft’, 
but of mental and physical hardship, constant surveillance by the police and the 
press, the official censoring of any political discussions between her husband 
and herself (Unterhalter, 2006: 169).
She concludes that the implications of the inscribed heroism that is articulated in the 
autobiographies by the mostly male participates of the struggle, is that it
.maintains a notion of women’s invisibility or homogeneity. In the discourse 
of heroic masculinity women may be ungendered equal comrades, they may be 
heroines who inspire, but somehow do not live the struggle. They may be the 
wounded, or the innocent the supportive relatives. In all these guises they have 
no autonomy, no different political interests, and no struggle. Their views are 
always expressed or interpreted by men (Unterhalter, 2006: 174).
This research wants to shed light on the women who are less publically known, when 
compared to the well-documented experiences of women such as Madikizela-Mandela. Chapter 
Five makes visible the ways in which women were affected by and participated in the armed 
struggle from various positions that framed their tools of participation in combat. The rationale 
for this was firstly to take up Motsemme’s (2011) call to transform the ‘public political’, and to
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then examine the ways in which these women have transitioned from an ‘everydayness’ of 
violence into post-apartheid life. Therefore, centering women’s coping strategies after war means 
that one must first examine the seemingly ‘private political’, without which Motsemme (2011) 
warns, one contributes to the totalitising of the political nature of these women’s subjectivities. 
As shown through Bozzoli (1991), Motsemme (2004 and 2011) and Unterhalter (2006), 
women’s experiences of apartheid violence often alters the conventionally accepted notions of 
political consciousness, reconfiguring the conception of silence as compliance into one of silence 
as resistance, all the while often lacking in military uniforms.
4.5 Research design and method
4.5.1 Sampling
The sampling of this study did not aim to offer a ‘comprehensive’ representation of women 
combatants and their transition to civilian life. As argued in the first chapter, the nature of the 
armed struggle complicates the definition of combatant. Furthermore, there are no available 
statistics of the number of women who were involved in MK, APLA, Amabutho and other self­
defence units. As noted by Motumi and Hudson (1995; also Motumi and Mckenzie 1998; 
Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009), the 
CPR list was fraught with challenges, as many participants were left out of it due to their 
inability to prove their identity, because they had had a number of aliases throughout their period 
of involvement. Part of the work of “recovery” that the Department of Military Veterans is 
undertaking is the registration of former combatants, who were left out of the initial formal 
process.
As argued in Chapter 3, the sample includes those who are not recognised as former 
combatants in the post-apartheid veterans legislation of 2011. In 2012, when working on the 
proposal for this research, I observed oral history workshops on the subject of Amabutho SDU in 
KwaZakhele in Port Elizabeth. The workshops focused on the groups’ role in the armed struggle. 
They were conducted by Janet Cherry, a colleague at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University (NMMU) and Theresa Edlmann, who was then writing up her doctoral thesis and 
heading the Legacies of Apartheid Wars project in the Rhodes University History Department. It
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was in that year of observing that I became familiar with Amabutho’s role and their quest to gain 
legislative recognition in the current military veteran’s framework. This year-long observation 
challenged my assumptions about conceptions of combat. Until then, my understanding of 
combatants in general had focused on the transnationally trained combatant.
It was the leadership of Amabutho that directed me in 2013, when I began the fieldwork, 
to the women who were involved in Amabutho at the height of apartheid violence. It was the 
women themselves who then directed me to the women with whom they were involved. In this 
regard, snowball sampling was the key method of securing participants for this study.
It was also a similar process of snowballing that I used to gain access to MK and APLA 
combatants. For MK members, I visited the ANC office in Port Elizabeth, where I was given 
contact details of the Umkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA) secretary, 
who then directed me to the deputy secretary of MKMVA, Nomfundiso Kulati. She would be my 
first MK participant. She directed me to MKs in PE, around the Eastern Cape, and Gauteng. 
After not being able to locate the PAC office in Port Elizabeth, I managed to find a PAC 
councillor in East London. He generously drove me to Nomvo Booi’s home in Amalinda, who is 
a founding member of the PAC, and received military training in Angola. I had read about Ma- 
Booi’s life story in a collection of essays edited by Lauretta Ngcobo called Prodigal Daughters 
Stories o f South African Women in Exile (2012). I could not believe my luck that I was getting 
the opportunity to meet her in person.
Ma-Booi’s daughter assisted me with some details of her mother’s life that she could not 
discuss herself, as she had suffered a stroke in 2009. Her daughter also gave me contacts of a 
senior PAC leader who had worked with her mother, allowing me to contact an APLA woman 
combatant in Mpumalanga, Joyce Sifuba, who then also directed me to two other APLA women. 
It was the PAC councillor in East London who shared contacts of an APLA leader in Umthatha. 
Upon calling him, he told me to find my way there, so that he could drive me to the women in 
Mqanduli, in Umthatha. I hopped on the bus the same day, slept on a friend’s couch, and in the 
morning I was on the road to Jixeni Village in Mqanduli, where I interviewed a group of women 
in their 80s, who had participating in what was then Poqo, in 1963.
I was also assisted by academic colleagues, such as Raymond Suttner, who I contacted 
after reading their work. They trusted me with their contacts from their time in the field. But in 
the main, it was the individual women of MK, APLA, Amabutho, who generously trusted me
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with the cellphone numbers of their friends and comrades which resulted in the interviews of 36 
women who participated in the armed struggle presented here.
I was also warmly welcomed at the Department of Military Veterans, where I showed up 
unannounced. I am grateful to Ntate Moloto, who asked me hard questions about this research, 
and directed me to Patricia Noyoo, Director of Social Services at the DMV, who was able to give 
me some of the figures of veterans receiving benefits from the department. I conducted the last 
interview in November 2014 at a research and stakeholders conference hosted by the DMV at 
UNISA. The participant is an employee of DMV, who had participated in the SDUs in 
Mamelodi. The interview was conducted in the corridors of the lecture hall where the conference 
activities had taken place.
So much of this sample is a result of the generosity of strangers, who were willing to 
open up about their lives talking about a difficult history, and also encouraged their friends to do 
the same.
The diagrammes below provide a representation of the profile of the participants in terms 
of affiliation, age, time of involvement, military training, countries of settlement during political 
involvement integration to the SANDF and official demobilisation. While I did have additional 
informal interviews with women and men of the different organisations, the table below accounts 
for the number of formal interviews conducted.
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F ig u re  1: N u m b er o f  P artic ip a n ts  and  A ffilia tio n  - 8 J u ly  2013  - 23 M a y  2014
Organisation 
al Affiliation
Number Women Men African Coloured White
MK 18 18 16 1 1
APLA 7 6 1 7
Amabutho 11 10 1 11
SDU Pretoria 1 1 1
Department 
of Military 
Veterans
1 1 1
TOTAL INTERVIEWS: 38
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F ig u re  2: A g e  and  L o ca tio n  o f  P artic ip an ts
Age of Participants Location of interviews
Born between 1928 - 1969 -  14 located in PE at time of interview
-  1 East London
-  1 Peddie (interview conducted in 
East London)
-  6 Umthatha (5 in Jixeni village, 
Mqanduli, and 1 Umthatha central)
-  2 Butterworth (phone interviews)
-  2 Gauteng (phone interviews)
-  1 Somerset East (phone interview)
-  1 Grahamstown interview 
(participant based in Johannesburg)
-  8 conducted in Pretoria and 
Johannesburg May 2014 and 
November 2014
[Total 5 telephone interviews]
Figure 3: Military Training
Received Military 
Training
Partial training Places of military 
training
17 former MK Tanzania, Lesotho, 
Angola Germany, Cuba, 
Russia (Soviet Union)
2 APLA Swaziland, Angola
4 Amabutho marshals Port Elizabeth
TOTAL - 23
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Figure 4: Era of Involvement in Armed Struggle
1960s 1970s 1980s
2 MK (1961 & 1962) 3 MK 13 MK
5 APLA 
(1961/1963/1964)
1 APLA
1 Amabutho 8 Amabutho
Figure 5: Participants Who Have Served Time in Jail
Affiliation Months/Years
1 MK and 1 APLA 3 years
1 MK & 1 APLA 1 year
3 MKs 3 months
2 MK Undefined period
Figure 6: Different countries of Settlement by Participants
-  Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Cuba, Russia, United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Greece.
Figure 7: Officially Demobilised
-  18 officially demobilised (16 MK, 2 APLA)
-  18 participants received a once off R20 000 during demobilisation
-  1 received R40 000
Figure 8: Integrated to SANDF
-  4 former MK members
-  2 left between 1996 and 1997
-  Two left after retirement
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4.5.2 The interview process
The work of Motsemme (2004) and Segalo (2011) cautions that conducting research with people 
who have undergone violence means that there are things that will remain ‘unspeakable’. In 
adopting a life history method, I had recognised that it would be insufficient to examine the 
civilian integration of women combatants by only focusing on their demobilisation process and 
life after demobilisation. By using the life history method, it was possible to understand they 
ways in which women were thrust into the theatre of apartheid violence. It is due to the data that 
is provided by life history research that my analysis was obliged not to depart from the 
demobilisation process, but to ask deeper historical questions about the nature of the war itself, 
and the ways in which it accounts for how women participated and which forms of participation 
are recognised in the post-apartheid imagination and legislation.
Thus, the structure of the interview was that it started with questions about place of birth, 
where the participant grew up, went to school, where and how they started to become politically 
involved, how they were involved, for those who left the country -  how they left the country, 
how they returned, and whether they participated in the demobilisation process. For those who 
did participate, I asked for the reasons why they opted not to integrate into the new SANDF, and 
for those who integrated and left shortly thereafter, I asked for reasons for their quick exit from 
the force. The length of the interview differed between three hours for the longest, to the shorted 
interview being about 30 minutes. I noted that the longest interviews were with the women who 
had left the country, and had resided in various countries in and out of Africa. I noticed that 
starting from the beginning, that is birth, I allowed the interviews to flow easily, to a point where 
I hardly had to interject while the participant was narrating their life. Yet, because of the distance 
of time, the life history method also allowed participants to arrange their lives as they 
remembered them.
In the section below, I reflect on the process of interviewing women about their role in 
the armed struggle and post-apartheid life.
4.5.3 Positionality: “one needs a strong stomach”
‘Whose research is it? Is her spirit clear? Does he have a good 
heart? What other baggage are they carrying?’
(Smith, 1999, p. 10).
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In Southern African Liberation Struggles: New Local, Regional and Global Perspectives, 
Sapire and Saunders (2013: 293) argue that in time, as it already is the case, “greater distance 
will grow between those who write these struggles and the struggles themselves”. As Smith 
further argues, “research is not an innocent or distant academic exercise but an activity that has 
something at stake and that occurs in a set of political and social conditions,” where my own 
positionality as researcher plays a vital role as it influences the exercise of research and its 
implications (Smith, 1999: 5). In earlier chapters, I have made a strong case for the importance 
of time and space. It follows that time and space come to bear where this research has been 
undertaken place two decades after the end of apartheid.
Before I reflect on what it meant to sit in the homes and offices of the women who took 
part in this study with them, listening to them recount their lives, I would like to first share a 
little bit about the personal road that led me to this research. If, as Smith (1999) and other 
feminist scholars have argued, research is not apolitical, it is also does not emanate from a 
vacuum. The kinds of questions that we ask are often shaped by a particular personal history 
which leads us to connect our own experience, those of our participants, with broader national 
and global structural processes. As Inayatullah (2011) argues, “theoretical decisions emerge from 
theorist’s needs and wounds” (p. 6).
The feminist powerhouse Cynthia Enloe (1989) has related that she began to think about 
women and militarism after reading her mother’s diaries during the time her father was serving 
as a soldier. Enloe, who had thought of militarism as affecting the uniformed soldier, was 
profoundly changed by her mother’s reflections and the ways in which the mother was also 
‘serving’ in the military, because of the way in which her life was consumed by the war.
My own father was integrated into the SANDF from the Transkei Defence Force under 
Bantu Holomisa. He took ‘early retirement’ in 1996, what I now understand as the rationalisation 
project that was headed by then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise. At the time, I was merely 10 
years old. His transition to civilian life had a profound impact on our family life, and I have vivid 
memories of him whistling in the morning while polishing his shoes in full military uniform. My 
curiosity was also compounded by the fact that my mother, who is a psychiatric nurse, used to 
come home with dramatic stories about the recently retired soldiers in her ward, who were
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suffering with mental illness following their demobilisation. It was from my father that I heard of 
the case of Lieutenant Sibusiso Madubela, who shot dead six white SANDF members, including 
a white civilian woman, at the Tempe Military base in Bloemfontein (Mashike and Mokalobe, 
2003: 15) on 9 September, 1999. Madubela, a former APLA combatant, was from my hometown 
of Umthatha. I vaguely remember the television and radio reports about Colin Chauke, the 
former MK combatant turned cash-in-transit robber, and wanted fugitive. So, while the public 
image of the soldier is that of control, I grew up with an alternative archive of images of former 
soldiers who were overwhelmed by the realities of everyday life.
Thereafter, reading the literature on demobilisation while I was an intern in the then 
Security Sector Governance at the Institute for Security Studies provided the language by means 
of which to understand the sudden early retirement of my father, at what was such a young age. 
It also allowed me to understand the mental and psychological destabilisation that many of his 
peers experienced as they demobilised. I better understood the profile of the demobilised soldier, 
which Cook defines as the “walking wounded -  depressed and violent men unable to overcome 
the traumas of combat and the institutions of war” (Cook, 2006: 41), which informs the debates 
on post-war demobilisation in this country.
In a sense, the literature helped me place my own family history within a broader national 
process of transition and reintegration. What I found missing in this narrative were the stories of 
the women who had fought in the armed struggle. They did not feature in the images of 
combatants who had turned robbers and private security mercenaries.
When I have had the opportunity to speak to the often-male colleagues who conduct 
research on DDR, I have in fact asked them why their samples do not include women. Often the 
response is that the women are “not ready” to talk about their lives as combatants and life 
afterwards. In one case, a colleague, upon hearing about the focus of my research, insisted that I 
spend time in Cape Town, where he would help me locate the women who were former APLA 
combatants. I then asked him why he hadn’t included them in his sample on APLA combatants 
reintegration into civilian life, and surprisingly, he did not have a response. When I began my 
fieldwork, I realised that the assertion that women are “not ready to talk” often comes from 
researchers, who have in fact not invited women to participate in their research. In the duration
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of my research, only one former combatant ultimately declined an interview, preferring to seek 
approval from her political party before doing so.
Throughout the interview experience, I had in mind the words of a former MK woman 
who had advised me when the research was still in its initial stages, that to examine this part of 
our history, “one needs a strong stomach”. I was obliged to use the same phrase when I reviewed 
Mandla Langa’s novel The Texture o f Shadows (Magadla, 2015). In terms of my own personal 
transformation during this manner of fieldwork, it became a ritual that I would take a shower 
after each of the interviews I faced. When I think about it now, it was my own attempt at 
cleansing myself of the heaviness of the lives I was made witness to in these encounters. I cannot 
describe how it felt, for example, when I interviewed a woman who was a marshall for 
Amabutho, when she suddenly stopped mid-interview, because she was telling me about her son 
and how he had died, shot in front of the house in which we sat talking. She stood up and had a 
drink of water. I sat quietly. After just a few minutes, she came back and continued the 
interview.
Even though the content of the interviews was difficult, I felt a profound gratitude as a 
black woman to sit in the homes and offices of women who told me about their world and the 
choices that context allowed them to make while under siege. I wish I could say much more 
about the experience in the field, but in this regard, language escapes me.
4.6 Data analysis
In the research process, the analysis of the findings hinge on the alignment between the methods 
used to collect data, life histories, and the chosen tool of analysis. Attride-Stirling (2001) notes 
that in most qualitative research, there is a notable omission of the “how” question from accounts 
of the way in which the data was analysed by researchers. Braun and Clarke (2006) point out that 
most research suffers in explaining the process of analysis, because researchers make the mistake 
of treating their interpretation of the data as self-evident, instead of seeing it as a critical process 
that involves complex decisions that the researcher makes in deciding which elements of the data 
are foregrounded, and which are less significant. In this regard, they argue that the process of 
data analysis involves a series of decisions in which the research shows that “the theoretical 
framework and methods match what the researcher wants to know”, and that the process of
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analysing the data and the inferring on results involves stages of making decisions about the 
meaning of the data, with regards to the questions posed and these decisions about the data ought 
to “acknowledge these decisions, and recognize [sic] them as decisions” (Braun and Clarke, 
2006: 80 emphasis original).
For this research, I used thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) describe thematic 
analysis as a “foundational method for qualitative analysis” (p. 78). Although the method is often 
located within other dominant analytic traditions, such as grounded theory, they argue that 
thematic analysis ought to be “considered a method in its own right” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 
78). In this regard, they define thematic analysis as “a method for identifying, analysing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within the data. It minimally organizes [sic] and describes your data 
set in (rich) detail” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 78). According to Vaismoradi (2013), thematic 
analysis examines “narrative materials from life stories by breaking the text into relatively small 
units of content and submitting them to descriptive treatment” (p. 400). The author argues further 
that thematic analysis is a chosen analysis method for narrative research, because it “provides a 
purely qualitative, detailed, and nuanced account of data” (Vaismoradi et al., 2013: 400). For 
Attride-Stirling (2001), thematic analysis seeks to “unearth the themes salient in a text at 
differential levels” (p. 387). Therefore, the method is useful for narrative research, due to its 
privileging of a detailed account of the gathered data.
Due to the volumes of data gathered through life histories, organising the data according 
to themes and sub-themes allows the researcher to determine the salient issues that emerged from 
it, and the ones different participants returned to the interviews. Part of the thinking and coding 
process involved in thematic analysis pertains to the way in which the researcher develops what 
counts as themes and sub-themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) point out that in determining what 
counts as a theme, one must reflect “something important about the data in relation to the 
research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data 
set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 83, emphasis original). They argue that what determines them is 
connected to its “prevalence, in terms both of space within each data item and of prevalence 
across the entire data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82). They point out, however, that 
prevalence should not be confused with frequency, in terms of how many times the theme 
appears in the data in quantifiable measures, “but rather that on whether it captures something 
important in relation to the overall research question” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82), where the
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process of teasing out a theme from the data set involves decisions from the researcher on the 
data in relation to their questions. Vaismoradi et al. (2013) point out that the difference between 
content and thematic analysis “lies in the quantification of data in content analysis” (p. 400).
Braun and Clarke (2006) point out that a researcher may arrive at a theme by using 
inductive (bottom up) or a deductive (theoretical) method. The inductive method means that the 
themes that are decided upon by the researcher “are strongly linked to the data themselves” (p. 
83). In this regard, this means that the “process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a 
pre-existing coding frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 
83). In this sense, they argue, inductive methods of determining themes are “data driven” (p. 83). 
A deductive theoretical method of teasing out the themes, is “driven by the researcher’s 
theoretical or analytical interest in the area, and is thus more explicitly analyst-driven” (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006: 84). They argue that this form of thematic analysis provides less details of the 
data set but often focuses on some aspect of the data (ibid.). The themes that are identified and 
presented in Chapters Five and Six were inductively delineated from the data.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter made a case for the use of oral histories as a narrative tool to centre women’s role in 
apartheid and in the aftermath. The chapter shows that life histories provide a complimentary 
tool for feminist research as women’s narratives have historically been ignored in social science 
research. Feminist researchers have drawn on women’s life stories to challenge dominant 
discourses about knowledge and society. Feminists in social science and in IR have also used 
narrative research to counter women’s invisibility in war discourses. It is shown that the 
literature on the anti-apartheid struggle is dominated by a focus on heroic masculinity at the 
expense of women’s narratives that have been coded in a complex use of silence that challenges 
feminists to invent methodological tools that “break the silence”. The chapter also explored the 
design of the study with regards to sampling techniques, the interview process, and positionality 
of the researcher, and thematic narrative analysis as the interpretive tool for this research.
140
Ch a p t e r  Fiv e
“ Ya y i  l i x e s h a  l e n t o  a y i t h e t h w a  ”  (It  w a s  t h e  t im e  o f  t h a t
WHICH COULD NOT PASS OUR LIPS):
Gu e r r il l a  g ir l s , Co m b a t iv e  m o t h e r s  a n d  t h e  In -b e t w e e n e r s
5.1 Introduction
This chapter thematically delineates the spaces from which women were affected by apartheid 
violence, and the different methods they used to push back against the violence. Chapter Two 
showed the multiple terrains of the apartheid war from which women, in different locations and 
ages, emerged as foundational combatants. Both Chapters Two and Three show that the 
transnationally trained guerilla fighter is the privileged combatant in the ways in which the 
armed struggle is written and remembered, while the demobilisation process further entrenched 
this by privileging a specific kind of non-statutory combatant, by only including the trained 
combatant. As shown in the previous chapters, this narrow depiction does not resemble the 
nuances of the war. What must be underscored is that the danger of this representation is an 
erasure of the foundational role played by women, as both victims of the violence and as central 
combatants in fighting against apartheid. This has enduring consequences for the writing of 
women’s contributions in anti-apartheid history and government policies that seek to honour 
former combatants. This chapter maps out the different locations where women fought against 
apartheid and the tools that were available to them to fight back against the state. The categories 
of “guerrilla girls”, “combative mothers” and the “in-betweeners” are introduced in order to 
emphasise the importance of space/location and age that shaped the methods that women used in 
participating in the apartheid combat.4 The aim is to argue that the majority of women 
participated in the armed struggle without military training. Therefore, the transnationally trained 
guerilla girls are the exception, not the rule, of women’s form of participation in the armed 
struggle. The 'combative mothers' and 'in-betweeners' are not recognised as combatants and are
4 A preliminary discussion of these three categories is in an article for the A fr ic a n  S e c u r i ty  R e v ie w  jo u r n a l ,  “Women 
Combatants and the Liberation Movements in South Africa: Guerilla girls, Combative mothers and the In- 
betweeners” (Magadla, 2015), where I began to argue about the significance of age, space and methods of struggle 
employed by women in the armed struggle.
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therefore excluded from state processes dealing with former combatants. The chapter builds on 
the literature that has located women’s role in different spaces such as MK (Cock, 1991), the 
ANC underground, women in the ANC underground (Suttner 2003; 2007; 2008), and self­
defence units and civic organisations (Marks, 2001; Cherry, 2007; Reynolds, 2013).
The section on ‘guerilla girls’ argues that while the public representation of women in 
the armed struggle was that of mothers with babies on their backs, the majority of women in MK 
were young adults of school-leaving age, who had been at the forefront of student organisations 
such as COSAS. Furthermore, it is argued that the institutional culture of MK, and the kind of 
mobility demanded by transnational combatant life, was also spatially more suitable to women of 
younger age. For these women, the personal experience of violence at the hands of the apartheid 
state is the key reason they became involved in politics, and eventually, led to their decision to 
leave the country for military training. It is shown that frequent arrests, and torture during 
personal confinement, are among the reasons that many of the women felt that they were left 
with “no choice” but to leave the country. The experiences of women who were underground 
operatives reveal the dangers that accompanied this work, which was the main form of operation 
for the banned liberation movements inside the country. It is argued that most of women and 
men, who carried out this work, are today not recognised as legitimate combatants, while those 
who also joined MK are better recognised for their contribution. This section shows that 
although the transnationally trained MK woman is the most recognised among all women 
combatants, there continues to be limited understanding about what was possible in the guerilla 
camp space, and why, ultimately, the majority of women never took the trained guerilla route.
The majority of women remained inside South Africa as the armed confrontation with the 
state reached its limits in the 1980s. The older women, the “combative mothers”, thrust into this 
battlefield, provided protection for their children, who were being hunted by the state in their 
homes, schools, churches and at funerals. These experiences of the mothers are traced back to the 
early years of the armed struggle in the 1960s, as the efforts of the women who fought within 
Poqo in the Transkei are placed at the centre. It is argued that the popular depiction of the 
revolutionary mother with the gun/spear, and the baby on her back, reveals the empirical reality 
of the majority of the women who were combatants of the People’s War. Yet, these women are 
written out of the dominant narrative of the armed struggle and excluded from the material and
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symbolic benefits that are afforded other former internationally trained combatants in post­
apartheid South Africa.
The ‘in-betweeners’ are the young women who remained inside the country fighting in 
the townships at the height of battles of the 1980s that ultimately made the country 
“ungovernable”. Schools and funerals are argued to be their main terrains of struggle with the 
state. It is argued that these women, together with their male peers who formed the generation of 
“young lions” at the forefront of ungovernability, are not recognised as combatants, due to their 
lack of formal military training and therefore have not benefitted from state processes on 
demobilisation and civilian reintegration. They live with palatable traumas of the war, and with 
little to no rewards accorded to them for their contribution.
The argument here is that the ability to delineate the woman who was likely to participate 
in the armed struggle as trained guerillas, and make visible the kinds of spacial conditions that 
made such participation possible. It opens up room to also ask questions about the other spaces 
in which the majority of women entered combat, such as the spaces where the combative 
mothers and in-betweeners operated throughout the armed struggle. Most importantly, 
acknowledging the different spaces that women of different ages occupied, and allows us to ask 
questions about the wellbeing of the ‘guerilla girls’ in post-apartheid South Africa, along with 
questions about the wellbeing of the un-uniformed ‘mothers with guns’, who participated in the 
center of the pursuit for “people’s power”.
While creating categories also risks reducing the complex space negotiated by women 
and men throughout the anti-apartheid struggle, I argue that naming and identifying the different 
spaces that women occupied in the anti-apartheid struggle is important for us to provide a 
language that builds on the multiple combatants that came out of that war. The creation of 
multiple, and overlapping, categories is also useful for our understanding of women’s roles that 
go beyond the current binary representation of the trained combatant versus the maternal mother 
that is present in both the literature on the anti-apartheid struggle, and feminist discourses on 
women’s participation in the anti-apartheid struggle. This task of naming women as combatants 
is important at this time when the goverment is developing state assistance programmes that aim 
to support those who risked their lives in order to end apartheid.
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5.2 Guerilla girls
It is first important to clarify why a distinction between ‘guerilla girls’ and ‘combative mothers’ 
is important, and that the public representation of women in the armed struggle tends to conflate 
these different women. The public representation of women at the center of the People’s War 
was that of mothers with guns in their hands, and with babies on their backs. This image depicts 
the empirical reality of the women combatants who fought inside the country. But when it comes 
to the women who left the country and received training as guerillas, the majority of them were 
young adults of school leaving age, who had been at the forefront of student organisations such 
as COSAS. The institutional culture of MK, along with the kind of mobility demanded by 
transnational combatant life, was also spatially more suitable to women of a younger age. Many 
of them crossed the borders for training, because they felt that they were left “with no choice” 
after being identified as enemies of the state.
In her article, Moms with Guns: Women's Political Agency in Anti-Apartheid Visual 
Culture (2009), Kim Miller examines the ways in which the ANC used seemingly contrasting 
images of motherhood and militarism to galvanise women to join the armed struggle. Miller 
points to the 1968 cover image of the ANC political journal, Sechaba, with an image of a woman 
holding a spear and a baby on her back. She argues that this image of a “good mother” with a 
spear shows that this mother is “prepared for sacrifice in a much more literal sense than usual, 
this maternal image affirms women’s life-giving potential, while concurrently displaying the 
mother’s ability, if not willingness, to take it away” (Miller, 2009: 68). For Miller (2009), the 
spear in the mother’s hands plays two important roles in that the it “is an unmistakable reference 
to Umkhonto We Sizwe”,5 and that although “MK did not use spears as weapons...as an 
indigenous weapon, the spear is a clear reference to past African military traditions and 
resistance to colonial rule” (p. 71). At the center of Miller’s argument is that the use of this 
imagery by the ANC reconfigures the ‘good mother’ in an unconventional -  if not uncomfortable 
-  role: that of soldier” (p. 68). The author also examines a cover image of an ANC issue of Voice 
o f Women (VOW), the political journal of the ANC’s Women’s Section, from 1980, which 
depicted an image of a woman carrying an AK47, with a baby on her back (Miller, 2009: 71). A 
similar image appears in a VOW poster commemorating August 9th Women’s Day in 1985, with 
two mothers carrying guns on their back, and babies, with the words “from ungovernability to
5 The name translates into English as ‘Spear of the Nation’.
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people’s power 1956-1986”. For Miller (2009), these images represented an explicit invitation of 
women to join MK, suggesting that “women were full participants in the ANCs military 
‘powerhouse’” (p. 71).
The women in the three images that Miller (2009) examines are not military uniformed 
women. Although the images are read as serving as an inspiration to attract women to join the 
armed struggle, it is striking that they have been used to analyse the ANC and MK’s relationship 
to women. As Miller notes, the latter image in the VOW journal with two women with babies 
and guns on their backs, is perhaps indicative of the ANC’s shift to “people’s power” and 
therefore, the image served to persuade women, “from one township to the next”, to join the 
struggle as combatants in the pursuit of people’s power (Miller, 2009: 74). At play here is the 
“combative motherhood” that is understood to be the dominant frame of the female guerilla 
fighter in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Enloe, 1989; Pettman, 1996: 133).
Yet, what this discussion of the maternalised guerilla fighter hides, is the fact that most of 
the women who joined MK were not mothers, but were young women in their teenage years and 
early twenties. It is to be argued in the section on combative motherhood below that it is not a 
mistake that the images of militant women in both Sechaba and VOW political journals of the 
ANC are not uniformed guerilla women, because the ANC recognised that few women 
participated as combatants within MK. The women that joined the armed struggle were the un­
uniformed women who had to carry both the baby and their weapon in their everyday struggle 
against the apartheid state. Work by Cock (1991), Makau (2009) and Ngculu (2009) shows that 
the numbers of women in MK increased after the student uprising in 1976. The women who 
were able to physically escape the country to receive military training were women, in the main, 
in their youth.
While it is true that there were exceptions to this rule, such as the case of Thandi Modise 
who argues that she became a guerilla because she was a mother (Cock, 1991), and that three out 
of the twelve MK combatants interviewed in this study had children before going to exile, it is 
important to articulate that the women in MK were a product of the student protests that emerged 
in the 1970s. I argue here that it is important to acknowledge that most of the women who joined 
MK were, at the time, “girls”. If this is the case, acknowledging that young women, with no 
babies on their backs, were the ones who crossed borders to join MK, changes the question about 
women and maternalism in the armed struggle. What might the persistent use of the imagery of
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the un-uniformed female soldier, with the baby on her back, tell us about what the ANC knew 
about the different kinds of female combatants that participated in the armed struggle across 
disparate times and place?
As noted in Chapter One, women challenged the rule within MK that women who 
became pregnant were not allowed to continue living in the camps (Cock, 1991; Ngculu, 2009; 
Tsampiras, 2012; Hassim, 2014). Therefore, unless the women left the child at home, most 
women who joined MK did not have children, and those who had children while training left 
during pregnancy, and although there was the option to return after giving birth, most women left 
the camps when they had children to find posts elsewhere in the ANC, often in Zambia and 
Tanzania. Thus, for the most part, it is young women without children who could take advantage 
of MK as a space within which to prepare themselves to participate in the armed struggle. 
Therefore, the image of the fighting mother with the child on her back does not represent the 
woman combatant in MK camps. The guerilla girl and the combative mother occupied different 
spaces in their participation in the armed struggle.
The theme of personal violence, as a “meta-reason” for women’s participation in the 
armed struggle, cuts across age and space as the core motivating reason for participation. 
Accounts of experiences of multiple forms of violence, including torture under solitary 
confinement, and the risks and state punishment that involved underground work, informed 
women’s decision to cross borders and join MK.
5.2.1 Personal violence: “I didn’t have a choice”
What do the young do in war? How do they do it? How are they drawn in? 
How do they hold through it? Against what odds?
(Reynolds, 2013: 28)
In the case of the women who joined the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), Alison 
(2003) argues that the “nationalist sentiment” motivated women to join the LTTE, what she 
defines as a “meta-reason” for enlisting, where she argues that narratives from women 
combatants reveal that they were motivated by communal perception of suffering, oppression 
and injustice.related to personal experience” and “witnessing the experience of friends and
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neighbors [sic]” (p., 40). The narratives expressed by women who became guerillas, is that they 
did so because of personal and communal experiences of daily violence. Thus, for them too, the 
“meta-reason” was to end the injustice in which they were living.
For instance, Pamela Daniels (alias Nombeko), from Zwide in Port Elizabeth, was 
arrested under the age of 18 on November 1984, together with executive leadership of COSAS in 
Port Elizabeth, in a case that became known as ‘The COSAS Nine’ (Newspaper clip, 28 
November 1985; Detainees Parents’ Support Committee, 16 November 1984). Daniels left the 
country in 1985 to join MK following arrest as part of The COSAS Nine. Daniels recounts 
constant police harassment in her home as the traumatic events that led her to want to challenge 
the regime, which eventually forced her to leave the country:
Whilst I was already in high school I was introduced to COSAS. The reason for 
me to join that was my mother was a business woman, ’cause she had a shebeen 
selling vetkoeks, chicken, fish and all of that. Now from time to time police will 
come in, kick the doors, take everything, and I used to be very scared to an 
extent that when they’ve taken everything we’ll have to go out and sell anything, 
whatever my mother had. This picture of police coming, kicking the door, taking 
everything -  it sort of got me...This police business traumatised me, in fact, to 
an extent that when COSAS came into play, I was readily prepared to join it 
because they were saying the same things that I felt needed to be dealt with in 
terms of fighting the regime, and of course, doing away with corporal 
punishment, because it was another way that they were instilling fear -  the 
regime that is. So I readily joined COSAS.
(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
A former MK member that I interviewed in Port Elizabeth, who preferred to remain 
anonymous, articulated that she was abused in boarding school because her family name had 
been tainted due to her brother’s involvement in the struggle. She felt that the family 
involvement in politics destined her political life:
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My brother was killed during the Maseru Massacre. Now, do you remember the 
Maseru Massacre of 1982 on the 9th of December? So what happened was that it 
became well known that there were a whole lot of people who were killed during 
the Maseru Massacre -  it was in the newspapers, and my surname was in the 
newspapers. So when I got to school, I arrived already having a wrong 
reputation because of my surname. Even though they did not know me, but 
because of my surname was known as one of those who come from families who 
are active in the struggle, those who are considered problematic by the system.
That is why even the administration there had an attitude towards me because of 
my surname. So in a way, I didn’t have a choice. I had to be involved in the 
struggle whether I liked it or didn’t, because my surname had already spoilt 
things for me, you understand?
(MK ex-combatant, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
Former MK member, Belinda Martin (alias Gloria Mtungwa), who was born in 1952 in 
Kliptown, spoke about the separation of racially mixed family that saw family members that 
were classified as Coloured, along with her black grandmother, moved to Soweto:
I grew up in Kliptown, it was a township of diverse cultures, and we were 
happy, we saw no difference in each other. We valued each other’s cultures, you 
know, and that is what made us such a happy community. And a thriving 
community, rich in culture. Everybody coming to buy cakes, koeksisters, and 
what have you. Then we had the Chinese shop, Indian vegetable shop, the 
Shangaani people were doing small-scale farming, the Venda people as well, 
small-scale farming, we bought vegetables -  we never had to go to town or 
anywhere. It was apartheid that destroyed our communities.It’s when we 
started having criminals, it’s when we started having racial hate, everything, 
because now people were indoctrinated, made to feel better in my community, 
given privileges over people that they lived with before, and you know, 
everything just became a racial mess. You understand? But my family kept 
together, and it’s because of that reason and because of hating human suffering
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and because of hating segregation and apartheid that I decided I am going to join 
the struggle.
(Belinda Martin, Interview in Pretoria, May, 2014).
Martin became active as part of a youth group, called Anti-Collaborationist Front Group 
(AFRO), formed by Coloured high school students in Coronation High School. According to 
Martin, the group was affiliated with the Black People’s Convention (BCP), and was mentored 
by the activist-poet and journalist, Don Mattera. She was detained in 1975 after leaking 
information to Don Mattera who was then working as a journalist for The Star newspaper. She 
left the country to join MK following detention and solitary confinement in John Vorster Square:
Nineteen-seventy-five, I was detained; I was on the run for about six months.
Six months I was on the run, after that article was exposed in the newspaper, 
because I was the main investigator and I had to do the article and filter it to Don 
Mattera, who was then working at The Star. So that is how I ended up being 
detained. Well it was horrible in detention, I was tortured severely, and I was 
made to watch other activists being tortured, to try and make me betray my 
comrades. And throughout my detention, I decided I’m not going to say a word, 
no matter how severe, I can rather die, and I had taken the oath on my own then, 
there’s no way I am going to betray anybody just to be free, you know, and 
denounce my belief in freedom and against apartheid. I told myself, and that is 
how it was, for those three months, throughout my torture I kept quiet. They told 
me I can go at any time, if I sign written statements, statements that were already 
written out against people, some of whom I didn’t even know . I became a 
broken record, I won’t do that. Severe beatings, making me stand on ice bricks, 
beating me with the butt of the gun, marks on my legs of the, you can see they 
are growing faint now, of the electrocution that I was exposed to while they 
were torturing me.. .Solitary confinement, and for three weeks, while I was in 
that cell, they never allowed me to wash or have a shower, I was pregnant three 
months, I was expecting three months, and I had a miscarriage, in the three 
weeks, because they started torturing immediately, and I miscarried and I
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remained with the fetus in the cell. It started rotting and smelling until one of the 
matrons couldn’t stand it any longer.. .the matron couldn’t stand it any longer, so 
she took out the fetus and she cleaned the cell and she smuggled me to the 
shower, after three weeks, I was smelling and I had to drink water out of the 
toilet.
(Belinda Martin, Interview in Pretoria, May, 
2014).
For many, as was the case with Martin and Daniels, the personal circumstances of living 
through apartheid were rendered valid in the community of other younger people in schools. In 
this regard, the communities of solidarity that they found in school legitimised their objections to 
the actions of the apartheid government and the impact these had on their families and 
communities.
5.2.2 Unrest in schools: “no choice but to leave”
In her case study of Diepkloof, Soweto, Monique Marks (2001) argues that it was a nationwide 
phenomenon that “most township youth who joined political organisations in the ’80s, were at 
school, and many of the leaders of these organisations were still at school” (p. 49). She argues 
that schools provided a “base for a common experience and also a geographical space for 
meeting and organizing [sic]” (Marks, 2001: 49). COSAS was launched in 1979 as a “response 
to the crisis in the schools” (Marks, 2001: 35). For the young women who eventually left the 
country and their counterparts inside the country, schools became a core site of mobilisation. 
Many such as Nomfundiso Kulati (alias Thabisa), born in 1969, was active in COSAS when she 
was in Matric at Nathaniel Nyaluza High School in Grahamstown:
So in terms of understanding the aims and objectives of COSAS, at first I never 
thought they would be that revolutionary, but as I grew into the organisation I 
learnt it was more than that, just a student organisation. I remember when my 
mom, I told my mom having been joined the Congress of South African Student 
Movement, my mom said, “eh, I hope that this thing will not organise boycotts 
in schools”. I said, “no, this thing is not organising boycotts”. This thing is about
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talking about, you remember, this overcrowding in classrooms? This thing is 
about shortage, of issues we were really dealing with, I mean, there was a 
shortage of textbooks, overcrowding of classes, and corporal punishments were 
kind of our daily challenges in our schools. Shortage of teachers and black 
schools generally were not really being attended to during the days of 
apartheid. And then this then became more political in a way and we started to 
demand a non-racial and free education for all through the existence of SRCs in 
schools, you know. And this organisation started to organise congresses now. So 
I was growing politically because my exposure now with other people of my 
age; and understanding throughout the country as to what is happening in 
different schools was being broadened, by attending various conferences and 
congresses of COSAS.
(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, August 2013) 
Her involvement in COSAS led to her detention in 1985, at the age of 16:
Remember, we called for boycotts when we were demanding for student 
representative councils. Then, you know, remember the system how they would 
deal with us, they would harass [and] they wouldn’t listen to us. They would 
chase us and we would be identified as the troublemakers and we were already 
labeled as terrorists then. So I was more of a target in my area and I was often 
detained, harassed I never slept home, I would run away. We never owned a 
house then.. .we lived in a backyard shack in someone’s house we used to move 
from one home to another.. .don’t know how many backyards I have stayed in 
Grahamstown alone. And eh, but then this led me to my being detained and I 
ended up in solitary confinement in Rooi Prison [ also known as ‘Red Hell’ or 
‘North End’ Prison, in Port Elizabeth]. This was now about 1985. After being 
tortured harassed and... Remember, the system the way it would respond to us as 
young people, they would kill and shoot and hit people, and we were already 
identified as the people that ‘are troublemakers’ and ‘terrorist people’, that were 
being ‘used by Oliver Tambo, wah, wah, wah’.
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(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, August 2013).
After coming out of close to a year of solitary confinement, Kulati states that she 
discovered that she had been expelled by the Department of Education. With no choice to return 
to complete high school, she says that she felt that she “was left with no choice but to leave 
South Africa”. She left the country in 1986, through Lesotho, and eventually ended up in the MK 
camp Caculama in eastern Angola, in 1987.
I interviewed Brenda Badela in Grahamstown while she was attending events at her son’s 
school. Brenda Badela (alias Thoko Matthews), was born and grew up in New Brighton in 1962. 
Badela was a regional executive member of COSAS between 1980-1983, during her time in 
Newell High School in Port Elizabeth. She notes that she came to politics because her home was 
a space of meeting for activists because of the leadership that her father provided in the 
community. Her father, the activist-journalist Mono Badela, was known to support trade unions, 
PEBCO, COSAS and the UDF in Port Elizabeth while working for the Evening Post and later 
City Press newspapers (Mutasa, City Press Newspaper, 2003). Brenda Badela notes:
I had quite a number of friends who were members of COSAS and because my 
dad was a leader, a political leader at that time. So they would come to my 
house, discuss politics and then I happened to have interest in that and that is 
how I went into politics. And besides that, because my dad was a journalist, he 
would actually write negative things about the government but positive things 
about the ANC; and so he was then banned.
(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013).
She talks about going to different schools to talk to other students about the history of the 
ANC, the use of Afrikaans in schools, and Bantu Education, as well opposing the introduction of 
the tricameral parliamentary system. Due to her active participation, Badela was in and out of 
detention between 1981-1983. Badela’s family home was petrol bombed in 1985, allegedly by 
members of the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) in the “inter-organisational conflict in 
the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area” in 1985 -  1986 (TRC Final Report, 1998: 96). Badela 
narrates her time in solitary confinement and how she learnt about the bombing of her home:
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During detention I was in solitary confinement in Algoa. That’s where my home 
is now. Every time I pass that police station, I laugh. I was all by myself, solitary 
confinement, all of us, because we were regarded as the most influential and 
most dangerous COSAS leaders at the time. You know, the treatment was very 
bad, because one of the guys who was torturing me is actually late now, 
[Gideon] Nieuwoudt. Nieuwoudt, was actually involved in the killing of the late 
Siphiwo Mthimkhulu, you know, Goniwe. He was very, very notorious but he 
has since died now. So, you know, they would either not give me food, give me 
water for three days, you know, take me to their rooms, torturing me, slapping 
me, you know, asking me many questions, thinking that you are hiding 
something, you are working for ANC underground; asking for some people I 
don’t even know, you know, “where is so-and-so, where is so-and-so? You are 
working with so-and-so underground” you know. So, ja, the torture was terrible, 
yho! Hm! And, eh, in my cell, I had, eh, fortunately it was a small cell, but I had 
a toilet, which was much better, and I had a shower. So there wasn’t, there was 
no bed. So we would sleep on the cement, but they gave us, you know the 
grey.those grey blankets, for us to put some on the cement, for us to sleep. 
Yho, those days were bad, yho! Whilst you are sleeping, at two o’clock, they 
would just come and kick your door. You were not allowed to close the door. 
You are allowed to, if it’s the door, you must sleep here, and the door must be 
wide open, because every time when the guard is passing, you know the 
security, they must make sure you are still there, you are still breathing. You 
know they would call your name from a distance, “Hey, Brenda!” you know, 
and then you have to respond and say “Yes, sir!” you know, then they just pass. 
So every 30 minutes they do that, because there was a period where people were 
dying in detention, you know. But at the same time, it was a torture, because if 
you are being woken up every 30 minutes, you are not going to sleep. And then 
sometimes they are going to wake you up, and I remember one Friday they 
called me and said, “Yho, but your house was bombed, petrol bombed”, and I 
thought they were joking. My dad was in detention, but my dad was in another 
police station. But I thought they were joking. “Ja, your house was petrol
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bombed”, you know and I’m like, “Yho, wow! And then what happened?” “No, 
nobody died, nobody was hurt.” And I’m telling you, Siphokazi, I didn’t know 
about it until I was out after three months. And when I asked my mom, my mom 
said, “yes, that’s what they did”. Fortunately, you know, that we grew up in 
three-roomed house, so they threw the petrol bomb in my room. But we had two 
single rooms, myself and my brother, the one who comes after me. So it just, it 
landed on top of my brother’s bed, but fortunately, because me and my dad were 
in detention. So my mom and my two brothers were sleeping in the main 
bedroom. Now, if Phiko had slept there, it would have been something else. And 
they said, “Ja, and your brother was here, but we released them because we told 
them, ‘no, but his dad and his sister are already in detention.’” You know, there 
was a time when they would go house-to-house and take people in the police 
van, take them to the police station and torture them for unknown reasons. I 
mean, my brother was not an activist; he was never an activist. You know, and 
the gap between me and him is about seven years.
(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)
At the time, Badela had two cases by the state against her, on one case she had been 
caught on the way from a COSAS congress in Durban carrying banned literature in Queenstown, 
on the way back home to Port Elizabeth. The second case involved the arrest of the COSAS 
executive, including Pamela Daniels, cited above, who was not an executive member, in a case 
that became known as the COSAS Nine (Louwe, Evening Post Newspaper,1985). Following the 
bombing of their home, the Badela family moved to Johannesburg. Badela escaped the country 
with her fellow COSAS Nine accused, who joined her in Johannesburg. They first stayed at 
Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s home of banishment in Brandfort. It was Madikizela Mandela 
who organised their escape to Lesotho. She told me that she decided to leave the country because 
“[she] was in and out of detention, and the fact that [her] home was burned down. [She] could 
see that the system at the time really meant something; they really wanted to kill [her] family at 
the time” (Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013).
Pamela Reynolds (2013) notes that the “most frequently quoted figure for detention 
without trial for children under 18 between 1960-1988 is 15 000 [sic]” (p. 164). She notes that
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this was “an estimate number based on numbers published by the HRC [Human Rights 
Commission] in the document ‘Detention without trial’- published in November 1988” (p. 164). 
As Reynolds (2013) notes further:
[a]t certain times and in certain places in the 1980s, to be, quite simply, a young 
black person out of place -  moving, hanging out, visiting -  was to be a target for 
the security forces. Even to be in place, or in a yard -  or in school -  was to be 
unsafe (p. 28).
It was through the strategies and networks of activists inside the country with those who 
were across the Southern African region that the women who joined MK and APLA were able to 
leave the country. The underground structures of the liberation movements inside the country 
were instrumental in creating communication between those inside and outside. Importantly, the 
networks that were established underground acted as a check and balance system for the 
movements to be able to ensure that those who went to exile were not agents sent by the state to 
infiltrate them. Some of the women who would go to exile began their involvement as 
underground operatives, and eventually decided to go outside to receive military training. As 
Suttner (2008) and Gilder (2012) have argued, underground work was an intensely transnational 
process across the region, which relied on the collaboration of different actors in order to achieve 
a single operation, the exiled leadership, those who facilitated the connections between those 
inside and outside, the gatekeepers who protected the security of the liberation movements, and 
the members of the local population, who shielded these actors from being captured.
Below I examine the ways in which women navigated underground structures and for 
those who eventually left the country to join MK, I examine the circumstances that influenced 
their decision to leave. It is clear that of those who were in the underground that the women and 
men who coupled that experience with formal military training are the ones who today 
recognised combatants in post-apartheid veteran’s discourses. Therefore, even though 
underground operations were the main form of access by MK inside the country, with intimate 
collaboration with operatives inside the country, the trained combatant is privileged.
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5.2.3 Underground work
The banning of the liberation movements meant that these had to find subversive ways to 
continue organising against the apartheid state. Underground mobilisation is one of the four 
pillars that the ANC adopted in its 1969 consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania. As 
Raymond Suttner (2003) notes correctly, “underground work is political activity that is not open 
or openly declared for what it is. Under the cover of doing one thing, one may in fact also be 
performing an activity below the surface, and not visibly” (p. 126). The narratives of three 
women combatants that I focus on here indicate that for some, underground work was 
undertaken with partial or no military training, and usually launched operatives into 
comprehensive military training after some experience as an operative. The experiences of 
Nondwe Mankahla indicates that these possibilities may depend on what period of struggle one 
began their underground work, because for those, like her, who participated in the sabotage 
campaigns of the 1960s, escaping the country for military training was not as possible as it was 
for those who operated in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Dyantyi and Xaba. Suttner (2003) counts 
the different ways in which underground work became possible, one that resonates with three 
women who operated as underground operatives for the ANC is the aspect of having a public 
face that is “that is quite distinct from the underground one that will not be revealed publicly and 
will only be revealed in disguised form or to a restricted range of people” (p. 126).
Nondwe Mankahla was born on 28 August, 1935 in the Red Location in Port Elizabeth. 
She told me that she first heard of the ANC in 1952 during the time of the Defiance Campaign. 
She points out though that as a 17-year-old at the time, she was not clear about the content of the 
Defiance Campaign. At the time, she says, “it was like playing ropes. When we were called as 
young people, we just went.” It was in 1953 that she formally joined the ANC. In 1954, she 
became a volunteer for the ANC Youth League. At the time, the work for volunteers focused on 
door-to door mobilisation in preparation for the Congress of the People meeting in Kliptown, 
which led to the adoption of the Freedom Charter. It was also in 1955 that she worked as a 
volunteer for the New Age newspaper, working with Govan Mbeki. She participated in raising 
funds for women from Port Elizabeth to be sent to the women’s march in Pretoria in 1956 
against the introduction of passes for women, and was among a group that sent petitions to 
government offices in Port Elizabeth and did not attend the historic Pretoria march. In 1959, she
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was employed by Real Printing and Publishing, working with Brian Bunting, Fred Carnerson, 
Govan Mbeki, Sonia Bunting and others. The job there was to collect the New Age which arrived 
in Port Elizabeth on Thursdays, and distribute it. She was still working with Govan Mbeki when 
MK was launched, although she was never given any details about the activities of MK. She was 
asked by Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba to courier parcels, as she did with the New Age, and only 
later learnt that the parcel equipment to assemble a bomb:
I became involved with MK just after its launch. They started meeting here in 
PE. Since I worked at that office, Mr. Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba used to meet 
at that office and ask me to carry a parcel to some place. And this parcel is fruit.
I would fetch the parcel from a place called Crack in the Wall, here in Govan 
Mbeki; I did not know what I was carrying. I would take the parcel to them... I 
would learn later that the equipment was actually explosives. The MK then 
was focused on targeting certain areas. They were targeting the area known as 
Sheya Kulata. That place was targeted. There were offices there then, municipal 
offices. The target was successful.
(Nondwe Mankahla interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013).
She says that when Govan Mbeki disappeared in 1962, she worked with Vuyisile Mini, 
who was also part of the MK Eastern Cape High Command. But the apartheid regime had 
heightened its suppression, which eventually led to Mbeki and Mhlaba’s arrest, and Mini’s arrest 
and execution.
Oom Gov left, and I was left distributing the paper in the offices of trade unions.
The union officers started getting arrested and I was left on my o w n . Mr. Mini 
also vanished, and it turned out that he was arrested and executed. So that is how 
I was involved. So they were arrested and that was followed by a silence. I did 
not hear from the headquarters that were in Johannesburg. I did not hear 
anything until I was arrested in 1963. This time I was sent to courier money that 
was meant to be for a child going to school in the Transkei, in Qokolweni. But it 
turned out that the money was being sent to a man who was wanted by the state,
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and the money was going to be used to continue targets in the Transkei. So I was 
involved until then, until I was arrested.
(Nondwe Mankahla interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
Mankahla was in jail for three years. She was arrested again in 1969. She never went to 
exile. During our interview she was not in a space to detail her life after her arrest only that she 
worked for the Port Elizabeth Women’s Organisation (PEWO) until 1994. In an interview in The 
Road to Democracy: South Africans telling their stories - Nondwe Mankahla (2006), she said 
that after her release from prison in 1970, she was “not well in the head. [She] suffered with 
nerves” (p. 233). Mankahla revealed in our interview that in order to receive military veterans 
benefits, she had been asked to produce a force number, which would prove her MK 
membership. In the absence of such evidence, she has not been able to receive any material 
benefits as a military veteran. It is not clear whether Mankahla can be defined as fitting a 
“typical” underground operative. In the case where most combatants who operated in the 
underground have the same background as she does, it may be the case that they, like her, are not 
recognised by the state as combatants.
Dr. Pumza Patricia Dyantyi (alias Alice Tsongo), born in 1948, now MEC of Health in 
the Eastern Cape, started being involved in politics when she was in high school in Cicirha 
College in Umthatha. She comes from Quthubeni location, which is also the home of Walter 
Sisulu. She told me that although there was “momentum about the struggle”, it was when she 
was studying her midwifery in Durban, and became an underground operative when she was 
working at Baragwanath Hospital in Johannesburg from 1968 to 1972. While working at 
Baragwanath, she worked with Nomazotho Gqabi, the wife of Joe Gqabi. It was at this time that 
she worked for the ANC, travelling underground to “Botswana carrying literature that was 
banned here in the country for cells that we had, underground cells” (Pumza Dyantyi telephone 
interview, 2013). In 1972 she moved to Durban, and studied midwifery with Nosidima Pityana, 
who is married to Barney Pityana. She was a member of the National Youth Organisation 
(NAYO) which was founded in 1973, and South African Student Organisation (SASO). Through 
her connection with Nosidima Pityana, she became close with Barney Pityana, and Steve Biko.
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From Durban, she was placed in Kuruman, in the Northern Cape. It is in Kuruman that she first 
became involved with MK:
So, I started being involved with MK there. Soldiers would enter the country 
from underground, they would be hidden there. We would look after them there 
with a family and for them, and they would proceed from there. We were doing 
this work, traveling up and down between Botswana and South Africa. 
Sometimes we would be carrying letters; sometimes we would courier things 
that were not disclosed to us. You would learn later that you were actually 
carrying a lot of money inside the country. I was arrested around this time.
(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)
She was arrested in 1979 as part of group that came to be known as the NAYO 7.6 She 
recounted:
I was arrested while I was traveling from holidays at home in Transkei. I met the 
Boers at the train station in Gauteng. They arrested me there. And some of the 
people that I worked with underground, when I arrived in Gauteng, it turned out 
that they were already arrested. We were known as ‘The NAYO 7...We were 
charged under the Terrorism Act and sent to John Vorster prison. The trial 
carried on. Out of seven, two people were convicted. One of them was the 
mayor of Gauteng, Amos Masondo. But it is clear to me that this thing was 
following me, because even after I was acquitted, I was arrested at the stairs on 
my way home. I was arrested for something funny called ‘Inciting People by 
Writing Letters’ -  something like that. They just wanted to arrest me. But then I 
managed to get out.
(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)
6 Phyllis Naidoo writes about Kgoti (alias Andrew Moletsane), who was a member of The NAYO 7. Available from: 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/F5_KGOTI_1.pdf
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Following three months at John Vorster prison, she received a banning order, banishing 
her to the Transkei. She never served the banning order, as she managed to leave the country 
through Swaziland in 1980. She spent time in Mozambique, then in Lusaka, Zambia and 
eventually went to train with MK Benguela camp in Angola. Although Dyantyi’s underground 
work was highly risky as she moved between South Africa and Botswana, the work that grants 
her recognition as a combatant is the formal military training. If Dyantyi, like Mankahla, had 
moved between courier work and routine arrests, would she have been able to participate in the 
SANDF integration process, and eventually demobilisation?
Makhosazana Xaba (alias Nomgqibelo) was born in 1957 in Greytown, but grew up in 
Ndaleni which is next to Richmond, Natal Midlands. She recounted that it was during her time as 
a junior in Polela High School that she first heard about Steve Biko and Black Consciousness, 
through the school’s debating team. She notes that “for some reason the debating students, they 
were often the senior students, were allowed to discuss political topics”. She notes that it was at 
Inanda Seminary that she openly engaged in politics and that there was a “much more open- even 
from the teachers- an open engagement with politics”. Even though she wrote Matric in 1975, 
she spent the whole of 1976 nursing an undiagnosed illness, while her peers were either at 
university or starting their careers. It was the Soweto uprising that energised and compelled her 
to action:
So when June 16 happened, everybody would leave me in the morning to go to 
school - my parents and my sibling -  and return in the afternoon.. .So I just 
always used to listen to radio. I was either listening to the radio or reading lying 
on my back. I couldn't do anything.. .And then I'd listened to this thing about 
what had happened in Soweto and I'm thinking: damn, this is terrible, you know.
So I just remember that time, because I had been ill and I was depressed, and 
that was a terrible year for me, because ‘my-age’ mates were either at varsity or 
starting their careers. I really wasn’t feeling good about myself. But when that 
happened, everything just seemed to change because it was like, ‘wow, I can do 
something in the world!’, you know.
(Makhosazana Xaba interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
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She went to train as a nurse in Edendale Hospital in 1977. Following the killing of Steve 
Biko, she joined the Edendale Youth Organisation, with some doctors who had been friends with 
Biko. The space was for political education and discussion. She notes that Ben Martins (a former 
Minister of Energy after 1994) used to supply banned literature to the group. After serving as a 
nurse in a small hospital in an a highly impoverished area called Khombe, in what was then 
northern Natal, she decided to pursue her Bachelor of Nursing Administration and Education in 
Ongoye University (Univeristy of Zululand), where she became an active member of the 
Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO). She was particularly influenced by the events of 29 
October, 1983, that led to the death of five people, including students, between UDF aligned
n
students and an estimated 500 members of the IFP who entered the university. She was one of 
seven students who were expelled by the university for her involvement in the events. It was at 
this time that she decided she wants to go and train. A friend linked her to a transnational ANC 
underground operative who was moving between Lusaka and Pietermaritzburg. He taught her 
basic “reconnaissance, the basics of unlocking keys and the basics of dead letter bombs” 
(Makhosazana Xaba interview, May 2014). She soon became part of the Natal underground 
machinery that was operating from Swaziland under Ronnie Kasrils, Jacob Zuma and Siphiwe 
Nyanda. At the time, she was working for an old age home for whites, where she could only 
work night duties, because a black nurse was not allowed to work there. She worked seven- 
nights-on, seven-nights-off. This position and schedule was ideal for her travels between Durban 
and Swaziland:
So the system was, you did seven-days-on, seven-days-off. So often during the 
off nights, that’s when I’d take a trip and come back. So it looked very innocent, 
you know. I’d come back from a trip. It was a very convenient because seven 
days was a good period of time to go do something and come back, you know.
So whether I was going to Swaziland or we were just busy with our activities 
and...it was easy.w as then doing the movements between Swaziland and KZN 
mostly, as a messenger carrying letters, and coming back with money, because it 
was difficult to find money to do the work. So I’d go there with some letters and 7
7 See V io le n ce  b r e a k s  o u t  a t  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f  Z u lu la n d , available from: http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated- 
event/violence-breaks-out-university-zululand.
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come back. I never carried guns, but I carried money. Loads of money on my 
body. for the various operations that needed to happen [I would hide] with things 
like pantyhose and whatever, it’s very easy to hide money everywhere. 
Everywhere on your body, it’s very easy, and bags, obviously.
(Makhosazana Xaba interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
Xaba operated between KZN and Swaziland from December 1984 until December 1986. 
She notes that that at this time, which was at the height of the state of emergency, she could not 
attend mass meetings, or be seen to be participating in any political activity. As a nurse, she had 
the “perfect” alibi for her underground work. This was until December 1986, when her trainer 
told her that it was time for her to leave the country. She left the country during the second state 
of emergency in 1986, through Swaziland, then Mozambique, Lusaka and then straight to the 
MK camp in Pango in northern Angola. Even in the Xaba case, it is not clear whether she had 
continued working in the underground while still working as a nurse, if she would then have 
been recognised and allowed to participate in the integration process, had she not had the 
military training she received.
It is perhaps not surprising that, of the women I interviewed, it is the women who were 
professionally employed who were able to conduct underground work involving moving in and 
outside of the country. For Dyantyi, nursing provided the method for moving between South 
Africa and Botswana while in the Northern Cape; while Xaba, who led a daily life also as a 
professional nurse, was able to move between KZN and Swaziland unnoticed for a full two 
years. During the launch of MK, Mankahla kept up a quotidian fa9 ade as a courier at the New 
Age newspaper, while she played a crucial role with others in the activities of the early days of 
MK in the Eastern Cape. Yet, the extent to which the apartheid state had encroached on “the 
everyday” makes it unsurprising that both Mankahla and Dyantyi would eventually face arrest 
for their underground activities. The accounts they make of their experiences demonstrate the 
high-risk nature of underground work, and the ways in which it was a fundamental part of the 
armed struggle. Suttner (2008) has argued that it is important for the various strategies of the 
liberation movements not to be understood in isolation, but to be understood as overlapping and 
even blurring. The uncontainable and shadowy space of the underground, pushes against the
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generalisations that appear in post-apartheid literature about “exile culture” and “inzile culture” 
that have come to assume rigid meanings in the work of scholars such as Ellis (2012) and 
Trewhela (2009). Importantly, accounts of experiences of underground operatives point to the 
importance of recognising the various sites of struggle and the combatants that emerged from 
those sites.
5.2.4 Training and life in MK
A Lone Soldier’s Yearning For Home
Deep, deep in a place never could be imagined,
In the far off land o f the Great Agostinho Neto,
I  sit and guard my Comrades just out o f a 
Horrendous air attack 
The bombs o f apartheid.
Deep, deep in a land never to be imagined,
In the land where so much blood was shed,
Where the Angolans sacrificed their lives to save ours, I  sit and ponder, will I  ever make 
it back home.
(Belinda Martin alias Gloria Mtungwa)
The rituals of life in the training camps involved rigorous physical training and a distinct focus 
on political education. The MK women emphasised the weight given to tactics in guerilla 
warfare, as they understood that they were participating in an unconventional war. Pamela 
Daniels narrates her arrival at the Viana transit camp in Luanda, Angola thus:
We arrived to a place, a transit camp that was called Vienna, in Luanda... In the 
morning we had to go to town. The transit, where it was it was like farm area 
where ANC was given land by the Angolan government. We were doing 
everything for ourselves, cooking, you name it. We had our armoury.. .There 
were buildings where our HQ was staying, and comrades were sleeping in tents, 
and these coaches, because it was a transit camp. In the morning we were taken 
to town. Now, at night it was such a beautiful view- the lights, everything, 
people playing basketball. You could actually see them and everything. In the
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morning it was a different view altogether. It was like at night we landed 
somewhere, we woke up somewhere else. Two out of three people that you saw 
had one leg or no legs. The buildings you could actually see the bullet holes. I 
remember thinking to myself, ‘where the hell did I think I was going?’...Now 
we had a new routine: wake up in the morning with morning sport; the bells will 
ring; go for morning sport. When we came back we bath; after bathing we eat; 
after eating we clean. After that we go and we’re drilled. Now we are being 
prepared to go to the training camps. And it is very funny how you, you quickly 
adapt. The environment allows you to do that and you actually see yourself as a 
soldier immediately, because the language, the behaviour and every other thing 
just points you out.
(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
Brenda Badela explained the everyday routine thus:
Military training in different tactics - your physical training, how to shoot, your 
topography, you know, if you want to grow, and politics as well. So we had 
classes; it’s like you are in high school, you know. Where there would be, where 
there would be (what do you call high schools), not lectures, but timetable, you 
know, for 45 minutes you are now going to do tactics. Tactics was more 
physical. The next 45 minutes is going to be politics, so teaching us about 
politics, you know, the countries that were close to the ANC, your Russia, your 
Cuba, your East Germany at the time and then topography.. .So those were some 
of the things, and then we had what is called engineering. Engineering is 
basically how to make bombs, how to use a hand grenade, you know. So it was 
very detailed, very dangerous because we had to be very accurate. It’s like 
science, engineering is more about science, it’s more about science; and then we 
had another one, which was called (what was it called?) -  shooting; where they 
were teaching you how to shoot now, all sorts of weapons. AK 47...
(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)
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Belinda Martins emphasised the collaborative spirit that existed in the camps between women
and men:
. a s  women in Mkhonto we Sizwe, there was no leniency. We had to do 
everything the men did, and we did it. We proudly did it, and we were not 
discriminated against by the men. We were helped, when we couldn’t carry on, 
they would hook you in. You know. And if you got tired, we would run together.
And that’s what made me so proud of the men in MK at the time. They would 
never leave you behind because you are a woman, they would encourage you, 
you know? We used to run 16km every morning, so it made it 32 kilometers 
.E very  morning that was part of our training, besides the field training, 
weapons training; you know we had to train in guerrilla warfare. Not 
conventional warfare, we were a guerrilla army. It was very rigorous; we were 
trained by the Cubans, the Russians, Czechoslovakians.I was the first female 
commander of the June 16 detachment.
(Belinda Martin interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
Makhosazana Xaba noted that most of the combatants in the camps were young people:
The atmosphere was v e ry . how would I describe it? Number 1: most of the 
people were younger than me. By this time I’m twenty (it’s ’86), I’m 29.
They’re younger than me, some of them were not educated. Some left before 
they completed school. Therefore they have no experience working as activists 
at home. They skipped -  the terminology that you skipped -  so they skipped 
[left the country]. They just remember marching and then they had to skip. They 
have no touch but they know about guns and grenades, and they are teaching and 
they are commissars and they are this and they’re that. There were two other 
people who were at least my age - my peers, and the other one (he died two 
years ago, shame), and with the other one, we ended up doing literacy training - 
literacy education for the younger ones who really needed literacy at a very, very 
basic level.
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(Makhosazana Xaba interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
Pumza Dyantyi, who was a professional nurse, worked in the camp’s clinic in Benguela, 
before she was moved to the Quibaxe camp. Joyce Sifuba of the PAC, also spoke about 
education programmes for young people in the camps:
. i n  Tanzania I trained in distant education because the Commonwealth wanted 
people who are going to teach or facilitate a programme distant education for the 
comrades who are in the camps who were not going to school; and for those who 
have at that t im e . you remember there were lots of these young people coming 
out, so they hadn’t finished school. When they arrived outside, some of them are 
too young to go to the camps, so the Commonwealth decided it would have a 
bridging school, where the young comrades are going to study. So I was one of 
the people chose to go to London to train in distant education. And when I came 
back I went to the schools in Bakamoyo the programme, I mean, the programme 
of the PAC and the ANC in Tanzania in the camps.
(Joyce Sifuba, telephone interview, November 2013)
Another participant noted that life in the camps was not easy, when it came to 
relationships between older and younger combatants, especially women combatants:
I’ve always been a person who is known to be stubborn and independent. I 
remember playing with boys, so I grew up with boys, so I never had that thing 
that I could let a guy take advantage of me. So when I arrived in Viana, some 
guys, the soldiers, the male comrades, were from the bush and it had been a long 
time since they saw women [laughs]. They will make moves, you know, towards 
new arrivals. That environment, when you arrive, you had fears when you meet 
the older people who have been there for a long time, and who have not been 
with women in a long time. So you would find that you develop relationships
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that are not genuine, relationships that are based on what you are going to 
benefit and some would who were lazy to train -  who wanted things to move 
easily -  would accept situations whereby they would be involved in a 
relationship not because of love, but because they wanted the relationship to be 
easy; because some of our combatants, the males, were in high ranks. Some of 
them would abuse their positions and take advantage of the female combatants 
that just arrived, because “if you don’t do what I’m telling you, I will make you 
sweat”, that kind of talk... “I’ll make you sweat”; so you find yourself in this 
condition and think, “ey, let me jo l [get into a relationship] with this 
commander”, because the lifestyle will be easy.
(Anonymous, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
Joyce Sifuba also articulated the unequal treatment between men and women in the PAC.
Well, the treatment will never be the same. You know, women are always taken 
for granted and they are taken advantage of. You have to be strong, you have to 
defend yourself all the time, because it’s a man’s domain, and if you are there, 
men sort of, even if they are comrades, they sort of undermine and ask 
themselves questions ‘what does this woman want here?’, you see? It has always 
been like that. But we were quite strong, we were quite strong. We had to stand 
our ground and show them that we can also do things. There are duties that we 
felt improved because of women.
(Joyce Sifuba, telephone interview, November 2013)
As Cherry (2011) notes about MK, general life in the camps was about waiting. 
Following training, combatants awaited “umChina” (being chosen by the leadership for a 
mission home). For most of the combatants, including the women, the call was never made. As 
Xaba expressed in our interview, “the waiting begins and you’re supposedly in an underground 
camp and if you don’t find something to do for yourself, I think you go crazy”. As Cherry and 
others have noted, the waiting was excruciating for combatants, who had hopes to return to
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South Africa to bring the regime to its knees. Some of them eventually became disillusioned, and 
often became alcoholics out of boredom and frustration. Some of the women were sent for 
further military training in countries such as Russia, East Germany and Cuba, and some were 
chosen to go and further their studies, after which they returned to other posts in the ANC in 
Lusaka, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and elsewhere. Following further training in Cuba, Totsie Memela- 
Khambule worked in the Swaziland underground. She was responsible for facilitating the 
infiltration of leadership ANC into the country. She notes that “the ANC took a view that they 
need to infiltrate the leadership [infiltrate the country with the leadership], because by just 
infiltrating troupers, people didn’t have guidance, they didn’t have support that, I mean, I 
brought Mac Maharaj in the country” (Memela-Khambule interview, Johannesburg, May 2014). 
Of the women who were trained outside, only one participant (in this study) returned to the 
country following MK training. Nombulelo April, born in 1943 in Cathcart in Eastern Cape, fled 
to Maseru in 1978, where she received training in MK. She spent time in Lusaka. In 1988, she 
managed to come back to the country through the Transkei, and settled in Butterworth. She told 
me that because of its forests, Butterworth was made an MK Base 1 underground cell (Telephone 
interview with Nombulelo April, September, 2013). She expressed that they were protected by 
Holomisa’s government and that settling in Butterworth for underground work made her a
o
“Transkeain” (Telephone interview with Nombulelo April, September, 2013).
The experiences of ‘guerrilla girls’ represents one part of a multifaceted armed struggle. 
Their accounts of experiences show the blurring of different forms struggle. namely the mass 
mobilisation from which the generation of student activists produced, some of which fled the 
country for military training; the underground combatants who carried the missions of MK inside 
the country, some of whom were eventually forced to leave the country; and those who received 
military training, in order to work the underground from neighbouring countries and smuggle 
guerrillas into the country. The narratives of women in MK make visible the intersections and 
overlapping nature of the different sites of struggle, all of which were instrumental towards the 
ends of armed struggle in a context of unconventional war. 8
8 Mrs. April was acknowledged in the 2014 State of the Nation Address by President Jacob Zuma, available from: 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/contentpopup.php?Item_ID=5567&Category_ID=
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While some women managed to cross borders to receive military training, and therefore 
claim the label of guerrillas, the majority of women, young and old, remained in the country as 
the confrontation with the apartheid state heightened in their homes and communities. They 
found places from their communities from which to mobilise and fight back. The next sections 
shift their focus to the respective categories of “combative mothers” and “in-betweeners”.
5.3 Combative mothers
The experiences of women such as Nondwe, who participated in the early MK sabotage 
campaigns, show that women’s contribution to the armed struggle can be traced back to the 
inception of the turn to armed struggle. The accounts of experiences by women, who fought 
along Poqo in the 1960s, show that older women, wives and mothers were at the forefront of the 
strategies that Poqo became known for, especially within the context of the Bantustans. These 
accounts show that at all stages and eras of the armed struggle, women responded from the 
specific locations in which they were affected. Poqo’s focus on resistance of the insertion of the 
Bantu authorities act in the Transkei made concrete the fight against an imposition by the 
apartheid state that had immediate impact on the lives of those in the Bantustan homelands. As 
the apartheid brutality and silencing intensified through different eras, while the young people 
transfigured schools as terrains of mobilisation and contestation, their mothers found other 
spaces, such as the church, as a battle site to protect themselves, their children and community. 
Thus, this section pays attention to how mothers participated in the struggle across different eras. 
For the Poqo women combatants of the 1960s, fighting against the imposition of Bantu 
authorities sprung them into action. In the 1980s, as the state violence escalated, women in 
townships found spaces from which to mobilise against a force that threatened their children in 
their homes, schools, churches, funerals and elsewhere. As Hiralal (2015) argues in her article 
about women detainees in the anti-apartheid struggle:
In the 1980s women became actively involved in the United Democratic Front 
and formed the UDF Women’s Congress. In addition, in the 1980s, women 
became actively involved in civic organisations and began to exert their
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influence on housing, poverty, unemployment and neighbourhood issues.
Women were also involved in trade union activities, playing a leading role as 
organisers and mobilising community support. The 1980s marked a high point in 
women’s struggles and demonstrations, which resulted in the prosecution of 
many women (p. 34-35).
It is true, as Ross (2003) argues that “women used domesticity, a space over which 
women usually have more control than other spheres, to map the interpolations of violence in 
their lives” (Ross, 2003: 42). With babies on their backs, these mothers were thrust into battle.
5.3.1 Contesting Bantu Authorities
In The Poqo Insurrection (1986), Tom Lodge argues that when the PAC and the ANC founded 
their military wings, Poqo and MK, the latter “operated as an elite framework of a larger 
clandestine and sometimes less committed support organization [sic]” while Poqo “in certain 
localities attained the dimensions of a mass movement...reaching the peak of its influence in 
1963” (p. 1). For Lodge (1986), “in terms of its geographical extensiveness, the numbers 
involved and its timespan, the Poqo conspiracies of 1962-1968 represent the largest and most 
sustained African insurrectionary movement since the inception of modern African political 
organisations in South Africa” (p. 1). He points out that the “Cape Province and the Transkei 
contained the main centres of PAC activity” (p. 10). In Jixeni Village in Mqanduli, Mthatha, I 
interviewed women who were Poqo members, who were arrested in 1963, at the “peak” of Poqo 
activity.
Mildred Nonotice Daphu, born in 1928, became involved with Poqo at the time when 
Chief Sabata Dalindyebo opposed the imposition of the Bantu Authorities Act that would accept 
the imposition of separate development by the state. The contestation was between Dalindyebo 
and Kaiser Matanzima, who supported and promoted separate development and was appointed as 
a Regional Chief Emigrant of Tembuland in 1958. The TRC Final Report notes that in 
“December 1962, Poqo members made an abortive attempt to assassinate Paramount Chief 
Kaiser Matanzima at his home at Qamata near Cofimvaba.. .Seven Poqo members were killed 
and three police officers seriously injured in the encounter” (TRC Final Report, 1998: 48). In
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1963, the Transkei became the first Bantustan to formerly accept separate development under 
Matanzima. The report traces political activity in Jixeni Village [spelt Jixini in the report] in 
1962 that members of the “Jixini branch of Poqo planned an attack on white people near the 
area; but before this campaign could take off, more than 100 Poqo members were arrested” (TRC 
Final Report, 1998: 48). Mildred Nonotice Daphu traces her involvement with Poqo, under the 
leadership of Mr. Mamfengu Leonard Mzolisa, during this contested time between Dalindyebo 
and Matanzima:
I became involved in PAC in 1963.It was in the times of Sabatha Dalindyebo,
It was the time of that which could not pass our lips! You cannot tell! It was the 
time of that which could not pass our lips!
(Mildred Nototice Daphu interview, Mthatha, October 2013)
She was arrested with others in Mqanduli while at a Poqo meeting about how to fight the 
Boers. When I asked what they were planning to do:
I would say that they were building a force, soldiers who would challenge white 
people. Their intention was to build weapons to fight white people. They were 
challenging the rule of the B oers. they believed at the time that they wanted to 
get the land back. They believed that the enemy was the whites who took their 
land. They were looking to fight with the whites.
(Mildred Nototice Daphu interview, Mthatha, October 2013)
Following the arrests, they were sentenced to five years outside prison that prohibited 
them from any political activity. They attended meetings during the night, and many of them 
were in and out of jail as they were known to be active in the community by the informants 
within their own community. They spoke of constant harassment whenever they were seen by 
the police in public, especially at funerals. Zile Xolo, the Jixeni PAC Chairperson, noted that the 
young PAC/APLA members of the 1980s, were inspired and guided by older women. 
Nocollege Mzolisa, also born in 1928, was arrested in Mqanduli. She had a young child with her
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while she was arrested, sent back home with other people. The child died while she was in 
prison. The only thing she would say of the matter is that the “child that I left behind, when I was 
in jail, I came back and they were dead. What have I benefitted?” (Nocollege Mzolisa interview, 
Mthatha, October 2013). Some women are said to have given birth in jail, and others died there. I 
was told that when it came to the remains of some who died at Nongqongqo prison, in East 
London, that their remains were not returned to the families.
Thus, for many of those who stayed inside the country, and refused to be silenced by the 
apartheid regime, life was this cycle of arrests and return home. In Worcester, Reynolds (2013) 
points to the “repetition and return to the township”, the case of Poqo members operating 
underground in Mqanduli from the 1960s onwards shows that this was a countrywide 
phenomenon, in both urban and rural settings (p. 32).
5.3.2 Church
The church emerged as a site from which women found a space to strategise against the 
apartheid violence, and the violence that erupted between UDF and AZAPO in Port Elizabeth. 
While schools, funerals and stadiums were spaces where the young and old protested, the church 
provided a space from which women could use religion as a fa9ade behind which to discreetly 
plan political activities. As Fatima Meer (1985) has argued, “religion, particularly Christianity, is 
an important factor in bringing women together” (p. 14). Scholars such as Haddad (2004) have 
shown that women’s prayer unions, known as the Manyano in the Methodist church, had been 
introduced by missionaries from 1906 onwards, as spaces where African women were to pray 
together, and for the missionaries “to prepare the young converts for domestic service by 
teaching them skills such as sewing, washing, and laundering as they saw appropriate to an ideal 
Victorian home” (p. 5). As Haddad (2004) argues, these spaces took a new meaning for African 
women dealing with the harsh urban influx control, working in racist white homes, and dealing 
with the separation from family members in both urban and rural areas. Women in the rural areas 
used the women’s only groups as a space in which to deal with the separation from their 
husbands and children in urban areas as influx control laws made their access to the city difficult. 
Women in urban areas used the weekly prayer meetings to cope with routine racism in the 
workplace and the psychological challenges of separation from their families. At the height of 
apartheid, Meer (1985) argues that “the Manyanos converted temporarily into protest groups
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against apartheid” which “undergird women’s activities in overtly political organisations” such 
as the African National Congress Women’s League (p. 14).
It was thus not surprising to hear accounts from women about how they used the church 
to mobilise with other women about how to “protect” the young people who were being chased 
by the police and how to respond to police violence. Fezeka Klaas, born in 1948 in New 
Brighton in Port Elizabeth, spoke about meetings in church.
We used to have prayer meetings at Ngesi, at a church in Ngesi. We would carry 
the bible, but we would be discussing politics. We would pretend that we were 
reading the scripture by holding the bible during the meeting, while we are 
planning what we will do politically.
(Fezeka Klaas interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
She also mentioned that as women, they would visit people detained in prison, especially 
those children whose parents had died, whom they would visit “as their parents would”. They 
would also visit “cadres who returned homes and the parents had died”. We used to visit the 
jails, as their parents would. They would also confront black police officers, who were notorious 
for arresting “the children even if he did not see them doing something”.
Mrs. Mde specifically spoke about women’s actions during the violence between the 
UDF and AZAPO. As Buur notes, from 1985 onwards a tense battle between the UDF and 
AZAPO “tore Port Elizabeth townships apart [ . ]  rallies by hundreds of youths at the houses of 
political opponents were often followed by arson attacks and sometimes by necklacing” (Buur, 
2006: 739; also see TRC Final Report, Volume 3, 1998). Mde narrated about how women tried 
to call for peace between the UDF and AZAPO by wearing white headbands:
We wore the head wraps so that they would think that we were gathering for a 
church service, maybe we were Zionists and so on. Yes. But mostly, there was 
the fighting between AZAPO and UDF. We wore the headband because it had 
two meanings: because 1) they would think that we were members of Zionist 
church; 2) and we want peace between the children. We wore the headbands to 
call for peace between the children. We used to pray, we would come together
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with others in Walmer, Centenary, the place next to the library, it was just a field 
then, and the hippos would arrive, and on one side there would be UDF, and on 
the other AZAPO, it would be that confrontation. The Boers would get there and 
shoot towards the UDF. We would ask ourselves why not AZAPO, which was 
also a party of black people, why is that when the Boers arrive, they shoot one 
side and not all of them?
(Mde interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
The use of white to symbolise a call for peace seems to be a common factor for women 
in diverse societies, who use their identity as mothers to make claims about violence in their 
societies. The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, wore “white head scarves” when they 
gathered every Thursday at 3:30pm in front of the presidential palace in Buenos Aires since 1977 
calling for the return of the 30, 000 Argentinians who had been “abducted, tortured, and 
permanently disappeared” in the “Dirty War” under “consecutive military juntas” between 1976­
1983 (Taylor, 2001: 97). As Taylor (2001) argues further, “the Mothers had to manipulate the 
maternal image that was already rigorously controlled by the State” as they made the claim that it 
was precisely their maternal responsibilities as “good” mothers that took them to the Plaza in 
search of their children” (p. 100). As had been the case in South Africa, ‘the Mothers’ notion of 
motherhood had gradually became political rather than biological”, as “they came to consider 
themselves the mothers of all the disappeared, not just their own offspring” (p. 102).
The case of the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace is a similar example, as the 
women in Liberia came together in 2003 the height of what is known as the Second Liberian 
Civil War. They wore white every day and gathered next to the road that then-President Charles 
Taylor drove on his way to work, and in the markets, where they petitioned for all parties to 
participate in the peace negotiations in Accra, Ghana (Gbowee and Mithers, 2011). They wore 
white to symbolise their call for peace and their non-partisan nature (Gbowee and Mithers, 
2011). It appears then that in instances of war women across the world subvert tropes of 
motherhood as essentially peaceful and the colour white as a symbol of peace to hold oppressive 
regimes towards the achievement of peace. The theme of protecting their families, especially 
children, is a central motivating theme in the activities of mothers who routinely put their own
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bodies forward in a rhetorical statement towards oppressive forms of power. This theme of 
protection is one I now turn to.
5.3.3 Protecting the children
In Chapter Two, it is discussed that both dominant international and local feminist discourses 
that perceive the use of maternal identity as a claim to take up arms as conservative. As Gasa 
(2007) and other (black) feminists have argued, at the height of apartheid violence, young 
children of school-going age were subject to it, where it made sense for the parents of these 
children to want to defend them. The theme of protecting children was a central motivator of 
women’s actions in the townships in the 1980s, whereas Bonnin (2000) argues, “spaces of 
everyday life were to be reterritorialized [sic] and new spaces and boundaries within the 
township recreated” (p. 307). The experiences of women who were members of PEWO in Port 
Elizabeth speak to such a reality, and the extent to which the mothers put their bodies on the line 
for the protection of not just their children, but all the children of the struggle.
Mrs. Mabhengeza, born in 1944, an active member of PEWO, who use hide members of 
Amabutho at her home, spoke about how they used to rearrange their yards at home so that the 
young people would be able to jump over the fence to get in easily.
I would say that the children would come to me when there was a problem in 
New Brighton. They would say “Mama, we would like you to hide these people 
here”. I would say “ok, my children, hide them here”...We just opened our 
homes and opened ways for them to get out when they were running from 
AZAPO. They would open the gate and go.
(Mrs. Mabhengeza interview Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
Mrs. Klaas had a son who was a member of Amabutho. She protected him and others at 
her home, recounting:
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One of my children was a member of Amabutho. He died in 2008. When they 
were being chased by the enemy, we would open our home to them. Sometimes 
the enemy was here. I would let them inside the room so that they can sleep. I 
would stand outside and when the enemy has passed, I would throw a stone on 
top of the roof. I would do it like that.
(Fezeka Klaas interview in Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
Their role in “protecting” the young men from the police often placed them at the direct line of 
danger, as Mrs. Mafutha articulated:
One night a bullet came through the window: Twaa! It hit the wall, the wall in 
the kitchen. We were protected by God, because I cannot tell you how we 
survived. I was cooking, making supper: Twaa! I reasoned that he was shooting 
at us; he wanted my life as well. I used to be woken up all the time by the Boers.
They were looking for the young men. They would wake them up, beat them and 
leave with them... that is the life we lived.
(Mrs. Mafutha Interview in Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
Victoria Nagetsana, born in 1936, talked about the constant police harassment in her 
home, because of her political activities, and suspicions that she was hiding members of 
Amabutho:
Do you remember when it [Hippo] used to come into the house? Yhu! You will 
see it stopping at your house. My husband liked his sleep, so I would get up to 
find out what they wanted, and they would be coming to our house. They would 
get in looking for me, they would have heard about a meeting taking place 
somewhere. They would be here to intimidate. they would call out my husband 
and say, “you had a meeting somewhere and you didn’t tell us. Get in!” My 
husband would be quiet and relaxed. I would say “wait for me to get dressed.”
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You would search for whatever you were wearing the previous day. They were 
like that.
(Victoria Nagetsane interview in Port Elizabeth, August 2013)
The accounts of experiences articulated above point to the lack of distinction between 
home front and battlefront in the context of guerilla war where homes of women became sites of 
both struggle and retreat as they formed the barrier between the state and their children. These 
women would not define themselves as combatants, although the ‘young lions’ they protected 
would describe themselves as combatants of the ‘People’s War’. Without their participation, it is 
difficult to imagine that their children would have been successful in confronting the state. It is 
these women combatants that the mostly male leadership of Amabutho also led me to, while on 
my search for the women who had fought side by side with them. In the eyes of their own 
children, the mothers are seen as fellow combatants.
5.4 The In-betweeners
Cherry (2007) argues that the literature on the young lions who were central in realising the 
ANC’s call for ungovernability, are often represented in gender neutral terms, or in specifically 
masculine terms. Thus the ‘young lion’ is represented as male. The older women that are 
discussed above as the “combative mothers” did not mention that they hide young women in 
their homes, and there is a lacuna in extant literature on the role of young women who were also 
the ‘young lions’ at the height of violence in the 1980s, with further research being crucial. 
When I began observations of Amabutho in 2012, I was haunted by a woman who must have 
been in her mid-30s at the time, who shared with me that for the longest time, she could not eat 
meat, because she had seen “too many people blown up” in front of her. What did the young 
women who remained in the country do at the time of the People’s War? Of the women who 
were in their teens and younger, who were part of PEYCO and Amabutho, personal/family 
violence and unrest schools and funerals were key sites of struggle.
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5.4.1 Personal/communal violence and unrest in schools
Nkosazana Sobantu, was born in New Brighton in 1964, and expressed that she became involved 
politically because her brother had been arrested at the age of 14 and taken to Robben Island. 
Following the arrest, her family was subject to constant harassment by the police:
My brother was in jail for 14 years, he was arrested in 1978 in Robben Island.
So there was no chance that I would stay at home and fold my arms when the 
Boers used to frequent our house and they would torture my mother, kick the 
doors, you see? It was not nice... They would abuse her. They would instruct 
her to show her documents that were not there. They would even dig into the 
floor looking for ANC documents that do not exist.
(Nkosazana Sobantu interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
The constant harassment at home was combined with the unrest in schools at the pinnacle 
of the boycotts and further complicated by the violence between UDF and AZAPO:
There was no stability. I was doing Standard Seven then, and it was not nice; 
there was violence in the community, and the schools were shut down. Then we 
returned in 8 7 .  AZAPO was fighting with the ANC. It was difficult in those 
days, people’s houses used to be guarded. Even our house at that time, used to 
be watched. So we lived like that, such that I only wrote my Standard Ten in 
1989. I was staying with relatives because of the unrest we had to leave the 
house because of my brother.
(Nkosazana Sobantu interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
Boniswa, also born in 1964 in New Brighton, spoke about the impact of the AZAPO- 
UDF classes on her family:
My sister in Motherwell. used to get beaten by the Boers here at home. And 
during the clashes between UDF and AZAPO, the clashes happened near our
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home. We used to get searched. We did not stay at home. Our mother was also 
involved in politics but I can’t speak about the details of her involvement 
because I was young. We used to hide things in our garden, like the PEYCO t- 
shirts.
(Boniswa interview, July 2013)
She also spoke about the presence of police at school, where they held some of their meetings:
We also used to meet at Cowell [High School] to have our meetings and often 
there would be shooting. There were soldiers who monitored the school. There 
was a person who was shot close to our home, he died at our gate.
(Boniswa interview, July 2013)
To defend themselves and attack the state, Thandiswa spoke about how they assembled 
petrol bombs because it was too dangerous to be caught carrying weapons:
We used to make petrol bombs. We used to put paraffin, sand, put them on a 
matchstick and put petrol and spirit. Those are the things we used to destroy, you 
see? Because if you had arms, you would get arrested. What Amabutho used to 
do by hand are hand grenades and petrol bombs.
(Thandiswa, interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
The accounts by the women reveal that their everyday life was consumed by the presence 
of violence. At home and in schools, they found themselves under direct attack from the State. In 
their work as marshalls for Amabutho, they found that funeral sites became a key place of 
struggle between themselves and the State. They defended the space and mobilised within it.
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5.4.2 Funerals
Digging for freedom
This young man says he and his friends refuse to work with us even though 
they know we can no longer cope with the digging; day and night. He and 
his friends say we must take a stand, refuse to dig graves for people dying 
all the time
That way we too, would make a statement; about this unnecessary war of 
girls and women raped, of children dying in the cross fire while playing, of 
families fleeing homes, of brother against brother. This young man says no 
freedom can come from so much bloodshed and mayhem.
This young man doesn’t know that we are women disguised as men,
We started digging graves when men disappeared, fell dead,
He doesn’t know that when we send him away to sleep at sunset we start 
another mission of hiding women and children in these graves so they can at 
least get some sleep, suckle their infants in peace.
This young man doesn’t know that to an army of women gravediggers 
freedom is taking an energizing nap, on the other side of the hill.
Makhosazana Xaba (2016)
Mamphela Ramphele (1996) argues that funerals became a site of protest during the anti­
apartheid struggle. She notes that male and female bodies were made political in particularly 
gendered ways. According to Ramphele (1996):
[t]he body politic depicts and treats the female body as incomplete and 
inadequate to the task of representing nobility, heroism, and public office. The 
female body usually requires a male body to render it whole and acceptable, and 
yet when the man’s body, having lost its vitality, lies helplessly without form, its 
helplessness and lifelessness acquire meaning from the proximity of the 
relatively frail body of the widow (p. 103).
A large part of the actions of the young was the role they played as marshalls in protests 
and funerals. Every interview I did with the young women who were party of PEYCO and
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Amabutho involved their encounter with the police in funerals. Nyameka Goniwe, the wife of 
Mathew Goniwe, recounts the atmosphere of the burial of her husband in a short documentary 
about the Cradock Four, that: “it was as if the ground was moving. It was just in defiance, a 
statement which was being conveyed to the government that there is nothing that you are going 
to be able to control. I can’t even explain that kind of spirit. It was a funeral but I felt like it was 
a liberation day for many. I think that is what lifted me that day.. ,”9
Fundiswa Menzeni, born in 1963 in Port Elizabeth, who was a marshall at the funeral of 
the Cradock Four, spoke about the following:
We used to get beaten during prayer, protest at a funeral while carrying the 
coffin... We would carry the coffin on our shoulders to the church, if the services 
was in church or to Dan Qeqe [stadium]. We would need to be the first ones in 
Dan Qeqe and do the guard of honour, so that people would not force their way 
i n .  I remember in 1986, Amabutho were being shot at in the church that I 
pointed out to you to pass as you were coming here, we were at a funeral. That 
church was not there then. We were shot by the Boers there, and they poured 
teargas inside, while Amabutho were carrying the coffins. My mother fell during 
the commotion there, while people were falling on top of the coffins. She was 
never fine after that. She died in 1986 on the 3rd of November; she was buried 
on the 15th of November. She inhaled the teargas and she was never ok after 
that. Even I use some medical treatment for high blood pressure, but still I’ve 
never stopped fighting.
(Fundiswa Menzeni, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
Nkosazana Sobantu spoke about the fact that they would not be able to take someone 
who was shot to hospital.
9 Cradock Four documentary: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Azz-F0mbWP8. Accessed 14 April 
2016.
181
We would notice that someone was shot by the pellets, especially pellets, 
because we would not take the person to hospital because if they do, you know 
that the police would arrest them.
(Nkosazana Sobantu interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013).
Tiny Tatelo Mokoena, born in 1963 in Mamelo, a former deputy secretary of COSAS in 
Mamelo and the publicity secretary of the Mamelodi Youth Organisation (MAYO) and a 
member of the Zakheni Women’s Organisation, spoke about confronting death on the day of the 
Mamelodi massacre.
Then came the Mamelodi massacre in 1985, the 21st of November in 1985.
Zakheni women’s organisation, civic women’s organisation was in the forefront 
of that. There was a march of complaining about the rates that were very 
expensive, paying for things that we don’t know; paying for things called uh 
sundries on the receipt and when you as you don’t get answers. So there was a 
very big march in Mamelodi and it end up with 13 people died at that massacre.
There was a massacre on that day 21st of November and then amongst the people 
that died there was a three-month-old baby, who died in my arms due to 
suffocation due to tear gas. Heh, I still have my memory. I carried the baby from 
the area it would be abou t., I don’t know the kilometres. It could be about 10 
minutes drive, 10 minutes’ walk from the place of the mother to the place of 
surgery. and when I was there, holding the baby, I requested the doctor to wait, 
check the baby, because in that surgery there were a lot of people that teargased, 
you know, bullets and all those things, and then when I went D r .  he said this 
baby’s finished, and the mother was here. ‘This baby’s finished’ ‘No! No! 
check, check.’ And he said, ‘no, no, Tiny. Come, come.’ And then he put me on 
side and said, ‘the baby’s finished. Please, let’s proceed with those that are still 
alive.’ And then I was wearing white tracksuit and he said, ‘please go home and 
put on something dark. If they have seen you, they will be able to shoot you 
from a distance.’ And then that part always comes back, it always comes back.
And that was when we were fully involved with internal politics, ja.
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(Tiny Tatelo Mokoena interview, Pretoria, November 2014)
The constant threat and reality of death pervaded the lives of women old and young. Like 
their mothers, young women find ways to resist the state, and in doing so, were implicated in the 
all-encompassing battlefront of apartheid violence. The state, which erased the lines between the 
civil and the military, attacked all who opposed it. Young women at the fault lines, protected the 
sanctity of the dead at burial sites. They also transformed these sites into redemptive spaces for 
the living to keep fighting the enemy state.
5.5. Conclusion
The chapter accounted for the different categories of women combatants and their sites of 
struggle. The guerilla girls at the forefront of challenging the state in schools in 1976 and 
afterwards, crossed borders to gain military training that would concretise their attempts at 
guerilla warfare. The combative mothers in the community constitute the space from which most 
women participated in the armed struggle. The erasure of the public and military spheres brought 
the war to their homes, the playing fields of their children in schools, in the churches and 
everywhere in their lives. From these sites they defended themselves, their children and lived 
under constant state interrogation and attack. The in-betweetners are those young women who 
fought the war within the country, without military training. Together with their male 
counterparts, they transformed their communities into battle zones and made themselves guards 
of honour for their communities. Despite this, the combative mothers and in-betweeners, and the 
spaces from which they fought, remain delegitimised.
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Ch a p t e r  Six
Ex p e r ie n c e s  o f  De m o b il is a t io n , t h e  Ne v e r  De m o b il is e d  a n d
LIFE IN THE AFTERMATH
6.1 Introduction
Following the February 1990 release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the national 
liberation movements the other important transition that took place, parallel to the political 
transition, was the formation of the new SANDF. As outlined in Chapter Three with reference to 
the DDR process, the creation of the SANDF involved the joining together of former enemies of 
the apartheid security force, the guerilla armies of the ANC and APLA and the defence forces of 
four of the ten Bantustan homelands. It was clear that the size of the new defence force would far 
outweigh the needs and material capabilities of the newly democratic state committed to a 
demilitarised society. The strict criteria for integration into the SANDF pointed to the state’s 
need to downsize the military, and thus to let go of thousands of former combatants who were to 
join civilian life. This thesis has shown that the formal DDR process, which was led by the ANC 
and the National Party representatives, was confined to a narrow definition and conception of 
combatants. In the end, members of the old SADF accounted for the majority of members of the 
new SANDF, which stood at 90, 000, with the combined members of the TBVC armies at 11, 
039, while the MK and APLA accounted for only 34, 888 members of a total 135, 927 strong 
force. These numbers did not reflect the thousands of women and men who had participated in 
the armed struggle at the all-encompassing battleground of the People’s War. The women who 
participated in this formal state process also constituted the minority of women who had 
participated in the different terrains of the armed struggle, inside and outside the country. 
Chapter Five has shown that the war produced multiple combatants. The categories of guerilla 
girls, combative mothers and the in-betweeners, used in Chapter Five, show that women of 
different ages, in different spaces and periods of struggle, were foundational to the success of 
People’s War strategy. Yet, it is the transnational woman combatant, together with the 
transnational male guerilla, who became understood as the formal combatants of the liberation 
armies in the SANDF integration and demobilisation process, whose hierarchy and criteria for
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combatant recognition was based on military training. As shown above, it is evident from the 
experiences of the women combatants of MK and APLA below, that there were further 
hierarchies during the integration process, as the SANDF soldiers seem to have dominated the 
process and the guerilla combatants found themselves assimilated into a culture that undermined 
their skills and experience as non-statutory forces.
This chapter deals with demobilisation and reintegration of women combatants at two 
levels: 1) at the state structure level -  state recognition services and benefits; and 2) at the 
personal level -  personal, family, social, political, psychological and spiritual. In terms of 
organisation, a distinction is made between formally recognised combatants and non-recognised 
ones. The chapter first addresses the experiences of the formally demobilised women 
combatants. These are delineated into different themes, from the women’s return from exile 
under continued precarious security circumstances in the country, the DDR process, the reasons 
they chose not to integrate, and demobilisation benefits.
The chapter then examines the trajectories of the combatants who were not demobilised. 
Despite their substantial contribution to the success of the armed struggle, the Special Pension is 
the main route through which the internally-based combatant women have attempted to gain 
financial support for their role in the armed struggle. It will be shown that most of the combative 
mothers and in-betweeners have been unsuccessful in applying for the Special Pension. The 
transnationally trained guerilla girls have been more successful in receiving the financial support. 
In the main, the majority of the internally-based combatants have received no form of support 
from the state, financial or otherwise. At a personal level, the chapter shows that women have 
had to reinvent themselves for the post-apartheid reality, economically, socially, politically and 
psychologically. The section examines the different ways in which women are navigating 
civilian life, and how they deal with the enduring memories and wounds of the past.
In the main, the chapter shows that although some women received the once-off 
demobilisation payment, and a few receive the Special Pension, the majority of women have had 
to find personal means to adjust to post-apartheid life. In terms of furthering their education, 
findings jobs in the formal and informal sectors, these have been self-help strategies that women 
have used in order to survive and support their families. It is therefore not surprising to conclude 
that most women combatants are poor and marginalised. Although there are few exceptions, their
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reality reflects South Africa’s geography of poverty, where black women constitute the poor 
majority.
6.2 Experiences of formally demobilised women
The experiences of the demobilisation process articulated by women combatants who formally 
participated in the state DDR process, reflects similar themes from those expressed by the mostly 
male participants in most of the literature on demobilisation (Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; 
Mokalobe, 2001; Gear, 2002; Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2003; Everatt et al, 2006, Mashike, 
2007; Maringira and Brankovic, 2013; Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013). They also depart in 
significant ways. Core similar themes include the feeling that members of the non-statutory 
forces weren’t properly treated in the process, in terms of the requirements in education levels, 
the manner in which the ranking was conducted by a committee dominated by members of the 
old SADF, as well as perceptions by the combatants that the non-statutory forces were 
assimilated into a racist SADF military culture. Furthermore, like their male counterparts, the 
women combatants felt that the once off-payment that they received for their years in the guerilla 
army was inadequate for the personal sacrifices that they had made in order to be part of MK and 
APLA. Some of the guerilla girls found that the Special Pensions Act required them to be above 
the age of 35 years, not taking into consideration that many of them sacrificed their youth in 
order to end apartheid. As a direct result of this, however, they found themselves with few 
resources to start their lives in the post-apartheid society. They also found the facilities that were 
to assist them with attaining new skills for civilian life, such as the Service Corps, wholly 
inadequate. As a result, many had to find personal means to further their education and gain new 
skills that would assist them in navigating new professions and new lives (where many of them 
had been out of the country for years, and some for decades).
There are, however, also significant differences between the experiences that women 
shared in this study to those found in the male-centred studies in DDR and civilian integration 
research. With regards to some of these themes, it might well be that they are muted in other 
studies, because they are concerns that are associated with women and femininity, such as 
concerns about family. Of the themes that became salient in this study, some women combatants 
articulated that they joined the armed struggle as a political end, and did not see themselves as
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career soldiers. Some women expressed that with the end of apartheid, they looked forward to 
the opportunity to raise their children and be with family, while other women also expressed 
their concern about their age and health in deciding against joining the SANDF and opting to 
reintegrate into civilian life.
6.2.1 Demobilisation
As noted in Chapter Three, the CPR list was central to the ability for individual combatants to be 
able to integrate into the SANDF or to apply for demobilisation. For the women interviewed the 
first step was to confirm that their names appeared on the list. Of the women who fought from 
outside the country, none of those from MK and APLA experienced any issues with finding their 
names on the list. A total of twelve women who were interviewed for this study were officially 
demobilised, ten from MK, and two from APLA. Of the twelve, ten never integrated into the 
defence force, but instead chose demobilisation. Two MK women briefly integrated into the 
SANDF, and then demobilised in 1996 and 1998, respectively. Eleven of the participants 
received the demobilisation amount of R20, 201 (US $5, 519) for group four, which is meant for 
those who served for five to eleven years from 1 January 1983 to 31 December 1989 (Motumi 
and Hudson, 1995:120). One participant received R42 058 (US $11, 491), which is the amount 
that was awarded to those who served between 22 and 23 years from 1 January, 1961 to 31 
December, 1972. Another two, Colonel Belinda Martin and Brigadier Claire Bless, integrated 
into the SANDF until retirement. They shed light on the dynamics of the integration process that 
are similar to those expressed in other studies, mainly with regards to education and ranking, 
assimilation, demobilisation benefits, service corps and special pension (Motumi and Mckenzie 
1998; Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; 
Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009; Lamb 2013).
6.2.2 Education and ranking: “they didn’t recognise our training”
As Motumi and Hudson (1995: 118) note, a requirement for integration was that individual 
participants were required to “submit proof of educational (and or military) qualifications for 
eligibility as members of the SANDF”. Upon failure to produce the education qualifications, a
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person was required to undertake assessments tests designed to measure potential on a scale of 
Categories 1 to 10. As Motumi and Hudson (1995) notes, assessments in the Categories 1-3 did 
not qualify for acceptance into the new SANDF, while Categories 4-6 were accepted, if they 
demonstrated the potential to become non-commissioned officers, whilst those who qualified for 
Categories 7-10 could be accepted as officers. This issue of education qualification was a 
contentious issue for many in MK and APLA, who felt that as a result of this, having sacrificed 
attaining education to join the armed struggle put them in a double-bind.
Linda Mjekula (alias Jessie Mlambo), a former MK combatant, expressed that when she 
returned to South Africa from Zambia in 1992, she had intended to join the SANDF. However, 
she did not qualify to integrate into the force, because she did not have Grade 12, and also did 
not manage to pass the subsequent tests that she was required to undergo in order to integrate 
(Linda Mjekula telephone interview, September 2013). The issue of education was a contentious 
one, as some members of MK and APLA felt that they sacrificed education and other 
qualifications in order to join the armed struggle. As Brenda Badela expressed:
...there are people who left the country in 1976/1977 who were doing Standard 
Five or something, and they stayed in the camps for the rest of their lives. And 
when they came back to South Africa they were asked for 
qualifications.There’s a huge difference between a guerrilla army and a 
conventional army, you see?...I mean, there’s a comrade who was our regional 
commander in Angola. You can imagine if you were responsible for that region, 
all the camps in Angola. That person is only a brigadier general. And when I 
said, ‘but [names the person], how come?’, he said, ‘it’s how things are, what 
can you do?’; because you’d actually think that this person must be far, far, far 
senior, not a brigadier general.
(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)
Belinda Martin also expressed the sense that members of MK and APLA were undermined and 
ranked lower than members of the SADF:
. I  integrated, they ranked me a ‘major’, although I deserved more than that. All 
of us were given very poor ranks, from MK and APLA, they didn’t recognise
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our training that we had. Even medical doctors who trained abroad from MK, 
were not, they didn’t want to recognise our education.. .Because the seven 
armies merging wasn’t easy, and in the military house, we had all the medical 
professions, professionals both from the SADF, MK and APLA, and they 
wanted to tower above the non-statutory forces, that was MK and APLA, and 
undermine the qualifications of our doctors, our nurses and everybody, and rank 
them poorly.
(Belinda Martin interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
Tiny Tatelo Mokoena, the only member of the SDU who integrated to the SADF, argued 
that the ranking system was used as a form of assimilating members of the non-statutory forces:
There was nothing like integration, honestly. It was just assimilation. Or, it was 
assimilation, or...because I integrated with a degree already.. .and then, but at the 
same time for the Defence Force to agree to make me an officer was a hassle.
And then, I was lucky I had a very good person, who was representing me. They 
wanted to make me a lieutenant. And he said you can’t. I want her as a major.
But they said MK doesn’t have an Airforce. MK was an armed struggle- 
conventional organisation. So you are taking her a step downwards. That’s when 
I became a captain. I integrated with the rank of a captain. We, we, firstly we 
were not educated as far as the rank system is concerned, we were not told 
whether we were comfortable with the rank system or whether we are 
comfortable with the process of integration. And the worst part is that MK put a 
lieutenant-colonel for integration, which to me says that the government of that 
time didn’t take issues of defence seriously, because if they did they wouldn’t 
put lieutenant-colonel as a low rank for someone to represent people. They were 
supposed to put a very high senior rank -  a major general -  to represent people, 
who would be able to fight for bigger and better ranks. And most of the TBVC 
states were promoted prior to integration. Immediately that they heard there’s 
integration, they fast-tracked their promotions. So when we came, most of were 
given very, very low ranks.. .So you needed a person from us to say, ‘heh-uh, if
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you don’t have someone from your rank, from your organisation they will give 
you any rank whether you agreed to it or not’. And they will give a lot of funny 
reasons that you are not at this age. I was told you can’t be a major because I 
was not even, by then I was not even (was 27 or 30?, ja.) I was not 30, and then 
all to find I was not 35 or something, I don’t remember age they put. But all to 
find that there were people that they put when after integration, I realised there 
were white majors lower age than me, you see? So they were not systematic as 
far as that is concerned and they were not uh.. .there was no fairness in ensuring 
that they put the right people in the right ranks.
(Tiny Tatelo Mokoena interview, Pretoria, November 2014)
For many combatants, the tone of the ranking system was one that set hierarchies for the 
culture that they were to expect in the SANDF. For them, the explicit tone was that their guerilla 
experience was regarded as inferior, even though as part of the “People’s Army”, they saw 
themselves as the victors of the war that had been fought. The process undermined, and in the 
words of some participants, “humiliated” guerrilla combatants in what they saw as the 
entrenchment of the white supremacist culture of the SADF into the SANDF. The ranking and 
the education requirements of the process influenced the decision of many combatants in 
deciding that they wished to be demobilised. The theme of assimilation that speaks to 
perceptions by the combatants of a dominant Afrikaner culture of the SADF that was resistant to 
the new conditions of a post-apartheid South Africa. With fears of suffocating under this culture, 
some women combatants instead chose demobilisation.
6.2.3 Assimilation: “we humiliated our veterans”
A key theme that arises about the challenges of the integration process is the theme of 
assimilation (Motumi and Mckenzie 1998; Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; 
Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009; Lamb 2013). As 
Mokalobe (2001) notes, members of MK and APLA were resentful of the fact that it was only 
them who had to undergo the Potential Tests and orientation into professional military training,
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most of which was administered by former SADF members, “who sometimes behaved with 
prejudice towards former MK and APLA combatants (p. 76). As a result of the perceived 
dominance of the SADF and dissatisfaction with regard to the ranking system, which they saw as 
undermining the skills of the non-statutory forces, many ex-combatants opted for demobilisation, 
to escape entry into an new defence force that was still dominated by the old SADF logic. For 
the women I interviewed who participated in this process, assimilation was a major factor 
shaping their dissatisfaction with the integration process and their decision to demobilise.
A former MK who preferred to be anonymous pointed to various causes of tension, from 
the use of Afrikaans, the use of the old SADF uniform, the ranking system as the multiple causes 
of the tension that came with assimilated integration:
I think we humiliated our veterans, our senior people, by putting them on the 
same par as me, you know, to operate, to enter the system and try, try to and 
make a living like I would when actually I thought my view would have been to 
treat them differently and stuff, and thus, because they are in that situation, the 
main core of the Defence Force at the administrative level remained the old 
correspondence -  in Afrikaans. Any correspondence that comes to me in 
Afrikaans, I don’t read it, I don’t care if it’s an instruction. And all my 
correspondences would be in English, because my argument is that if you create 
a new system you all have to learn into the new system, so there will be things 
that we know there will be things that we don’t know. Why does it apply only to 
non-statutory forces, because issues of language, issues of uniform, issues of 
culture in the Defence Force and stuff like that.. .which basically resulted into in 
the long term, in my view, in us being assimilated into the thing and stuff.
(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
Of the uniform, she said:
I refused to wear the uniform, because I said, we integrated, so I’m not wearing 
the SADF uniform; we need a new uniform that can reflect both. So I left. 
Throughout my life in the Defence Force, I never wore [the] uniform.
(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
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Claire Bless, a white MK combatant who integrated into the SANDF, spoke about how 
members of SADF addressed her in Afrikaans, which she refused to and was not able to speak, 
while she sat next to her black comrades. She just kept saying that integration was a difficult 
process. For others, such as Pumza Dyantyi, the integration and demobilisation process were 
very difficult, because this meant that they came face-to-face with their former enemies, the 
Boers:
Truth be told, my child, I found the process very difficult for me having to work 
with the Boers. For grading, when we were being interviewed, they were 
assessing our grade and I was graded a sergeant, and I was Grade A. I am a 
colonel. I did just a part time at the Mthatha base, and I felt that I was not ready 
to work with these people. I decided that it is better that I go for demob.
(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)
For Pamela Daniels, entering the SANDF implied that the open spirit of engagement that 
she experienced while in MK was going to disappear under the new forms of engagement in the 
new army where soldiering was rigidly defined, and is not open to the challenge of institutional 
culture:
When I came back, of course I was planning, because there were not much 
options, I was planning to go to the Defence. Fortunately or unfortunately at the 
point when I wanted to integrate, there was a scene in Wallmansthal, where 
soldiers were fighting and looking at the situation, and of course seeing how the 
process was unfolding. I felt because I’m one person who speaks my mind, in 
the middle of Angola, I would speak my mind, and of course as you know 
there’s command and control in the Defence; you cannot just say or do whatever 
you want. But fortunately, we were taught that you respect leadership. You do 
not fear leadership; and therefore as political soldiers we had room to be able to 
air our views. Not like in any other army, where you are subjected to command 
and it ends there. So that’s the difference. So I f e l t . I  would not survive in the 
Defence, one; and of course what I’ve stated -  the way, the process unfolded, of
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course, based on the fact that we had this whole negotiated settlement and all 
that. So I felt, once I saw what was happening in Wallmansthal, I decided to take 
... the money. Of course, not knowing what I was going to do, I was going to 
go. I took, I demobilised in 1996.
(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
As Daniels expresses, in the eyes of some combatants, the rigidity and the undermining 
nature of the SANDF integration could be understood as a result of the negotiated settlement 
between the liberation movements and the National Party. The taste of this environment of 
assimilation during integration motivated some combatants to opt for civilian life.
6.2.4 Health and age
By the 1990s, some combatants had been active since the 1960s and 1970s. At the time of 
integration, they were already in their 40s and 50s. Two such combatants in this study had been 
active in the 1960s and 1970s in APLA and MK, respectively, felt that their health and age 
compromised their ability to integrate into the SANDF.
Joyce Sifuba of APLA, expressed that after being away since 1964, she and her husband, 
who was also a combatant, wanted to quietly adapt to life back in the country after their arrival in 
Johannesburg. They both felt that they were too old to join the defence force. They also 
considered living in a place that would allow for an easy transition to South Africa for their 
children who were born in exile.
We did not stay for long in Gauteng. We went to register in our office, and then 
came to Mpumalanga. We came to Mpumalanga to find a place to live. We came 
to Mpumalanga because we came with children who do not know South Africa.
So we felt if we, my husband said, if we go and live in Johannesburg, they will 
be swallowed by the volumes of Johannesburg. Let’s look for a place outside 
and then they can gradually go in and adapt the way of living in South Africa 
because Johannesburg was too fast. And, eh, my husband comes from Cape
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Town, and he also thought that Cape Town is too fast. Let’s look for a remote 
place that’s quiet until they settle down.
(Joyce Sifuba telephone interview, November 2013)
Phumla Gaba (alias Phumla Williams), who was born in 1948 in New Brighton, Port 
Elizabeth, was a school teacher before she left the country to join MK in 1978 at the age of 
thirty. Upon returning to South Africa, she worked for the ANC office as part one of the officers 
responsible for repatriating people back home. She said that when the repatriation was over, she 
realised that she did not want to integrate into the SANDF, because she was not well physically, 
as she suffered with arthritis (Phumla Gaba interview, September 2013).
6.2.5 Not a career soldier: “I just wanted to be independent”
For many who gave their lives to the cause of liberation, inside and outside the country, the 
unbanning of the liberation movements and the eventual transition to democratic rule threw up 
new questions about the kind of professional lives that one was to take, now that the battle was 
won. For those in MK, like others in different positions within the different movements, had to 
ask themselves if they were to continue on as professional soldiers or take a different path now 
that the armed struggle was over. While material considerations were made regarding the 
decision to integrate or demobilise, some of the women expressed that they had not become 
soldiers for career goals. Therefore, after the end of apartheid, they did not see themselves 
becoming career soldiers. When I asked Makhosazana Xaba, who is now a respected writer of 
fiction and poetry, whether considered integrating into the SANDF, her response was:
No, I didn’t want to. I really didn’t like the idea. When I was in the camp, I knew 
what I was there for. I had wanted to be there, I understand why I needed to be 
there: so that I could come back and fight. But I didn’t want that as a profession. I 
couldn’t visualise myself as a 50-year-old who is in the SANDF. That’s not where 
I wanted to be.
(Makhosazana Xaba interview, May 2014)
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Totsie Memela-Khambule, who is currently the CEO of Eduloan, expressed that after 
attaining a Masters Degree in Management and getting interested in the financial industry, she 
decided that she “could contribute in the Defence Force without necessarily being a soldier” 
(Totsie Memela-Khambule interview, Johannesburg, May 2014). She did not elaborate on the 
ways in which she has been able to make this contribution outside of the SANDF. Another 
participant noted that she demobilised because she wanted to be independent, and not indebted to 
a political party or government:
“I decided that I did not want to go back to the military when I got back home 
because I was still ...I just wanted to be independent, completely independent 
and not feel responsibility to government and so I demobilised. There was a 
demobilisation process, so I became one of the people that demobilised.”
(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
When Bonnin (2000) argues that surviving and resisting apartheid terror meant that the 
lives of most people were suspended, for those the guerrilla combatants, there was little space for 
them to conceive of professional lives outside of the war that they were fighting. The end of 
apartheid opened a space for them to imagine a new future beyond a life of mere survival and 
resistance. Thus, it is not surprising that some women opted for demobilisation to give 
themselves a space to make concrete the rewards of freedom.
6.2.6 Family: “we’ve been away for a long time”
Some women chose against integration into the SANDF because, after years of separation with 
family, they wished to rebuild their family lives. Nombulelo April lost two of her children in 
1994 and 1998; they both suffered from the physical injuries at the hands of the police in search 
of their mother during the apartheid years. She expressed that she looked forward to a time to be 
with her children. Phumla Gaba expressed a similar yearning for a family life after years of 
separation
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...we’ve been away for a long time and you have that feeling that it has been a 
long time since you were home. I studied primary, secondary, boarding school 
and then I worked in Transkei and the left, so there is that feeling I want to be at 
home.
(Phumla Gaba interview, September 2013)
Nomfundiso Kulati, who returned to South Africa in 1994 after completing a broadcasting 
diploma in Zimbabwe, decided that she would not integrate in order to be able to look after her 
then young son.
So I came with my son, tried to re-establish myself using the qualifications that I 
had. I didn’t want to integrate and be part of the National Defence Force, not 
because I didn’t have passion, but because I had this child, and when I looked at 
my boy, I was asking myself, ‘who would best take care of him?’ So I just 
wanted more to be a civilian. And I was lucky to get a job as a public relations 
officer.
(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
The theme of family is muted in other studies about integration and demobilisation. It 
may well be that, in those studies, the male combatants were not asked if family consideration 
affected their decision to demobilise. Even though in this study, the women combatants were not 
explicitly asked if family affected their decision not to integrate, it is unsurprising that women 
combatants would feel more comfortable to articulate the importance of family in their decision 
making, as women are socially expected to prioritise family, even when they consider their 
professional development. In the same vein, it may be that certain male combatants did not feel 
that it is “manly” to discuss family as a factor in their decisions. Thus, prevailing understandings 
of femininity and masculinity shape, as in all research, what participants can reveal about their 
motivations in making certain decisions.
6.2.7 Demobilisation payment: “not worth what I went through”
It was not a surprise that the many of the women who qualified to receive the once-off 
demobilisation payment felt that it was an inadequate amount of compensation for the sacrifices 
for the sacrifices that they had made. The money was particularly considered insufficient for
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people who were starting their lives anew, often with enormous expectations from families 
which also needed their financial support.
I received the demobilisation [amount] ... but you should realise what I 
received was not worth what I went through. The disadvantage being the 
recognition of all the years that I spent, the training that I went through, and 
what I went through. Now R21, 000, really, I mean, I didn’t enjoy my 
youth; I went through what I went through. We were living under conditions 
that were not safe. From time to time we were attacked; from time to time 
we had to run away, to go to alternative bases, because the Boers might 
attack.
(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
Nomfundiso Kulati explicated the demands of having children, and also the expectations of 
financial support for one’s extended family, in relation to compensation:
[w]ith family, things are kind of fine, although they have great expectations 
because: 1) you have sacrificed your life at a young age, and at times, they look 
up to you to improve their socio-economic situations. Remember, because we as 
Africans have all these, you know, extended family, and you can’t provide. And 
you discover that: 1) I was entitled to... when I came back there was no United 
Nations, eish, UNHCR, so I never got all the benefits of those who came back 
earlier than me. So I had no money, I had a child, I did not integrate. Okay, I 
decide to take a minimum amount of a demobilisation fund, which was 20, 000, 
which ended within few days, few months or so.
(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
The once-off payment that demobilised combatants were given to assist them navigate the 
socio-economic transition to civilian life did not take into account the multiple financial needs 
that many of the women and men were to face as they were making multiple transitions, from 
guerilla to civilian, and from life in exile, to life at home. The SANDF-run Service Corps was the
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institutional mechanism provided to demobilised combatants to attain the skills that would assist 
them in finding their path to new careers as civilians.
6.2.8 Service corps
As noted in Chapter Three, the Service Corps was the main instrument that the state used to offer 
short term training of new skills that demobilised combatants would require for their post­
military lives. As Gear (2002) notes, the Service Corps offered 18 months of skills training, 
conversion courses, and career profiling. The 18 months was divided into three months of 
literacy training, and adult life skills training, three months of vocational training, which was 
facilitated by the Department of Labour, and 12 months of practical experience (Motumi and 
Hudson, 1995: 123). According to Motumi and Hudson (1995: 124), the Corps was criticised for 
failing to conduct adequate research to identify the needs and aspirations of the demobilised and 
instead choosing to offer a blanket approach to the menu of skills that were offered (Motumi and 
Hudson, 1995: 124).
Of the women interviewed for this study, only one participated in the 18 months training 
offered by the Service Corps. She focused on farming as a skill, and is currently a fulltime 
subsistence farmer. For the other women who officially demobilised, the Service Corps did not 
appear in conversation, having offered the training that they knew they would need in re-starting 
their lives. One of the participants, who preferred to be anonymous, participated in the design of 
the Service Corps programme, and offered an insider critique that is important to cite in detail, as 
it corroborates the weaknesses that scholars Motumi and Hudson (1995), and Gear (2002) have 
highlighted in their critiques. Her first response regarded the fact that the SANDF had not chosen 
skills training relevant to the combatants, but rather followed templates that had been used in 
other countries. Insightfully, her argument was that, due to a desire to maintain certain control, 
the SANDF was not able to let go of the programme and instead in the Service Corps, the ex­
combatants behaved like soldiers, even though the purpose of the programme was to prepare 
them for civilian life.
You see, the concept and the initial research about, because the difficulty that 
you had is that you had to work with what you had. The audit of what skills 
people have was done. The ask [requirements] of the South African economy,
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opportunities that were available around that particular time, was done.the 
whole proposal was based on that. But there were certain things that were part of 
that particular process that we had raised that were constraining what could be 
an effective programme, because the bigger issue was that our view was that you 
can’t do these th ings. My argument was that you can’t prepare people for 
civilian life, and then want them to continue to live as soldiers. First thing they 
do in the morning is to do is drill...the issue that we kept on raising as a 
constraint, and that was the source of the problem, was that these people -  we 
are preparing them for civilian life -  but we want to continue to treat them and to 
a point sometimes humiliate them in the soldiering environment; that they would 
have to wake up and drill and do all the things that, you know, for me, the first 
three hours they are awake, they are soldiers.
(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
She extended her argument on the limited preparation give to soon-to-be civilians in a 
military environment, as a crucial weakness of the purpose of the Service Corps:
. t h e  argument was that the environment was not conducive, is not enabling 
them to think outside of the military. So, when they finish these sessions for 3-4 
hours, they go back, and are held to the same rules as they do, and to actually 
say what does discipline mean when you’re a civilian? What are the things that 
we need to carry that we’ve learned as a disciplined soldier, that you need to 
carry as a citizen? ...These were the issues that we were grappling with and we 
were saying, ‘this thing can’t be effectively done in a military set-up’. You see?
You probably needed a different environment. It could still be owned by the 
Defence Force, but they can’t be living as soldiers. If it’s a question of releasing 
people to go to their families, and come to that particular process, they are still 
under the ambit of the Defence Force, but they are living a normal life. They are 
not staying in a camp and doing the drills, you know. That’s one.
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(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May, 2014)
She also pointed to the fact that the people who were running the programme were 
themselves soldiers as another limitation.
The second thing we’re saying, the big components of the people running the 
Service Corps are soldiers, you know? They don’t fully appreciate the nuances 
of the life that, you know, ordinary citizens who are non-soldiers that we are 
preparing these people for. So those were and those things were never answered.
These were the things that were rejected and the thing was primarily run by 
soldiers who were primarily white, and the people were preparing were 
primarily black.
(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May, 2014)
The formal demobilisation process, which for some began with a brief integration into the 
SANDF, was a hostile and undermining experience for many combatants, who felt that their 
guerrilla experience was being discarded in place of the white Afrikaner culture of the SADF. 
The fear of being assimilated into this culture influenced the decision of some women to opt for 
demobilisation. As it is also shown, the end of apartheid opened up an opportunity for some 
women to re-imagine their lives anew, and to form new personal and professional identities 
outside of guerrilla identities that had shaped all their life until then. While for some, age 
compromised health, and the desire to be with children informed their decision not to integrate. It 
is also shown that the once-off demobilisation payment and the Service Corp were inadequate in 
supporting former combatants in building new socio-economic identities. Thus, in the main, the 
former combatants were obliged to personally transition into civilian life. For those who could 
not participate in the formal demobilisation process, the special pension is the only way that they 
were able to obtain financial support to build their lives following the sacrifices they made to the 
anti-apartheid struggle. While the pension is meant to assist the broad range of individuals who 
participated in the People’s War, the formally trained transnational combatants are more likely to 
receive this form of state support than combatants who were inside the country.
200
6.3 Experiences of women who were not demobilised
6.3.1 Special pension: “there are a lot of problems with the special pension”
The provision of the special pension, as outlined in the Special Pension Act of 1996, has been the 
main form of state financial support that the women who fought inside the country along APLA, 
MK, and the Self-Defence Units, such as Amabutho, have sought to get from the state. As noted 
in Chapter Three, the Special Pensions Act provides for persons “who made sacrifices or who 
have served the public interest in establishing a democratic constitutional order, including 
members of any armed or military force not established by or under any l a w .” According to 
Heinecken and Bwalya (2013), “of 20, 000 applicants, only 2, 000 have been approved and a 
great deal of controversy remains in terms of how this is administered” (p. 35). Although the 
special pension was an issue for the women who were officially demobilised, it came very 
strongly amongst the APLA and Amabutho women in Mqanduli and Port Elizabeth. They 
detailed the various attempts to receive the pension, and the struggles of dependents, who have 
tried to apply for parents who have since died. For older women, accounts of experiences of 
APLA women in Mqanduli show that the process of applying for a special pension is a 
frustrating, bureaucratic procedure, which has not offered relief for many of those who have 
applied. For younger women, the fact that the act required applicants to be 35 years in order to 
qualify did not reflect the reality that many young people sacrificed their youth towards the ends 
of freedom. Thus, for those who could not participate in the formal DDR process, the provision 
of the special pension has offered little reward. In the main, these women have had no support 
towards building civilian livelihoods in post-apartheid South Africa. Out of the 36 women 
interviewed in this study, only seven receive the monthly special pension. Five are MK members 
and two APLA, all seven are women are the transnational combatants.
Nkosazana Sobantu commented on the fact that a requirement of the special pension was 
that applicants needed to be 35 and older at the time of the passing of the act:
Amabutho worked a lot in terms of putting force into the government. They 
were disrupting, burning cars, all the buildings of the government, because 
anything that had come through the system, was an enemy to us. So they played 
that role and the people using them were adults and the police did not understand
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how children could do this. So would see that children were participating in the 
struggle and now they are not able to receive the Special Pension because they 
were still too young. There is an act that says they are too young: that they were 
not 35 during 1996, of which because of that, some of them are not able to 
receive the pension. We are fighting against that, because they are the ones who 
fought, but today they are not recognised. They are not being given the privilege 
that others are given.
Nkosazana Sobantu (interview in Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
This age criteria also affected those like, Nomfundiso Kulati, who were formally 
demobilised. Demobilised combatants were allowed to receive DDR benefits, and apply for 
special pension. Kulati could also not apply for the special pension because of her age:
It was around ’97, I think ’97/98. Because I was young, joined the struggle at a 
young age, I also -  there’s this issue of special pensions. Many people were 
benefitting through that act, the act has disadvantaged me because of my age- 
they were saying I was too young then. Eh, the act wanted people were 35 years 
when the act was passed in 1996 and I was younger than 35 years so I don’t 
qualify. Now that I have children and both of their fathers are no more, the act 
does not even take into account the fact that I have two kids I must raise all by 
myself.
(Nonfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
Mrs. Mabhengeza stated that with the help of members of Amabutho, she had applied for 
the special pension with no success:
I applied for the Special Pension, but I did not receive the money. It was done by 
Amabutho. There is a child called, [mentions name], who is from New Brighton.
Another one called [mentions name], they did the special pension application for
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me, but it never came out. They said we know that ma-Mabhengeza was there. 
You see?
(Mabhengeza interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)
Zile Xolo, the APLA chairperson of the Jixeni Branch in Mqanduli, outlined some of the 
challenges faced by women who applied for the special pension under the PAC/APLA:
.o n e  of the problems is that the mothers did not know how to apply for the 
special pension. There was no one to assist them about how to apply, and so a 
lot of them were unsuccessful with the application. Then there was the opening 
of the Appeal Board, and they appealed. It did not help, because when a person 
has been unsuccessful the first time, it did not help when they tried other steps to 
apply. For example, their leader Nqeketho, the leader of the region, was arrested.
He is a man. He then learned what one has to do when they are making the 
application. He then came back and taught others what they need to do when 
they apply, and the death certificates for the families who are applying on behalf 
of the deceased and birth certificates etc. But, in spite of all of that, their 
applications were declined again. We think that the issue is that the Special 
Pension was started without it, the process of application, being explained to 
people. And then they amended the section on children. The Special Pension 
allows your children to be the beneficiaries if the parent has died. The amount 
that they receive was just R50, 000, when the parent has passed on. And then 
this provision was amended such that children of a certain age would no longer 
be eligible to receive this amount. This became a problem for those who made 
the application for their children to benefit before this provision was amended.
These are some of the reasons that we are facing difficulties. One of the women 
in the area was so distraught after her application was not successful, that she 
suffered a stroke. The other issue was that with the emergence of new IDs, there 
were problems with Home Affairs. Some of the women, ages of the women, 
were inaccurately captured by Home Affairs. Often, the actual age was reduced, 
and others increased, and they would have already made the application with an
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ID with another age, and a new one with correct age, and the different ages, 
which caused another problem for the application process.
(Zile Xolo interview, Mthatha, October 2013)
Xolo provided other examples of the kinds of administrative problems faced by 
applicants, such as those pertaining to surnames:
.w e  had a case of a Ma-Nquthula and her daughter in law. Ma-Nquthula is the 
second wife to her husband. The first wife died. When Nquthula married, her 
husband’s son had a wife already. When she was arrested, she was arrested with 
her daughter in law. And yet now, when they applied and were each other’s 
witnesses, they were asked why they have the same surname. They were 
witnesses for each other because they were arrested together. Their application 
was rejected, because they share the same surname. You see, there are a lot of 
problems with the special pension.
(Zile Xolo interview, Mthatha, October 2013)
Totsie Memela-Khambule complications that were faced by partners, who were both 
combatants and activists, often women are assumed to be the dependents of their partners, even 
though they made their own contributions:
But then, over the years, there was now when the special pension started. I 
mean, it took years to apply for the special pensions, going to Pretoria, polishing 
(what you call) chairs there, and it was quite interesting because over the years, 
my husband died, the father of my children died. We had been married in exile.
And interesting thing happened, whereby they said to me I cannot get his money, 
because there are two of us. But I didn’t go to exile with him. I went to exile 
alone. It was not on his ticket that I went; I actually met him there, so my going 
there had nothing to do with him. But, besides, it’s not about him, for me it’s 
about his children. So it’s only now I’ve had again, I think it’s more because my 
sister works in the Defence Force, that I’ve been able to restart the process and
204
I’m still in the process of applying for his money. He died long time ago. He 
died (Lesedi was how old?) Lesedi was 7, and he’s now 24. I still don’t have that 
money.
(Totsie Memela-Khambule interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
There is overwhelming sense that the institutional mechanisms provided by the 
government to support combatants of the People’s War have not been sufficient to support them 
to rebuild their lives after the war. Those who participated in the formal process of DDR had the 
benefit of a once-off payment and a possibility of receiving special pension, as some of the 
women do. But for the internal combatants, there has been little to no institutional support to 
allow them to pick up the pieces and transition into post-apartheid life. Below, the chapter 
examines the personal, social, economic and psychological transition that the women combatants 
have negotiated for themselves. These accounts are of the guerilla girls, the combative mother 
and the in-betweeners.
6.4 Personal reintegration
The formal integration and DDR process that some women participated in was but one aspect of 
the reintegration that the women combatants were to undertake. The all-encompassing and 
transnational nature of the apartheid war means that separation and displacement is a key feature 
of the legacy of that war, like many others. The dead bodies of loved ones which remain 
unaccounted for inside and outside the country, the lack of payment of reparations for those who 
testified as victims in front of the TRC, point to an unrelenting ‘woundedness’ that continues to 
pervade post-apartheid memory of the People’s War. This section examines reintegration into 
peaceful civilian life beyond the state process of demobilisation, and civilian reintegration. The 
anxieties of the women who had been separated from family in exile are made visible, along with 
the profound pain and uncertainty of being reunited with one’s family, and the enduring 
psychological trauma that is palpable in the lives of all women combatants. It is shown here that 
in an economically challenging post-apartheid context, women carried the heaviest burden of 
being the breadwinners of their immediate and extended families. In such a context, women find
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themselves needing to be “strong” for their families. The informalisation of the post-apartheid 
economy has resulted in the cheapening and feminisation of work, where women find poorly 
paid jobs to sustain their families (Hunter, 2011). In her doctoral work on township mothers and 
daughters, Motsemme (2011) argues that township mothers have found themselves in the post­
apartheid context, where their children are poor, and many have been casualties to the HIV/AIDS 
crisis. Thus, in the aftermath of apartheid, poverty and death remain an everyday reality in South 
Africa. Women former combatants are at the centre of this socio-economic crisis, where they 
carry the social responsibility to find means for their families to survive. The section also 
examines memory, and the various ways in which women carry with them lingering thoughts 
and habits that are shaped by the war in which they participated.
6.4.1 Coming home: “I don’t know you”
For the South African women who went to receive training outside the country, coming back to 
South Africa following the unbanning of the national liberation movements was a tale of its own 
that offered no guarantee that one would find their family alive. There is evidence from other 
post-war societies showing that survivors of war deal with overlapping cases of trauma as they 
attempt to recover their lives in the context of peace.10 The separation and displacement that 
resulted from apartheid violence, is not unique in this case. The process of returning home after 
years of separation was, for many women, replete with personal, social, political and economic 
uncertainty.
Brenda Badela, narrated landing in East London with her family from Lusaka, describes 
the anxiety that she and her family felt as they arrived in the country:
.F rom  Lusaka to Jan Smuts Airports, then from Jan Smuts Airport to East 
London. When we arrived in East London Airport, there was a problem with our 
flight here, there was definitely a problem with the flight landing here; so it
10 The final Liberian TRC Diaspora Report (2009) revealed evidence of the “triple trauma” paradigm amongst 
Liberians who fled the country to Ghana, Ivory Coast, United States, UK and elsewhere. The triple trauma paradigm 
posits that “refugees experience trauma in the country of origin, during flight and in the country of refugee” 
(Liberian TRC Diaspora Report, 2009, p. 303). Liberians shared traumatic tales of how they were forced to leave 
Liberia after witnessing brutal killings of family members, of the hardship in trying to escape through Liberian 
borders that were overtaken by rebels, o f starting a new life in a country with no material assets, and a family that 
was either all killed or scattered over West Africa.
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ended up landing in, i n .  it ended up landing i n .  oh, you know what: we were 
supposed to go to Umthatha from Lesotho to here, from here we took a flight to 
Umthatha; Transkei at the time was independent. But on our way to Umthatha, 
the weather in Umthatha was very bad, in that the plane could not land. We were 
very scared, Siphokazi, we did not know what to do! We then realised that Bantu 
Holomisa was here in our plane. How many were we? I think we were only four.
Here is Bantu Holomisa; I think my ex-husband approached him in the place.
They said the plane is going to land in East London, instead of Umtata. So he 
approached Bantu Holomisa told him that these are MK people. We were 
scared; we did not want the whites to identify us. Bantu asked, ‘how many are 
you?’ Andile stated how many we were. Bantu said, ‘no, that’s fine’. Let’s land 
in Umthatha [corrects herself] -  lets land in East London. That was 1990 
January/February, I don’t remember. When we landed in East London he said,
‘those 5/6 comrades, can they please come with me?’ Five guys or something 
like that, you know, but he used a term. So as a result of that when we arrived at 
the airport, the Boers did not even bother to look at our passports or IDs, or so 
on. He took two cars, because we needed to be transported, so we drove from 
East London to Umtata -  that’s where we were supposed to land anyway -  
Mthatha, because of security reasons. Much as the ANC was unbanned, but we 
were still not sure how the Boers were going to treat us once we arrived.
(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)
Joyce Sifuba also pointed out that the ways in which the repatriation process was carried out, left
many people to fend for themselves with little to no social security:
“When people were repatriated when they came in, the United Nations has 
nothing to do with it. When you get home, you were dropped off, and from 
there, you have to fend for yourself. Your own organisation must see to it that it 
gives you information: where to get help, or where to get assistance.”
(Joyce Sifuba telephone interview, November 2013)
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Besides the anxiety regarding actual arrival home, the biggest anxiety for many women 
was about the well-being of their families and their ability to re-build relationships. It was 
particularly difficult for the women who had left young children behind, when they left the 
country. Belinda Martin expressed the anguish of returning home to dying parents and a daughter 
who did not know her:
Nineteen-ninety-one, I came back home. Things were horrible when I came back 
home. The family was, the family was not the family I knew. You understand? 
Everything was topsy-turvy at home, because my mom was in hospital, my dad 
was also not too well, he had cancer. I was at home for a month before my mum 
passed away in my arms. I had just given her a bath one morning in June, and 
she passed on. And June, July, August, my dad passed away, the same year.
1991. Also in my arms, after bathing h im . my daughter, my brother’s 
daughter, my step sister’s son was being taken care of by my parents, and they 
were absolutely traumatised. They could never accept me, you understand? And 
they always thought: ‘now that you’re back you’re coming to try and take over, 
when we were the ones who suffered with your parents when you were not 
here’, and things like that, and my daughter especially, felt I abandoned her. Ja, 
and would never accept me as her mother. You understand? When my mum, the 
coffin went down, she said to me at the grave, ‘there goes my mother, I don’t 
know you’. You know. And it took years; it took years for us to have a mother- 
daughter relationship.
(Belinda Martin interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
Pumza Dyantyi expressed the anxiety of starting afresh at home, while the peers that one 
left behind seemed to have met the professional and material expectations of adulthood:
Well it was not easy when I arrived. Remember that when you come back you 
see peers, people that you grew up with, they have cars and you are just coming 
back. You have no work, you have nothing. It was not easy to depend on your 
family to give you something. But it didn’t take me too long to get a job. But it’s
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a very tough time to adjust, but the thing I am thankful to God, that my mother 
was still alive. At least, because there are those who came home and there were 
no homes, there was nothing. At least, I still have some people. It was very 
difficult, very.
(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)
The theme on psychological trauma extends on the mental demands of transitioning from 
exile to home, and for all women involved, the demands of transitioning from war to peace. The 
point of highlighting the step of coming home, for those who had left the country, is to show that 
the process of repatriation was coupled with anxieties about the status of one’s family and the 
transition from often unstable transnational life to the task of grounding oneself within their 
community again after years, and sometimes decades of separation. Combatants also faced the 
task of building new professional identities that were to determine their economic security in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The theme of economic security revealed that most women have 
struggled to find economic opportunities.
6.4.2 From umzabalazo to ukutabalaza (from the struggle to hustling)
Levels of education have made the biggest impact on the socio-economic well-being of women 
interviewed for this study. The women who have received tertiary education have more job 
security than those with high school, or no education. Of the thirty-six women interviewed in this 
study, fourteen are currently employed. Of that fourteen, eleven are former MK, one from 
Amabutho, one from an SDU in Mamelodi, and one from APLA. Amongst the employed include 
a former member of parliament, CEO, a current minister of health in the Eastern Cape, teacher, 
civil servants, five civil servants, and the rest either own their business or work in the private 
sector. Of the seven unemployed, three are member of Amabutho, three MK and one APLA. 
About fifteen are at pension age, six Amabutho, four MK (two retired from the SANDF), and 
five APLA. Most of the women in this sample, employed or not, are the ‘breadwinners’ of their 
families. Most of them are responsible for their immediate and extended family. Most of the 
women who are receiving old-age pensions support unemployed children and grandchildren.
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Many of these women have to find different ways of making ends meet. In the main, for women 
young and old, have to ‘hustle’, in a manner of speaking, to keep the family afloat. Victoria 
Nagetsana exclaimed that she is struggling to support her grandchildren, who are under her care:
Hey! I am struggling! The grants take long and I am not clear on the issue of 
foster care.
(Victoria Nagetsana interview, Port Elizabeth, August 2013)
Mrs. Mabhengeza that she has tried to get involved in community projects so that she can 
supplement her old-age pension, in order to support her unemployed children:
I attend meetings. There are no street committees. We are called to meetings and 
are told about new projects. We were told about a project that paid us R130, but 
we have not been paid. We would collect papers around and we were promised 
money. It has been four years and we have not been paid. We accept these 
projects, because the pension amount of R1200 is not enough, we have to pay 
accounts.
(Mabhengeza interview, Port Elizabeth, August 2013)
Motsemme (2011) denote “ukuphanta” (used interchangeably in isiXhosa as 
“ukutabalaza” and “ukuphanda”) as a means of ‘finding a way in order to survive,’ ‘getting by’ 
and ‘making ends meet’ (p. 104). She argues that this “is a social concept that can be found in 
several communities, particularly the working class, throughout the world” (p. 104), noting that 
the process of ‘hustling’ “involves a set of skills, a way of doing something to create 
opportunities for income to achieve often provisional results, such as acquiring groceries, school- 
fees, clothing, toiletries, beauty products, fast-food, entertainment, cover transport costs, airtime 
and other everyday household necessities” (p. 106). She notes that because, for the poor, the 
needs always outnumber the available resources, the poor often are forced to resign themselves 
to a hand-to-mouth existence, or as it is said in the Portuguese language, “pra Hoje ja  da, pra 
manha dues dara” (for today we’re covered; tomorrow God will provide) (Tavares, 1998, cited 
in Motsemme, 2011: 106).
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6.4.3 Political involvement
For many women their past role in the anti-apartheid struggle has shaped their current political 
involvement or refusal thereof. In the main, most women remain politically involved in ANC, 
PAC and Amabutho structures. Some of them hold leadership positions at branch, provincial and 
national levels. The women who are poor, it is difficult for them to explain why they support a 
party that has not yielded material benefits for them. Some, such as Boniswa, who gave up their 
youth for the struggle, find themselves in a complex place where they have to explain to their 
children why she continues to support the ANC even though there is little material benefit to her 
current life. She shared that her
Eldest child often asks, “why are we still with the ANC because there is nothing 
it has given you”. Even the youngest child is tired of it. But I like the ANC; I 
live because of the ANC. I bought my children Sarafina the movie, to show them 
how white people used to treat us, because the youngest one used to come from 
school telling me about the DA, ‘the DA this and that’, I would get upset by that.
But now they understand.
Thandiswa expressed similar sentiments that although she survives by doing domestic work, she 
will remain ANC:
The [children] usually laugh and say, “but Mama, you are still struggling”. I 
respond by saying, “yes, we were struggling for you”. Even now, we are still 
ANC here at home; no-one will change and join Helen Zille’s party. We are ANC, 
our vote will to ANC, not any other party. If you look at Cape Town, black people 
are still oppressed, and yet they vote for Helen Zille. White people are still living 
well, we are struggling. To white people, I will die a kaffir. I tell my children that 
if they have to fight a Boer for more money at work, they must fight them there 
not from the outside, you can’t fight from outside.
And yet, Boniswa expressed elsewhere a seemingly contradictory statement, where she noted:
People who are doing better are those who were always privileged, those who 
were poor are still poor. It is as if on top of the oppression they experienced, 
there is another layer that has been added. It is worse now. It is as if it would be
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better if we were not free because the way I see it, we were better off when we 
were being chased by the Boers.
Winnie Tukushe, who was in the leadership of PEWO, reflected that the incorporation of 
organisations such as PEWO into the ANC Women’s League was perhaps a mistake, because 
women have stopped organising. Instead, women only grieve at funerals, and are not doing the 
political organising that is needed in their communities. She expressed that, due to her ailing 
health, she grew tired of attending political meetings, also because politicians are “liars”. Mrs. 
Mafutha also expressed that most people are in politics for personal gain, and that for that reason, 
dedicate her life to God rather than politics. The theme on psychological trauma shows that most 
women face the challenge of surviving current challenges while also dealing with palpable 
trauma from the past.
6.5 Psychological trauma
After the massacre
After the bodies had been identified, counted and taken away
After the police had come and gone, the neighbours stuck around
Four women walked the familiar path in a single file, paraffin lamps in their 
hands
The stars listened to their now hushed cries, watched them wipe away silent 
tears Mechanically they filled their water buckets from the homestead tank
Back at home, rags and soap from the cupboards they started cleaning: first, 
sweeping shards of glass scattered in every room, then, wiping splashes of blood 
on walls and broken windows, smeared across the furniture, doors, sometimes 
even spotting the ceiling.
In the kitchen, they removed pieces of brain tissue splattered in all directions
When they went on their knees to clean the floors cupping congealed blood in 
their hands—they told the girls to look away instructed them to comfort younger 
children, sing them lullabies until they sleep.
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They put in a bowl all the cartridges and bullets they found. In the bedrooms, 
they stripped the blood-stained bedcovers and curtains soaked everything in 
large zinc tubs for washing the next day.
They went into each room, repositioned everything until the homestead looked 
almost exactly as it did before the massacre. By sunrise the women had restored 
the homestead. But images of bodies that were identified counted and taken 
away
Linger, years later, in the women’s hearts and heads
In their hands they still see blood, broken glasses and brain tissue.
Makhosazana Xaba (2016)
The theme of trauma is a central one in the research about the post-military lives of 
combatants. The studies show that beyond social and economic marginalisation, there is 
extensive psychological trauma of unaddressed pain and woundedness from the violence of 
apartheid (Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 
2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009; Lamb 2013). The work on wellbeing of formerly- 
conscripted white soldiers in the SADF also reveals unaddressed trauma (Edlmann, 2014). The 
absence of literature on women’s experiences of demobilisation means that the testimonies by 
women to the TRC are the only ones that represent the psychological trauma that women have 
suffered due to the war (Ross, 2003; Motsemme, 2011). The hint towards cataloguing women’s 
multiple sources of trauma has focused on women’s sexual abuse in MK camps (Mokolobe 
2001; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009). The experiences that are articulate below offer a rich and 
distinctive account of the multiple sources of trauma that have not been articulated in other work.
This participant from MK expressed the pressure about starting a new life, family 
pressure, health issues that she faced because of the multiple pressures she faced. And a painful 
relationship with a child that she left behind when she went to exile:
Look, things were challenging, but I never went to counseling, neh? But I had a 
challenge, for instance, when I got back home, there were so many things I 
could not understand why they were happening that way, you know. I wanted to 
fix everything at once, forgetting that we had gotten back to reality and that
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things would not go the way you wish. So I developed a low blood pressure, and 
with the low blood pressure I used to get admitted in hospital now and again.
And, you know the other thing really I didn’t mention, was that when I left for 
exile, I had a baby who I left, who was a year and a few months -  a son. Now, 
when I came back, I got back, and my son did not know me. That was my 
biggest challenge, really. It was difficult because he stayed with my mother’s 
sister. When I got back she prevented me seeing him. I had serious struggles 
with my aunt, serious struggles with my aunt in terms of my child. So much 
struggle that there was a time that I really hated her. I thought I would never 
forgive her for preventing me to bond with my child, by all means. And I even 
ask myself, what kind of parent would prevent another parent not to bond with 
their child, and she calls herself my aunt, you see? So I had such struggles, I did 
not understand how some people do certain things. So I would spend time in 
hospital with low blood pressure, stressing about this and that. But one day, 
while sleeping in hospital, I told myself that, ‘you know what, it’s not gonna 
help me stressing, so I better take one step at a time.
(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September, 2013)
Fundiswa Menzeni of Amabutho expressed that the daily violence has physical and 
mental implications for the mental wellbeing of individuals today. Here, she highlights the 
lingering traumatic smell of the police teargas.
Sometimes you observe that there are problems, such as lack of health, people 
are not doing so well... most of them were beaten too much by the Boers. The 
tear gas because they mess up with you internally. You see the tear gas, yes.
(Fundiswa Menzeni interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
Fezeka Klaas expressed that she is not able to look at a dead body because she saw too 
many people who were killed brutally.
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It affects me badly, sisi. Even now when a person passes away, even if they were 
sick, I cannot look at the body, I cannot look at the body, regardless of who it is.
Nonfundiso Kulati spoke about her battle with anger, about living with memories of 
torture in jail, and the difficulties times in exile:
Honestly, when it comes to trauma, it manifests in many different ways. Yes, I 
don’t drink. We do suffer from that post-traumatic stress in a way. I mean, you 
can imagine having to be in jail at a young age, to be detained and beaten up at a 
young age and leave. That would affect you psychologically. It’s not like 
anybody was meant to leave and train in conditions that you never really, I 
mean, expect you to find yourself in, you know, to be. It does manifest, because 
at times you have this unexpected anger, you know. Okay, you try sometimes to 
manage it but you, it’s difficult at times; it’s not easy.
(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
Nkosazana Sobantu spoke about the ways in which women struggle in personal 
relationships, especially with partners whom they do not perceive as having been active in the 
struggle, but are benefitting today, while they themselves struggle.
.th o se  who are suffering mostly are the women with social relations. 
Sometimes you see when someone is trying to study, but they still have that 
image that they are a soldier, and sometimes, she is dating someone who is not 
a soldier, who does not understand the way she feels. Sometimes you see a 
picture of something, maybe corruption, and the person comments by saying 
that, ‘we did not struggle for this’, and yet that person was not there during the 
struggle, and the person is benefitting from the struggle today. They were 
never arrested, did not go to exile, and were not part of Amabutho, but today 
he is benefitting.
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Another participant shared about the difficulties she faced in her first marriage with a 
fellow MK member. Due to their training, she noted that they would come close to attacking 
each other. She struggled with meeting the expectations that families have within a patriarchal 
society:
But also, what I see as a major, major problem is the fact that we went to a state 
of war; as you know, when a soldier fall you can’t leave him, you must carry 
your dirt, you must watch your dirt, you must take care of them. You see, you 
live, you do all those things, and you come back there’s no de-briefing, there’s 
no psychological de-briefing; and you are expected to integrate and live a 
normal life. I mean, really, that’s not practical, that’s not realistic.. .you see 
being in the military you live in a certain way. There are these rules; there’s a 
discipline of the military, and you tend to want to live that way even in a family 
environment, and that will translate to a lot of...challenges with children, 
because with my late husband we were both soldiers and, and even when we do 
things, we used to come to a point where we would say, ‘okay we will shoot 
each other’, because we were equally trained in our own individual right.. .in our 
own individual right we are commanders, because in our training, we were told 
we are all commanders. We were trained. We did a commander’s course. And, 
and, and families would not understand that way of doing th ings.
Most women have found different ways to deal with psychological trauma, often outside 
of seeking professional help. In the main, most of the participants are still going through 
individual journeys of reconciling their current behaviours with the past. They share their 
experiences of the past with family members, often their children, as a way to appreciate the 
present and to reconcile with the wounds of the past. It is clear from this data that greater 
institutional attention ought to be paid to women’s psychological wellbeing. But one gets the 
impression that although communities are aware that women suffer from these difficulties, often 
women are expected to endure unremittingly. The adage that women are ‘stronger than men’ 
psychologically obscures the real ways in which women’s trauma remains unaddressed, and as 
such, ever more urgent.
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6.6 Women are stronger than me
While the theme of trauma was salient in women’s articulations of the emotional and 
psychological challenges that they face in recreating their lives at the end of apartheid. There was 
also a repeated articulation of women’s emotional and psychological strength, which enabled 
them to better withstand than their male counterparts. When asked if women had been involved 
or attempted to engage in violent and criminal activities when they found themselves facing 
economic and personal challenges, women’s strength was expressed as a way of pointing to 
women’s coping capabilities. Pumza Dyantyi used strength as a way of explaining why destitute 
women ex-combatants have not turned to alcoholism, as have their male counterparts:
Lots of people are destitute, MK; both women and men. That’s why there is not 
much difference but men tend to be more accepted than women. I suppose we 
are stronger than them.. .Psychologically strong than them, because you find a 
woman that has been exiled who is not working, who is trying to make ends 
meet who is not a drunkard and an alcoholic. But you’ll find men, most of them 
are alcoholics. I think it’s a matter of them being strong psychologically.
(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)
Another MK ex-combatant also argued that women may be perceived to be physically weaker 
than men, but held that they are psychologically stronger than them:
I believe that men are naturally weaker that women. We may be weaker 
physically, neh, because we are called ‘the weaker sex’. Physically we may be 
weak, but in terms of our mind set, we are stronger than men and we are used to 
dealing with pain. I think we are also designed to take care of others, and men 
are not designed for that, hence they break so easy. And they bottle things 
inside, we talk about things when they bother us, you know. We cry and most 
men still believe that men are not supposed to cry. It’s a healing process to cry.
So, I didn’t really have to go through the counselling process.
(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September, 2013)
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Pamela Daniels reiterated this point:
The male character is different from ours. We are children bearers. We are home 
builders. We are the ones who are supposed to be strong for the family. We are 
caring for the families. And I would think that we are supposed to be having the 
same responsibility. But what I have experienced is that our male counterparts 
they abuse alcohol, not that we don’t have those challenges as women, but it’s at 
a much rather controllable rate than our male counterparts. Maybe because also 
we stayed with them in these camps in exile; they got married to foreign women; 
we were just brothers, even though we were women, we were soldiers; they did 
not look our way. But when we came back, our families were there. Families did 
not accept the women that they came back with, and it created a lot of tension, 
and they become targets to women (of course, no offence), women inside the 
country with this belief that they are having moneys; they have all these benefits, 
and every other thing that is happening. As you can see, we live in a society 
where you are who you are, because of what you have. So, I think these are the 
challenges that we are facing, that we are seeing in our counterparts of course. 
We also have challenges, but we are in a much better place than our male 
counterparts -  MK women, that is.
(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
In the African-American context, Harris-Perry (2011) argues the imposed and celebrated 
image of the strong black woman is a misrecognition of African-American women because this 
image of “super strength”, obscures the day-to-day suffering of black woman against structural 
poverty and discrimination by “defining endurance as natural”, and thereby robbing African- 
American women of the ability to engage freely in the public sphere, and “demand resources to 
meet their individual needs” (p. 2). Where Enloe (1983) asks if women are an integral part of 
post-war transformation, could we argue that states are well aware that patriarchal understanding 
of sacrifice allows men, exclusively, to claim the rewards of their sacrifices from the state? This 
is while women who sacrificed on behalf of national liberation do not have the same recourse to 
claim that which is due to them. In this regard, the celebration of strength by women ex­
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combatants is not surprising in a context where their sacrifice does not guarantee material 
benefits from the state. On the other hand, patriarchal understandings of violence do not allow 
for a narrative where women ex-combatants can threaten the state with the tools of their military 
training in a post-apartheid context, since violence is masculinised.
6.7 Memory: “Please, I mustn’t die before [he] is 21”
The theme of civilian life applied more so to the women, who fit the conventional understanding 
of combatant. In this case, this applied to the women who were trained militarily outside the 
country. Some of the literature on integration in South Africa and elsewhere points to a self­
perception by former combatants that even after demobilisation, they are fundamentally different 
to other civilians. This is often articulated in the adage ‘once a soldier, always a soldier’. I 
wanted to understand the ways in which a military past shapes the ways in which demobilised 
women perform their civilian lives. Brenda Badela affirmed that she remains a soldier:
We have this term: ‘once a soldier always a soldier’. Although I’m not a soldier, 
an active soldier, I’m still a cadre of the A N C . discipline, order in the house, 
and democracy, is something I don’t believe in, because in my army days, you 
know, we would be told there’s no democracy in the army. So on some days, in 
my house, I would say there’s no democracy, so I’d always fight with my kids, 
and they’d tell me, “mama, this is not MK, camps here this is the house’, you 
know.
(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)
Another participant expressed that at her workplace she is perceived differently to her 
colleagues, because of her military past:
I mean even at work, in a meeting we would be debating, and if there’s 
something I need to raise, they will hear it from my tone, that it is a soldier 
speaking now, not just anyone. Even at home, I think once you trained as a 
soldier, that thing stays with you, irrespective of where you are. It’s not the kind 
of training you easily.you don’t wear it away, understand? So even when I
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walk, most women are ladies when they walk, I can’t even walk slowly; when I 
walk it is clear that I am walking. Sexy shoes would never work, because they 
break. I put my shoe down.
(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September, 2013)
Nomfundiso Kulati articulated that, in her everyday life, she behaves like a soldier. This has 
shaped who she associates with on the social level. Mostly importantly, she notes that her 
military past has shaped her to be an independent woman:
In my life, in a way, being a woman at times, it has made me to be very 
independent. I don’t like to be controlled. I like to think independently. And 
behaving like a soldier at all times._ I don’t like to take orders. That’s not nice. I 
always want to lead others, that’s my problem. Yes, not arrogantly but at times it 
irritates to find people you know my school of thought is different from the 
South African public, I mean, I can’t even, I don’t even have friends like the 
people that I mingle with; either they were in exile, either they are very political, 
so I can’t just befriend the ordinary women of South Africa because their mind 
set is too narrow.
(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, September 2013)
Joyce Sifuba expressed that she is suspicious of placing soldiers in a pedestal as the ones 
with discipline amongst undisciplined civilians. She expressed that the behavior depends on 
person to person:
I think it depends with the person, really, because you find that these same 
soldiers are not disciplined. You find them without discipline. I quarrelled with 
one that I was asking if he was inside or outside, but the discipline is not there.
So I quickly, because of my age, I quickly reprimanded him. I am a mommy,
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even in the office. My children, they always say I’m not a good person, because 
I speak out. I don’t let something that is wrong pass me by; not that I’m perfect 
b u t .
(Joyce Sifuba, telephone interview, October 2013)
Makhosazana Xaba also provided a different perspective stating that because she never 
participated in combat, she does not identify with a distinctive soldier mentality. Instead, she 
pointed out that her past work in the underground is the one that affects her current daily habits 
such as the importance of keeping time:
I never fought, so I waited for umChina and I never had to fight. So if soldier 
mentality comes from fighting, I don’t have it. If I were to talk about mentality 
at all. it would be the mentality of living underground, because that is what I did 
a lot of, and sometimes I have to stop myself doing certain things that I know 
come from there, from that experience. So is that being a soldier? Yes, but in a 
traditional sense? No. You know? So I don’t know if I would say ‘once a 
soldier, always a soldier’, in that sense; but I know that, I mean, I’ve always 
been.there’s a small example: I told you how when we were working 
underground we could only ever be three together. If I’m having a meeting with 
you at two o’clock; if you’re not there by five-past, I leave because it’s unsafe.
Now even before I had to do that I just, I’m the kind of person who likes being 
on time, but when I was doing that; then it got worse. It got intensified, not 
worse. It got intensified. So I was very upset with Nkosana, because he was 
running late and I knew that the later he ran, then he will arrive and you know 
and then, and then, and then. And people say to me, ‘Can’t you just chill? People 
get late, people g e t . ’ and I said no, you know. Now what’s the worst thing that 
could’ve happened? He ran late, we wait: nothing, really. But I ju s t .  things 
must happen as they should: on time. If there’s a change of plan, let’s know. If 
we must do this, let’s do it, you know. When I go into a restaurant and I see, I 
choose a seat that’s got a wall behind me, I won’t just go at any table. Now it’s
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no longer because I feel I’m at risk, but now the excuse is (it’s not an excuse, it’s 
still genuine) but I’m a writer so I need to look and observe and see things.
(Makhosazana Xaba, Johannesburg interview, May 2014)
Xaba continued to share that the premise of underground work was one’s ability to 
conceal the truth. She shared that after apartheid, she had to learn that revealing the truth is no 
longer a security risk, especially in how she was to raise her daughter.
I mean I can sit with someone, I had to tell myself this morning that she’s going 
to be interviewing me, so I must be open. I’ve given her the time. I’m happy to 
talk. But I can talk to someone for three hours and they can walk away not 
knowing a thing about me. I mean, I do remember a time when my daughter was 
young, when I consciously said to myself, you can’t be a parent and lie, because 
I was so used to having to lie about everything -  about my existence -  that I 
found that I was lying when it was not necessary and I had to say to myself, ‘you 
no longer have to. You’re safe now. You’re home. You’re free. You don’t have 
to lie about anything. And you’re raising a child, so stop it.’ I remember that 
being very, very hard, because part of lying was to just not be known. It was 
about removing anything that anybody could use about you. So it wasn’t lying 
because then you might be caught or, you know, it wasn’t a .  I mean there were 
different kinds of lying. If I’m just meeting a complete stranger and we happen 
to be sitting at a bus stop and we’re talking. I’m not going to tell who I am. You 
see? But that’s not because the stranger might follow me. It’s just because part 
of keeping safe is that you must be anonymous. And then there’s lying because 
there’s a reason to lie. But when you’ve done that for so long, I personally found 
that it was very, very h a rd . I actually have a theory that the reason that a lot of 
ANC people, I say ANC people, because those are the ones that I know, but I 
think it might be applicable to PAC and others -  the reason they tell so many 
lies is because they are not conscious of the fact that they no longer need t o .  
because if lying was protective you have to be very conscious, and say, I no
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longer need that shield, so I will stop lying. I mean, your mind, your body learns 
certain habits.
(Makhosazana Xaba, Johannesburg interview, May 2014)
Another former combatant expressed that her military past, especially her experiences of 
losing close friends to violent deaths, has shaped her own relationship with death. It has 
informed the ways in which she relates to her family, especially her children.
You know before I had a child death was, ja, you know, happens. And when I 
reflect on my experience, I remember when I was pregnant with him, [names the 
child], I was five months pregnant and th a t .  during the war against Inkatha in 
[names place] and that’s I guess that last real fight when we kicked them out of 
the township. Basically, I’d made a decision that I’m not bringing up a child in 
this violence. Either I stop it or I die. It was that straight forward. It was, so my 
relationship with death was, so I could easily take risks on me in that sense. And 
it’s also the first time that I had coffee in my entire pregnancy, because I was 
there from about after seven [pm] lying on top of a shack in the shooting. 
When I got home, his dad was sitting outside on the stoep with my mum. They 
didn’t know whether I’m alive or dead or whatever and stuff like that, you know. 
Uh, so it kind of gives different meaning to life, my life, in the sense that things 
that I would do before [he] was born that would be risky on my life, I think 
twice about them. But I think as they are growing up, I mean, one of the things I 
do (now I’m doing less and less of them), I never thought I’d be this age. I 
actually never thought I’d be 21, so that’s my, so it was, I never thought I’d be
2 1 . I  celebrate my birthday seriously every y e a r . I know we’re supposed to 
take that for granted that I’ll be 27, I’ll be 30. I never did. I never did. I always 
was conscious, so every year, I celebrate the extra year I have, and at some point 
I had a, a, this real dream that I’m grateful that I got to the age that I am, but 
please, I mustn’t die before [he] is 21, to be able to look after his brother, you 
know. And, ja. Last year, I made a big party, because he turned 21.
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(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
All women combatants struggle with the traumas of the violence of life under apartheid. 
As noted in Chapter Four, a woman who was a combatant of Amabutho told me that for a long 
time, she could not eat meat, because she had seen too many people killed in front of her. The 
visceral nature of that image is one that surely stays with all combatants in different ways. The 
unaddressed legacies of apartheid manifest themselves personally, and one imagines that it 
manifests itself in the post-apartheid institutions and political culture.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the different women combatants have transitioned to post-apartheid 
South Africa. Through the experiences of the guerilla girls in the demobilisation process, the 
chapter has shown that the process was dominated by the members of the old SADF, which 
contributed to the feeling by the non-statutory combatants, of being undermined and patronised. 
The accounts of experiences by the women who were demolished build on the literature on the 
process of demobilisation by adding women’s experiences, which have up to now been muted in 
that literature. The conclusion is that the demobilisation process did not offer institutional 
mechanisms that wholly supported the multiple challenges that faced the guerilla girls to 
transition to civilian life. The chapter also shows that the combative mothers and in-betweeners 
have had little-to-no institutional support from the state. The Special Pension has been a flawed 
mechanism, which has proven to be an administrative living nightmare for the women 
combatants and their dependents. It is shown, again, that although the pension is supposedly 
open for all types of combatants, and it is the transnationally trained guerillas that benefit from it. 
The chapter has also shown that the economic marginalisation of most women combatants has 
enormous personal consequences, because the personal sacrifices that women took have not 
translated to better lives for themselves and their families. The chapter has shown that 
psychological trauma tends to be under-discussed in the lives of black women in general, 
because the social pressure to be the bedrock of the family means that women are not able to
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voice their challenges with trauma. The study has shown that materially and psychologically, 
many women combatants have not been supported by the state.
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Ch a p t e r  Se v e n :
Be t t e r  La t e  Th a n  Ne v e r ? Th e  De p a r t m e n t  o f  Mil it a r y  
Ve t e r a n s  a n d  t h e  Re -Em e r g e n c e  o f  Ve t e r a n s  in  Po s t - 
POLOKWANE SOUTH AFRICA
While the future is certain, it’s the past that remains unpredictable.
(Langa, 2015)
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the success and weakness of the formal process that was led by 
the SANDF and outlined in the Demobilisation Act of 1996. This chapter examines the 
legislative framework that guides the work of the Department of Military Veterans. As argued in 
Chapter One, the establishment of the DMV and the subsequent adoption of the Military 
Veterans Act No. 18 of 2011 signalled a re-emergence of the combatant into post-apartheid 
public policy and public culture. A separate department of veterans emerges fifteen years into 
South Africa’s democracy, raising questions about the ways in which the government seeks to 
address the concerns of the military veteran community. It is shown in this chapter that the 
reemergence of military veterans discourse has been characterised by similar political tensions to 
those of the initial demobilisation process, in terms of contestation about the definition of the 
military veteran. There are many who perceive themselves former combatants who are excluded 
from this legislative framework and the material benefits that it offers. But one of the 
consequences of this Act is the recent acceptance of AZANLA combatants into the military 
veteran’s framework shows that the state is able to shift in its policy in ways that resemble the 
realities of the combatants of the anti-apartheid struggle. The acceptance of AZANLA former 
combatants raises the hope that this inclusion can be repeated to accommodate other combatants. 
In the main, the legislative framework resembles the narrow categories that defined the 
integration and demobilisation processes in terms of who is included, and who is excluded. Thus, 
in the interim, it is found that the transnational guerrilla combatant alone stands to benefit from
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this new governing order for military veterans, to the exclusion of the domestically-based former 
combatant.
The chapter shows that the DMV’s policies and practice reveal a neutral approach to 
gender that seems to assume that the challenges that male and female veterans are the same. The 
reports and statements from the DMV do not demonstrate attentiveness to the ways in which 
challenges face by women and male veterans may differ because of gender. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the attention of the department seems to largely respond to the anxieties of destitute 
male veterans. In this regard, the chapter outlines the legislative processes of the DMV more 
broadly, and how women are present or absent in these processes. It also makes visible the hopes 
of women ex-combatants who participated in this study. It is shown that, since 2009, few former 
transnationally combatants are receiving military veterans benefits, as many of them are still to 
be verified by the DMV in a verification process that some women combatants have found 
elaborate and even intrusive in terms of the evidence it requires in order for one to be verified as 
a military veteran.
7.2 “Thrown outside like morning mucus ...”
The literature on the integration of statutory and non-statutory forces into the SANDF, and the 
demobilisation process that followed it, shows that the formerly demobilised combatants felt that 
the process did not adequately prepare them for civilian life (Cock, 1993; Liebenberg and Roefs, 
2001; Mokalobe, 2001; Gear, 2002; Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2003; Everatt et al, 2006; 
Maringira and Brankovic, 2013; Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013). In their study of MK ex­
combatants, Liebenberg and Roefs (2001) note that a majority of demobilised combatants “said 
that the SANDF could have equipped them with skills that would have improved their chances in 
the job market” (n.d). The study points to feelings of “disillusionment, distrust and extreme 
dissatisfaction with the treatment received by former soldiers from the SANDF”, according to 
the authors, this is “related to a (perceived) lack of support in skills development, financial 
assistance and in securing alternative employment either inside or outside the SANDF” 
(Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001: n.d). The study then recommends “further (re)skilling of former 
combatants” and pilot projects in agriculture, security companies, tourism, bio-tourism and crafts 
(Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001: n.d). In her study that composed of ex-SADF seven soldiers, MK,
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SDU, APLA, Inkatha Protection Unit, and SDU Thokoza, Gear (2002) points to the theme of 
“betrayal” that is felt by former combatants who demonstrate a “sense that the ideological 
paradigms that framed the wars they fought in, and their abilities as combatants, have been 
betrayed”, because “for many, the disjuncture between what they fought for and their present 
realities is a bitter pill to swallow” (p. 13). Gear (2002) also shows that that some former- 
combatants are resentful of what they see as the social mobility of few comrades, while many are 
left to fend for themselves. One participant in Gear’s study expressed that what the “ANC has 
done to us has destroyed us”, and that it also felt as if the “ANC has thrown [them] outside like 
morning mucus” (p. 16). Another participant expressed the disparity that exists between 
members of the same national liberation movement:
The disparities that exist now are not only between ourselves and our white 
counterparts but our comrades as well, that have become, overnight, bourgeoisie 
and they are driving flashy cars and sleeping in very expensive hotels; they fly 
over our heads. But I think after all is said and done, you look at the thing in a 
perspective that is consistent with what you did and you will tell yourself, 'Now 
when I joined the movement I didn't join to benefit myself. ..It was the common 
concern for all South African citizens - that we need[ed] to liberate ourselves 
from the draconian racial barriers that existed at that time. And for now what 
you need to do is only to make the most of the worst situation.. .the best way 
you know how.' But there are people who are in a more disadvantaged position 
than I am. I must recognise that.
(Gear, 2002:11)
Gear (2002) has meanwhile noted in this regard that
Ex-combatants are expected to re-integrate into civilian society and to leave 
their militarized [sic] pasts and accompanying identities behind. Not surprisingly 
this does not easily happen, especially in contexts where there are few 
opportunities through which alternative identities can be built. In South Africa, 
ex-combatants are often ill-equipped to make this transition and the communities
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into which they are expected to integrate are equally unprepared for negotiating 
the soldiers return or the ending of their combatant status (p. 119).
Similarly, Cook (2006) argues that the South African demobilisation process was “sub­
optimal”, where she contends that “the government’s efforts to help tens of thousands of 
demobilised soldiers to reintegrate into society were inadequate at best” (p. 44). Mashike (2004) 
describes demobilised combatants as “time bombs”. He argues that the demobilisation process 
was an “afterthought”. Adonis (2008) also argues that the DDR process “had limited success 
resulting in a concern that this could lead to political instability and violence” (p. 17). Cock 
(2004) also argues that “many ex-combatants are marked by their experiences of war, their 
training in the means of violence, their lack of marketable skills and their access to weaponry” 
(p. 5). She argues that if ex-combatants concerns are left unaddressed, ex-combatants may 
become a “destabilising force”, like they have been in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique 
(Cock, 2004). As shown in Chapter Three, the consensus in the literature is that most former 
combatants live in poverty, and that they present a potential political threat to the government if 
their needs continue unaddressed (Cock, 1993; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mokalobe, 2001; 
Gear, 2002; Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2003; Everatt et al, 2006; Maringira and Brankovic, 
2013; Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013). This frame of thinking seems to have shaped the relatively 
recent push within the ANC to address the concerns of military veterans.
7. 3 Enter the Department of Defence and military veterans
Since 1994, the legacy of the country’s militarised past had largely been subsumed under the 
Department of Defence, which was responsible for coordinating programmes to assist 
demobilised soldiers transition into civilian life, as outlined in Chapters Three and Six. Writing 
in the Cape Times newspaper, Dzinesa (2009:nd) argued that “President Jacob Zuma's 
reorganisation of South Africa’s defence ministry into the Ministry of Defence and Military 
Veterans, which is also tasked with the concerns of war veterans, is a recognition of the 
important place this group occupies in the body politic.” For Dzinesa (2009), this reconfigured 
visibility of veterans’ issues by the State, pointed to recognition that “thousands of South 
Africa’s former liberation fighters are unemployed, lead destitute lives, and suffer psycho-social
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problems.” Furthermore, he argues that the state was also reacting to anxieties that, if veterans 
socio-political issues are not addressed, “their military training may cause — and in many cases 
has, in fact, caused — destitute veterans to turn to crime or become mercenaries.” He notes 
further that the announcement of the new institutional framework dedicated to military veterans 
“is an outcome of the ANC’s 2007 Polokwane Conference resolution to establish a presidential 
commission on military veterans, ahead of the introduction of a ‘comprehensive social package 
for all ex-combatants of former liberation armies’” (Dzinesa, 2009: nd). The 2007 ANC 
resolution noted that “the Ministry of Military Veterans be established as a matter of urgency”.11 12
According to Dzinesa (2009: n.d.):
The government should be commended for what could significantly pre-empt 
the disruptive potential of disenchanted freedom fighters. History has shown 
governments of neighbouring states, such as Zimbabwe and Namibia, which 
marginalised or neglected former liberation fighters, did so at their own peril as 
restive, poverty-stricken ex-fighters threatened national stability.
At the time, MKMVA general secretary, Ayanda Dlodlo, was quoted by the Business 
Day Newspaper to have stated that MKMVA had “long been lobbying for recognition, including 
the establishment of its own ministry”. For Dlodlo, their “first prize” would have been the 
establishment of a full military veterans ministry, thus “the renamed department - the 
Department of Defence and Military Veterans Department - was a compromise, but a major gain 
for the veterans, many of whom live in poverty”13. According to Johwa14, Dlodlo reiterated the 
risk of military veteran use of criminality by stating that the “failure by the state to harness the 
skills of military veterans had led to the establishment of mercenary outfits”.
11 52nd National Conference: Resolutions. Available from: http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2536
12 Business Day report by Wilson Johwa. 14 May 2009: MK veterans lobby for ‘second prize’. Available from: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2009/05/14/mk-veterans-lobby-for-second-prize
13 Business Day report by Wilson Johwa. 14 May 2009: MK veterans lobby for ‘second prize’. Available from: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2009/05/14/mk-veterans-lobby-for-second-prize
14 Business Day report by Wilson Johwa. 14 May 2009: MK veterans lobby for ‘second prize’. Available from: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2009/05/14/mk-veterans-lobby-for-second-prize
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As noted by Van der Merwe and Lamb (2009) in Chapter Three, the CPR-based SANDF 
integration process “was integral in defining who constitutes South African ex-combatants” (p. 
10). As they correctly point out,
these definitions are hotly contested, no doubt because they have a role in 
influencing access to or exclusion from scarce resources and opportunities, as 
well as informing other processes, such as building of actual memory. These 
controversies continue as parliament debates the provision of new benefits for 
ex-combatants (Van der Merwe and Lamb, 2009: 10).
The definition of the military veteran’s definition, as defined in the 2011 Military 
Veterans Act closely resembles the CPR-based definition. According to the Military Veterans 
Act, a military veteran is a South African citizen who:
(a) rendered military service to any of the military organisations, statutory and 
non-statutory; which were involved on all sides of South Africa’s Liberation 
War from 1960 to 1994; (b) served in the Union Defence Force before 1961; or 
(c) became a member of the new South African National Defence Force after 
1994, and has completed his or her military training and no longer performs 
military service, and has not been dishonourably discharged from that military 
organisation or force (Military Veterans Act, 2011: 4).
Thus, the act confines veteran status to the members of the statutory and non-statutory 
forces who participated in the integration and demobilisation process. This, therefore, means that 
veteran status and benefits are likely to benefit the transnationally trained guerilla combatants of 
the non-statutory forces. This is in spite of the fact that some ex-combatant research includes all 
categories of ex-combatants beyond those of the transnationally trained, MK and APLA (Gear, 
2002; Everett et al., 2006). This research shows that the informally trained and domestically 
based ex-combatants are in deep need of state assistance. The recent 2015 inclusion of Azanian 
National Liberation Army (AZANLA), the armed wing of the AZAPO, whose members have 
now been invited to present themselves for verification of their roles as ex-combatants, points to 
a possible widening of veterans status and benefits beyond the transnationally trained 
combatants. Since 2014, the DMV has been verifying the combatant status of members of the
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AZANLA who can now be included in the veteran’s database for veteran benefits (News 24 
report, 2015). The Western Cape AZANLA commander, Zola Mosia, noted that the organisation 
“did not participate in the amalgamation of forces because we were suspicious of being absorbed 
by the defence force. This means our cadres do not enjoy the benefits like other military 
veterans”.15 The inclusion of AZANLA combatants may open up a space for the further 
inclusion of the domestically based ex-combatant organisations.
In the 2013/2014 Annual Report by the DMV’s Tsepe Motumi, the first Director General 
of the department, outlines that the “aim of the Department is to formulate policies and standards 
aimed at providing a comprehensive quality service delivery system to Military Veterans and, 
where applicable, their dependents, in recognition of their role in the democratisation of South 
Africa” (Department of Military Veterans Annual Report, 2014: 17). He further notes that “there 
is an urgent need to provide visible rewards and due recognition to deserving those Military 
Veterans who sacrificed their lives and well-being in ensuring the greater realisation of the 
freedom.” Accordingly then, “the main objective of the Department of Military Veterans is to 
provide national policy and standards on socio-economic support to Military Veterans and to 
their dependents, on heritage and empowerment programmes including those that contribute to 
nation building and reconciliation” (Department of Military Veterans Annual Report, 2014: 17).
The Military Veterans Benefit Regulations was gazetted on the 19th February 2014. The 
benefits it outlines are the following:
1. Compensation for injury, trauma and disease -  to a military veteran 
who sustained disabling injuries or severe psychological and neuro­
psychiatric trauma or who suffers from a terminal disease resulting 
from participation in military activities, may apply for a lump sum 
payment as compensation if (a) the disabling injury; (b) the severe 
psychological and neuro-psychiatric trauma; or (c) the terminal 
disease, resulted from the military veteran's participation in military 
activities.
15 2015. Available from: http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/Local/City-Vision/Liberation-fighters-should- 
not-loose-hope-20150430
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2. Counselling and treatment for mental illness and post-traumatic 
stress disorder - a military veteran or his or her dependant qualifies 
for dedicated counselling and treatment for serious mental illness or 
post-traumatic stress disorder if the mental illness or post-traumatic 
stress disorder was caused by his or her participation in military 
activities or is associated with his or her participation therein.
3. Facilitation of employment placement - an unemployed military 
veteran qualifies for facilitation of employment placement by the 
Department...must submit his or her curriculum vitae to the 
Department with supporting documents to enable the Department to 
facilitate his or her employment placement, subject to availability of 
opportunities.. .If necessary, a military veteran must be assisted by the 
Department to draft his or her curriculum vitae.
4. Facilitation of business opportunities - the Minister must establish a 
business vehicle through which business opportunities can be pursued 
by the State on behalf of all military veterans...All existing and 
potential military veterans' business entities that are partially or 
wholly owned by military veterans and that are benefiting military 
veterans qualify for facilitation of business opportunities.. .To qualify 
for facilitation of business opportunities, a military veteran's business 
entity must be registered on the military veterans business entity 
register.
5. Subsidised public transport - a military veteran qualifies for a 
public transport subsidy if he or she: (a) is not employed and receives 
a pension from the State; or (b) is employed and has an annual income 
of less than R125 000.
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6. Access to health care - a military veteran qualifies for health care 
services, at the expense of the State, at a public or private health care 
facility in the Republic if he or she: (a) is not employed and receives a 
pension from the State; or (b) is employed but - (i) does not qualify 
for a medical aid subsidy from his or her employer; or (ii) the military 
veteran’s medical aid cover is not sufficient owing to the status of his 
or her health.
7. Housing -  a military veteran qualifies for a housing benefit of a total 
value not exceeding R175 000 if he or she: (a) is not employed and 
receives a pension from the State; or (b) is employed and has an 
annual income of less than R125 000, and: (i) does not own a house; 
(ii) has not previously received a house or other housing benefit from 
the State; or (iii) if he or she is in a spousal relationship, his or her 
spouse has not received a house or other housing benefit from the 
State.
8. Burial support - a military veteran qualifies for burial support at the 
expense of the State if he or she, at the time of his or her death: (a) 
was not employed and received a pension from the State; or (b) was 
employed and had an annual income of less than R125 000, and was 
listed as a military veteran in the national military veterans database 
. t h e  Department may, after considering evidence from either the 
demobilisation records, the certified personnel register or service 
certificates provided by a military veteran’s relevant recognised 
association, provide burial support for the military veteran who was 
not listed in the national military veterans database at the time of his 
or her death, provided it is proven by documentary evidence that he or 
she would have qualified to be listed in that database had he or she 
registered before his or her death.The amount for burial support 
payable to a military veteran is R25 000.
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These benefits stand to make a substantive difference in the lives of ex-combatants. The 
section below examines just how many ex-combatants have benefited so far.
7.3.1 Delivery record
On visiting the DMV in May 2014, I interviewed Patricia Noyoo, Director of Social Services. 
She confirmed that there were 57, 000 names of veterans on the department’s database, a figure 
which had also been circulated in the media16 17. The figures that she shared at the time are similar 
to the figures published in the DMV’s 2013/2014 Annual Report. This is the only report that is 
currently publicly available pending the 2015/2016 Annual Report. Thus, although the figures 
are sure to have changed, the figures shared here are the ones that are reflected in the report, and 
the ones that I was given by the DMV representative. However, a 24 March 2016 article by the 
Mail and Guardian newspaper cites the DMV’s spokesperson, Mbulelo Musi, referring to 
“roughly 70 000 registered military veterans in the country”. The verification process is 
conducted in collaboration with the South African National Military Veterans Association 
(SANMVA) and other military veterans organisations. The 2013/2014 DMV Annual Report 
stated that out of the figure of 57 000 names in the database, only “342” military veterans had 
been interviewed, and “1 74 of these Military Veterans were recommended to be included in the 
DMV database.” (p.15).
In terms of veteran’s compensation, the report notes that a preliminary list of a 100 
military veterans has been compiled and targeted for the once-off compensation, the amount of 
which is to be determined by the Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula. In terms of the healthcare 
provision, the DMV notes that it has signed Service delivery agreements with the South African 
Military Healthcare Services (SAMHS) and Military Veterans’ Healthcare Practitioners 
Association (MVHPA) as partners in the delivery of healthcare to Military Veterans. According 
to the report, “to date the Department has loaded a total of 7 703 Military Veterans on the 
SAMHS database for access to healthcare as legislated, and out of these 4 719 are accessing 
healthcare services” (DMV 2013/2014 Annual Report: p. 13). It also notes that “this process 
started in 2011, with 2000 Military Veterans who were 60 years and above and those with
16 http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/57-000-military-veterans-registered-1569575
17 Available from: http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits
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chronic conditions. To strengthen easy access to healthcare, nine Military Veterans help desks 
were set up at the SAMHS healthcare facilities across all provinces in line with the Ministerial 
directive of April 2012” (p. 13). It also notes the establishment of the Military Veterans Health 
and Wellness Centre, whose benchmarks were to be determined after a visit which was 
instructed by the Deputy Minister to the United States in order to “finalise the Concept Paper and 
Business Plan for South Africa’s 1st Military Veterans Health and Wellness Centre” (p. 23). A 
Mail and Guardian news report recently noted the DMV was challenging the validity of a deal 
signed with Zeal Health Innovations in 2015 wherein department officials had signed a R200 
million contract claiming that the department did not have a budget for it18. The article profiles 
Nkutsoeu Motsau, the chairperson of the AZANLA Military Veterans Association, a “former 
Robben Island prisoner survived the apartheid regime and a horrific car crash years ago, which 
left him quadriplegic”19. The article shows the administrative hurdles that veterans are obliged to 
go through in order to access health support from the department. For less visible veterans unlike 
Motsau, one imagines that for many veterans the access to health support through the DMV 
remains elusive.
In terms of delivery in education, the 2013/2014 report notes that 100 military veterans 
and dependents have been offered with education support. The department has Memoranda of 
Understandings with NSFAS and Department of Basic Education to assist facilitation of this 
benefit to the relevant institutions. If implemented successfully, the partnership between the 
DMV and NSFAS could mean that many veterans and their dependents would have access to 
tertiary education institutions. This would be a monumental relief for many veterans whose 
children are often not able to access tertiary institutions due to financial reasons.
In terms of housing, the Department reports to have signed:
Memoranda of Understanding and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with 
provincial departments of Human Settlements, specifically North West, KZN, 
Mpumalanga, Limpopo and Free State Funds were transferred or ring fenced for 
construction of Military Veterans houses for the 2013, 2014 financial years.
18 Available from: http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits
19 Available from: http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits
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Subsequently, the number of houses to be built during 2014 financial year will 
increase. Service Level Agreements with Gauteng and Mpumalanga have been 
submitted for DG signature, Western Cape and Eastern Cape are currently in 
progress (p. 23).
The report also notes that Housing Subsidy System in Department of Human Settlements 
has been adjusted to accommodate the DMV housing means test. It points out that one of the 
barriers to the provision of housing to veterans “is the transfer of top-up funds to Provinces. 
National Treasury insists that funds should be transferred only after houses have been built i.e. in 
line with stipulations of the MoU signed by both Departments. Provinces prefer that funds be 
paid in advance to enable compliance with agreed specifications for “a military veteran’s house”.
In terms of pension, the report notes that the
[...] first list of eligible recipients of pension was compiled in collaboration with 
Special Pensions, Department of Social Development and the DMV National 
Health assessment initiative, respectively. The Military Veterans Pension 
Framework was discussed with National Treasury and Treasury’s formal input 
has since been received and reviewed. National Treasury and DMV are 
cooperating to accelerate delivery on pension for Military Veterans, SASSA is 
ready to pay out pensions to Military Veterans as soon as DMV is ready.
The report does not detail how many pensions have been given out in the period of 
review. No numbers are given for the provision of financial support for veterans using public 
transport. The report only notes that “there has been a slow progression towards cooperative 
governance in the provision of this Benefit”, where it then notes that the “DMV is to intensify 
effort in this regard in the current financial year” (p. 24).
In terms of burial support, the department has provided amounts between R10, 000 to 
R25, 000 to “one hundred and eighteen (118) Military Veterans’ households provided with burial 
support” (p. 14). The report also notes that the DMV is working in partnership with the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to facilitate the “exhumation and
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dignified reburial of former liberation fighters who had been buried in paupers graves in 
Limpopo and Northwest” (p.24).
Lastly, the report does not detail how many veterans have been able to gain access to 
counseling facilities mental illness and/or post-traumatic stress disorder. There is no gender 
representation in terms of how many of the veterans who have benefitted so far are women and 
how many of them are men. Overall, the report shows the limited scope that has been reached so 
far by the DMV. The accounts of experiences from women ex-combatants show that one of the 
key issues with regards to access to the DMV is that its processes and administrations mainly 
operate from its headquarters in Pretoria, at a distance from the majority of veterans across the 
country.
7.4 Celebrating guerilla girls in a gender neutral policy
Gender specific language is not present in the legislative framework of the DMV. The 
encompassing category of veteran is understood to represent the interests of all veterans. In this 
manner, the material and symbolic needs of veterans do not demonstrate an understanding that 
while veterans, as a group, are socio-economically marginalised, the ways in which this 
marginality is expressed may differ in specific ways to women and men. The presence of 
women, as a category, shows up in the July/August issue of the DMV’s magazine in celebration 
of women’s month. Although this special issue seeks to highlight the role of women in general, 
and women combatants more specifically, there is limited detail given to the lives of women 
beyond a celebration of known women combatants, and a rhetorical celebration of women’s 
contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle.
The July/August 2013 issue of the DMV’s magazine, Honour, carries a cover image of 
Ruth Mompati with the caption, “we celebrate and honour women military veterans for their 
contribution”. This issue was the first special issue dedicated to women military veterans. In the 
editorial, the DMV’s head of communication, Mbulelo Musi, commemorates the 1956 women’s 
march, and notes that women continue to face the challenge of “rape and all forms of women 
abuse in homes, schools, work places and indeed all societal endeavours”, while also daring 
“society to create that necessary enabling environment for women in general and women military 
veterans in particular to express themselves freely and to be given an opportunity to play a
238
meaningful role in all societal endeavours socially, politically, culturally and economically” 
(Honour Magazine, 2013: 3). The editorial does not speak to specific to contributions made by 
military veterans in society, and it also does not to speak to specific issues that women veterans 
face today.
The magazine also highlights “the first re-union for the uMkhoto weSizwe Women 
Military Veterans” which was held on “17 August 2013 at 9 South African Infantry Battalion 
(9SAI) in Khayelitsha Cape Town” (Nkosi, 2013: 7). The article on the event by Nkosi does not 
share the various issues that women discussed at the reunion, beyond affirming women’s roles in 
the armed struggle and the challenges that remain in order to fulfill the achievement of their 
human rights. Two participants in this study, Nomfundiso Kulati and Phumla Gaba, were part of 
this reunion. In the article, Kulati is noted for having read a poem by Maya Angelou. When I 
asked Kulati and Gaba about the event, they noted their delight in seeing old comrades that they 
had not seen in years, and expressed hopes that this was the beginning of a process by the DMV 
to support women’s veterans. The fact that this was the first re-union of MK women points to the 
lack of institutional mechanisms to support veterans more broadly, and women specifically. The 
women who were reunited were all transnationally trained guerillas.
Besides honouring the contributions made by Ruth Mompati, the magazine profiles three 
other women military veterans: 1) Ellen Molekane, who is the deputy director-general in the 
office of the Minister of Defence; 2) Phumla Williams Acting CEO of Government 
Communication and Information Systems; and 3) Col (Ret.) Mokolanyane Patricia Moeti. In her 
profile, Ellen Molekane makes a striking point about the state’s effort to support the welfare of 
veterans, arguing that “from 1994 to 2008 the effort was halfhearted. The intention to deal with 
the socioeconomic issues of military veterans took prominence in 2009 when a Ministry of 
Defence and Military Veterans was proclaimed by the new administration under President Jacob 
Zuma” (Honour Magazine, 2013:12) . She further notes that
we need to recall that the South African National Defence Force was formed on 
the 27 April 1994 by incorporating statutory and Non-Statutory Formations 
(NSF), namely South African Defence Force (SADF) and Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei Defence Forces on the one hand, MK and 
the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) on the other. The statutory forces
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military veterans were better taken care of as they moved from a privileged 
position as opposed to the NSF that had no systems in place in the previous 
apartheid dispensation. For the NSF, a deliberate decision had to be taken by the 
new democratic state to look after those veterans (p. 12).
Phumla Williams affirms this view by arguing that
[t]he government started late to set up a dedicated Department to deal with the 
plight of ex-military combatants. Setting up that Department marks the start of 
acknowledgement of our retired military combatants’ contribution. I do however 
hope that the MV’s will make a contribution in teaching our younger generation 
the role that was played by these veterans to bring about this democracy that we 
are today all enjoying, values and skills such as patriotism and discipline, which 
MV’s understand are critical to impart to the youth (p. 13).
While this issue of the Honour magazine was dedicated to women veterans, it is striking 
how little detail specifically about the wellbeing of women veterans is offered in the issue. In 
form of the profiles noted above, more space is given to women veterans who already occupy 
senior positions in government or used to occupy senior positions like Moeti and Mompati 
(before her death in 2015). Little detail is offered about less visible women, and the ways in 
which they are grappling with life after MK. The magazine, like much of the legislative language 
used in veteran’s legislation, can be read as gender neutral. By gender neutral, I mean that the 
framing by the DMV assumes that the challenges faced by veterans are either uniform or 
‘ungendered’. Therefore, there is no acknowledgement that women and men veterans may face 
different challenges beyond those of gender-based violence.
Furthermore, in the limited narrative that pays attention to women’s veterans as a 
category, it is the transnationally trained woman combatant who is venerated and is understood 
as deserving of the DMV’s support. There are no accounts of experiences of the women 
combatants who participated inside the country. Therefore, it seems that women combatants may 
have to push the DMV to move away from its gender neutrality, and pay attention to the ways in 
which women veterans face specific challenges compared to their male counterparts. In the 
discourse on human security, women and feminist activists challenged the presentation of policy 
in gender neutral terms and insist on gendered legislative responses from states that are today
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reflected in the implementation of the human development index indicators and the human 
development goals (Hudson, 2005; Hudson, 2009; Hendricks, 2011).
Lastly, the misrecognition of combative mothers and in-betweeners will inevitably cause 
resentment amongst women combatants if some feel that their contribution has been erased. In 
the current legislative framework and practice, the majority of women combatants do not stand 
to access material benefits. This is similar to how the narrow definition of the initial 
demobilisation process excluded these women.
7.4.1 “Women are disappearing”
The women who participated in this study expressed a desire to receive benefits facilitated by the 
DMV. Few of them had access to the department, either in their provinces or the headquarters. 
There is a sense that the department is out of reach for many women, and that their processes are 
highly bureaucratic. As a result, none of the women were yet benefitting from the stated benefits 
offered by the DMV.
One of the experiences articulated by one participant was the interview process that is 
part of the verification process for individuals to be part of the DMV database. Makhosazana 
Xaba shared her experience of going through the verification interview, which she found to be 
personally invasive:
...round about early last year I got a call from somebody else that I was at the 
camp with, Ndumiso, and he says, ‘why aren’t you on this, you know, they’re 
putting everybody on that list again,’ (because in the process people were left out)
‘and I was talking to Tsepe [Motumi] and Tsepe says he hasn’t seen you.’ And I 
said, ‘you know, I don’t know how many times I’ve tried following up on this 
process and it just feels so cumbersome for me so I left.’ He says, ‘No, no, no, no.
Tsepe’s now in charge of that. He’ll help you.’ So I called Tsepe: ‘so what do I 
need to do?’ He says go to the verification committee in Braamfontein, give 
evidence there, and then they’ll come back to me after that. I said, ‘oh okay, fine’.
So I go there (it was in March last year), I sit in this room, they record everything 
and they start asking me questions about the trees that grew around Pango: ‘what 
kind of trees where they?’ They asked me about the circumference of an AK47
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cylinder. They asked me about the size of a grenade. I lost it. I lost it and started 
crying. I tried not to scream. There were all these SANDF people, SANDF, MK, 
‘blah, blah, blah, blah, blah’ represented in this committee: all these big fat men. I 
ended up looking like a fake and I said, ‘you know, I didn’t think I was coming 
here to answer questions that sound like I’m in primary school, you know. If I had 
known that that’s what I’m supposed to do I would probably would’ve gone 
somewhere and got a list so that I would answer this for you. You want to know 
when I was there, I can tell you. You want to know who my commander was at 
that time, I don’t remember. I didn’t try to keep names in my head. You know 
what kind of situation we were under. If you’re asking me about how to cock a 
gun, I don’t want to be an SANDF person. I don’t want to be in the military, so 
I’ve forgone all these things deliberately.’ I cried. I felt so horrible inside. So then 
they asked me so the person who had referred me said to me, ‘you know Khosi 
you mustn’t cry. There were two people who’d come here and they didn’t 
remember anything. So we are aware of this, this that’s happening and between 
you and me, I can tell you that I think these questions are inappropriate. But 
anyway, I will call you and we’ll take you through the process of [what do you 
call that process? The process where other people testify to the fact that yes they 
knew you?]’ But he didn’t come back to me, and I followed up and followed up 
and things just fizzled out and fizzled out. And I thought okay it’s happening 
again. So maybe I’m not meant to be in this. But now I’m more curious, because 
I’ve been told by Ndumiso that you can get medical aid for yourself and your 
daughter. You can get a bursary. And I’m thinking, but I do need those things 
now, you know. My daughter is at varsity, her father has died. You know, I’m 
gonna be very old soon, I’ll need medical aid. Maybe I should pursue this. But 
things just fizzled out completely until Mandela dies and I bump into somebody 
that I was at university with in town and he says, ‘where have you been? I haven’t 
seen you.’ We hadn’t seen each other since varsity. And so I tell him what 
happens. He says, “No but Tsepe is my friend. Tsepe is my friend.” I say, “Tsepe 
didn’t! I followed up and followed up. Tsepe just left me hanging because I didn’t 
remember anything and I broke down and cried. I was a bad case, so to speak, and
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Tsepe couldn’t help.” So he says, “No, no, no I want to talk to Tsepe, I want to 
talk to Tsepe.” So we are trying to revive that right now, so I don’t know how it 
gonna go.
(Makhosazana Xaba interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
In August 2016, Xaba updated me that she eventually managed to find the commander 
that she had served under, who was now working in China. She was now about to restart the 
process of verification. From her experience, combatants who will undergo the verification 
process are not only expected to undergo an interview, but their success also depends on the 
collaboration of former comrades whose whereabouts they may not currently know. This 
elaborate process of verification may be one of the reasons that the process has demonstrated 
limited success as noted above in the 2013/2014 Annual Report. Few military veterans have been 
successfully verified.
The Special Pensions application process also involved the verification of an individual’s 
participation through evidence provided by those they had worked with. It was not clear from the 
women combatants who served inside the country whether they felt that they would be eligible 
for this process, and what verification for those who did not have commanders may mean. Mrs. 
Mabhengeza noted that when she was applying for Special Pensions, she was assisted by the 
young men whom she had worked with when Amabutho was operating. Thus, there are ways in 
which to verify one’s role for the combatants who were inside the country, who did not receive 
military training.
Joyce Sifuba noted that for many APLA veterans, it is difficult to access assistance as 
most institutional assistance is confined in Gauteng. She pointed out that most women “are 
disappearing” in terms of this process, because they do not have time to attend countless veterans 
meetings, when they have families to look after, nor the resources to travel to Pretoria to the 
headquarters of the DMV:
I go to Pretoria often,because my children are there, and they are soldiers. So, 
what about someone who does not have a child in the system? And I get things 
because Ama-Afrika who are in high positions in the system still contact me. But
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what about those who do not these opportunities, who are left out of the system? 
...The person says to themselves “Yhu, let me stay here in the township and eat 
whatever I have. Women are disappearing. Like I said, there are MVA meetings, 
but there are very few women. If you see ten women in a meeting, that will be a 
lot. I hope that with this research you are doing you can apply for more funds, so 
that you can find these women. I asked Witbank, and Neilspruit but we still do 
not have the names and numbers of those women. NJS: It needs a person to 
constantly go to the meetings. When they say there is a meeting, you must go to 
that meeting and voice your concerns. I voiced out to Mr. Mlambo that we 
should search for these women. And these women they came and are 
breadwinners. So when they say there is a meeting in Gauteng and I am in PE, 
how will I get to Gauteng? The money I would use to travel from PE to Gauteng 
is the money I need to use to buy food for my children. You see, now you are 
wasting money because of the economic situation that we are in these days.
(Joyce Sifuba telephone interview, November 2013)
Other participants also complained about the centralization of the DMV work to its 
Pretoria offices, and that most of the filling up of documents is done in the offices of colleagues 
who work in government who have computer and printing facilities. Nomfundiso Kulati 
complained that the DMV’s emphasis on assisting veterans within a salary bracket, 
disadvantages those who are employed. She was arguing that measuring access to veterans’ 
benefits by salary does not take into account the multiple financial responsibilities that many 
individuals, like her, carry:
...in terms of the Veterans Act...I’m entitled to a house. I’m entitled to 
education if I want to study including my children. But I also learnt, okay I earn 
a salary; okay I’m a single mom. But they want my payslip. When they look at 
my payslip, they think I can afford, which I cannot. Look one of my kids now is 
at tertiary and I mean, it’s expensive, education these days and the other one will 
be at tertiary next year. Remember; now I have boys there are all these initiation
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this and that. I’m not entitled to that house because by virtue of having... of 
working for government even though I’ve sacrificed so much at a young age. 
Eh, our story is a story that needs to be looked at seriously by the leadership 
again. Yes, they talk about it very nicely at conferences, Polokwanes and these 
other previous conferences as if things will be done, but nothing much.
(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)
While it is understandable why the DMV would prioritise the needs of the desperately 
poor, Kulati’s sentiments demonstrate the ways in which the framework has to consider the 
different interests of ex-combatants. Overall, women expressed a sense of confusion over the 
processes of the DMV and took a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. Many felt that the department is still 
new; therefore, perhaps with time, its administrative performance might evolve in a way that the 
DMV became accessible to different types of combatants in different parts of the country, 
especially women.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the current legislative framework that seeks to address the interests of ex­
combatants since 2009. The chapter has shown that the conceptualisation of the DMV from 
members of the ANC in Polokwane recognised the socio-economic and political marginalisation 
of combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The view of members of the ANC and MKMVA 
leadership, such as that of Ayanda Dlodlo, reflects the dominant view that if ex-combatants 
interests are not addressed, they will pose a security and a political threat to the state. The 
chapter shows that the definition of military veteran reflects the narrow definition that framed the 
CPR-based integration process. In this regard, it is the transnationally trained combatant who 
stands to benefit from this legislative order. However, the recent inclusion of AZANLA former 
combatants to this framework shows that the state may be able to adapt policy to include other 
combatants in the future. Furthermore, the chapter shows that the legislative framework of the 
DMV is presented in a gender-neutral operative vocabulary that seems to assume that the 
interests of women and male veterans are uniform. This gender neutrality sits side-by-side with a 
rhetorical positioning of women, whose current lives are under-written in the policy and
245
magazines of the DMV. For the participants of this study, the DMV presents a bureaucratic 
challenge to their ability to access veteran’s benefits. As a result, none of them are currently 
benefitting from this framework.
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CHAPTER 8:
Co n c l u s io n
8.1 Introduction
The aim of this study was to examine state assisted demobilisation and the civilian integration of 
women ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The thesis has shown that the context in 
which recognition for formal demobilisation takes place, is gendered in ways that excludes the 
majority of broadly defined women combatants. Once the lens of the combatant is widened, it 
becomes visible that there are combatants that find themselves without recognition according to 
the legislative framework that the state has devised. As such, most often these are women who 
exist at the margins of national liberation and post-liberation discourses. Through the literature 
on women’s methods of resistance in the townships, rural areas and outside the country in the 
wide terrain of the anti-apartheid struggle, the thesis has shown that women’s peripheral status in 
post-apartheid combatant discourses stands in dialectical opposition to the contribution that they 
made in defeating apartheid. The respective categories of guerilla girls, combative mothers and 
in-betweeners put forward by this thesis points to the reality that in fact not just some, but all 
women, were thrust into the anti-apartheid transnational struggle cum war effort. The study has 
shown that the once the extensive terrain from which guerilla war took place with the resistance 
of the apartheid state’s counter-insurgency methods, that the war against apartheid was carried 
out by private individuals, and more often than not, women. Yet, masculine nationalist 
discourses about the armed struggle present the complex confrontation against apartheid as if it 
had been between the state and two non-state liberation forces, MK and APLA. It has been 
shown in this study that this description exaggerates the international dimensions of the formally, 
externally trained (most often male) guerillas, who are posited as having won the day and the 
war. In excavating the complex terrain of this war that took place outside of any conventional 
battlefront, and was conducted in the shadows, and women’s role in the downfall of apartheid, 
the study has also shown that the war against apartheid and its enduring legacies are remembered 
differently in post-apartheid South Africa. The compromises of a negotiated settlement, whose 
credibility relies on the undermining of the country’s enduring legacy of war, has contributed to 
the silence in both policy and public culture on the demobilisation and civilian reintegration of
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former combatants. It has been shown that these complex intersections, and their gendered 
nature, are under-studied.
Through the use of feminist theory in IR, the study has shown that the war, combat, 
combatant, struggle and outcome are all gendered processes, with material, psychological and 
symbolic consequences for the informal women combatants who were the heartbeat of the armed 
struggle. The study has made an original contribution in breaking down the domestic and 
external divide that is held by conventional IR theories, which functions to exclude and 
delegitimise women’s war roles. In accounting for the major findings of this study, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the recognition of women for participation in demobilisation process is based 
on an intricate intersection of binaries that together deligitimise women’s combatant roles, such 
as: combatant/civilian, internal/external, rural/urban, public/private, older/younger. This thesis 
has shown that the historic exclusion of women in demobilisation processes was also coupled 
with compromises of South Africa’s political negotiations, which generally undermined the 
demobilisation process for broader political ends. The conclusion of this thesis is that most 
women ex-combatants have not participated in the state-led demobilisation process and are, as a 
result, struggling to build their lives in post-apartheid South Africa.
This thesis has shown that the limited participation of women in demobilisation is due to 
the fact that the design of the process, which privileged internationally trained combatants, 
automatically excluded the majority of women from being able to participate in it, because they 
are not recognised as combatants. The narratives of the women who participated in the process 
reveal dissatisfaction with what they viewed as state assistance that did not appreciate the life- 
altering sacrifices that women made in participating in the armed struggle. The study sought to 
fill the identifiable gap in the literature on ex-combatants in South Africa, which until now 
focused on the lives of male ex-combatants who are struggling to rebuild their lives after 
apartheid. They mostly possess limited skills that are not compatible with the demands of the 
economy. This is while the literature offers limited details about the postwar lives of women ex­
combatants. It has been made visible in this study that the task of examining women and the 
demobilisation and civilian reintegration process has demanded that the researcher begin by 
examining the conditions that facilitated or impinged upon women’s ability to participate in the 
SANDF integration and demobilisation process.
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The study also shows that the concerns of women combatants are not taken to be as 
urgent as those of their male counterparts because, even when women have participated in 
combat, they are not expected to threaten the state militarily in the aftermath as a tool to 
pronounce their demands. Therefore, the state relies on tropes of women’s peacefulness and 
strength that make it acceptable for the state not to prioritise the needs of women combatants.
8.2 Major findings
8.2.1 Conventional versus unconventional combatant
The point of mapping the extensive and all-encompassing terrain of the armed struggle against 
apartheid was to show that, in order to understand the conditions of participation in the 
demobilisation process, we would need to understand women’s participation in the war itself and 
the ways in which the demobilisation process, in its criteria for combatant participation, 
resembled the nuances of the war. Through the use of feminist theory in IR, it has been possible 
for the study to show the ways in which women’s war contributions often go unrecognised and 
that it can be argued that demobilisation processes are important because they sanction 
recognition and heroic respectability, which determines whom the state views as having made 
the sacrifices for its survival or liberation. The feminist critique of the artificial nature of 
categories of war, such as combatant and civilian, and private and public, have made it possible 
to examine the often inherent gendered biases of demobilisation processes that are a result a 
historic inability by states to count women’s war roles as part of ‘formal’ combat. This thesis has 
shown that, even in the context of a war that has been proclaimed by its own participants as 
“unconventional”, as was the case by the national liberation movements and the apartheid state, 
women’s participation continues to be understood within narrow lenses that often contribute to 
the erasure of women’s actions, and therefore their ability to qualify to participate in 
demobilisation processes.
Firstly, the study has shown that the debate about the demarcation of combat is a 
gendered discourse that imposes inapplicable categories in the topography of guerilla war. The 
study builds on Suttner’s (2007; 2008) work that has sought to count women’s methods of 
combat as a formal, constitutive element of the various battlefronts. It has been shown here that 
the artificial divisions that are created through formal military training do not account for the
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multiple methods that make combat possible in the context of guerilla war. Thus, the study 
importantly adds additional categories of women combatants to the ones in Cock’s (1991) study, 
viz. the guerilla girls. It has been shown that the guerilla girls form one part of the various 
strategies of the armed struggle. The inclusion of combative mothers and in-betweeners builds on 
Magubane’s (2010) invitation for a feminist scholarship that takes seriously the context from 
which women resist and the methods that are possible to use in such contexts. The demands for 
formal training do not account for the kinds of resources that were needed in the articulation of 
the ‘People’s War’. The inclusion of non-conventional women combatants reflects the empirical 
nature of the armed struggle, which the demobilisation process ought to have resembled.
Secondly, the challenge against the use of military training to distinguish the combatants 
from civilians has also been used in this study to address the arbitrary divide regarding the 
internal versus externally trained combatants. By challenging the assumed divide of the internal 
and external, this study shows the complexity of space during apartheid. In Chapter Five, it is 
argued that the narratives of women who were interviewed for this study -- who operated in the 
underground, such as Mankahla and Dyantyi, and who were arrested for their activities -­
demonstrates the extent to which the apartheid state impinged on the everyday in ways that 
reveal the real dangers that came with being an underground operative. The narratives of women 
who participated in the underground, Mankahla in the inception of MK, and Dyantyi in the late 
1970s, demonstrate the importance of underground work to the practical articulation of the 
armed struggle. It is argued that the complex ‘space’ of underground work challenges the 
distinctions that extant discourses have made between different forms of struggle, which are 
understood to have taken place in particular spaces, contributing to a literature that views these 
spaces as espousing cultures of their own (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Trewhela, 2009; Ellis, 2012). 
The findings of this study challenge the separation of forms of struggle and the privileging of the 
external as the centre of armed struggle activity.
Ellis and Sechaba’s (1992) book details the weakness of MK, and the alarming ease in which 
the army could be infiltrated by apartheid security agents. This led to secrecy amongst the 
leadership, which became authoritarian, conspiratorial against and punitive towards those cadres 
suspected of working for the apartheid state. The authors argue the legacy of this secretive and 
authoritarian culture of the ANC in exile, if unaddressed, will find expression in the forms of
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governance that take shape in democratic South Africa. Ellis (2012), in a later book, extends on 
this argument, by insisting that authoritarian, criminal and punitive ways of governing adopted 
by the ANC in exile, and indeed those of the apartheid security architecture, have not been 
reformed, and can be seen in how the ANC behaves in governance today. Paul Trewehla (2009: 
69) has also argued in the same vein that ANC leadership is shaped by “two different styles of 
leadership within the ANC, the one -  of the ‘external’ leaders -  deriving from three decades of 
closed, autarchic, command society in the camps..., the other, of ‘internal’ leaders, from the 
more open and pluralistic culture developed in the trade union and civic associations within the 
country during the 1970s and 1980s”. Hugh Macmillan’s intervention to this debate has been to 
argue that “the ANC did not have a single culture of exile. This differed markedly from place to 
place, and from time to time. It was hugely different in, for example, the camps in Angola and 
the urban environment of Lusaka” (Macmillan, 2013: 281). He underscores the dangers of a 
homogeneous view of ‘exile culture’, and points out that “the case of ‘inziles’ were [also] not 
homogenous, and that the two groups overlapped” (p. 281). Raymond Suttner has also argued 
regarding the ANC, that there were no “stark and sharp” differences “between various decades 
and forms of struggle” (2008:165). What is implicit in Ellis and Trewehla’s claims about the 
dominance of a secretive, military culture is its masculine nature, which is evident in the tensions 
between the key figures in charge of different organs of the ANC, MK and the SACP, who all 
happen to be men, from Chris Hani to Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki and Joe Modise, to Oliver 
Tambo. There is limited engagement in the discourse with how men and women were affected 
by the cultures and forms of struggle in respective periods. This study shows that when the 
spatial divide of the internal and external is interrupted, and more so when it is shown that the 
majority of women and men participated in the armed struggle from the domestic front, this 
invites new questions about the legacy of the armed struggle. In showing the central role played 
by women within their communities in the armed struggle, it opens a space to move beyond the 
fixation with personalities who are understood to have made key decision in exile about the 
armed struggle, where it becomes possible to seriously examine the ways in which communities 
were affected by the war and the ways in which they have transitioned in post-apartheid South 
Africa. In this manner, this research has shown that centering women’s roles allows refocusing 
our analysis not only on a few combatants who formed part of the ‘People’s War’. A focus on
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women combatants has shown up multiple combatants who sacrificed their lives for the 
articulation of the people’s strategy.
The study has also shown the importance of challenging the distinction made between the 
public and private. As Sjoberg (2011) has shown, feminists in IR are suspicious of the 
boundaries between the internal and external central to demarcating the parameter of analysis for 
IR theories that assume that sources of insecurity to the state emanate from outside threats. By 
making visible the multiple ways in which women become part of global processes, including 
war, feminists have argued that the “international is personal”, in order to show the ways in 
which processes of war come are accompanied by real material costs for multiple actors, whether 
in direct combat or not. As Enloe (1989: 196) has argued, “accepting that the personal is the 
international multiplies the spectators; it especially adds women to the audiences”. It was shown 
in Chapter Four that the literature of the anti-apartheid struggle in general tends to depict the 
resistance to apartheid as a “public-political” spectacle that found expression in the image of the 
male protestor in the heat of township violence (Motsemme, 2004, 2011). As Motsemme’s 
(2011) and Bonnin’s (1997, 2000) work shows, the focus on the public interactions between the 
apartheid state and the black population overlooks the intimate nature of the violence. This study 
builds on the literature showing private and personal experiences with apartheid violence. It has 
been shown that the “shadows” that apartheid counter-insurgency executors, such as Eugene de 
Kock speak of, are the homes and communities in which women have control and which they are 
protective over. In the defence of their homes and communities, women resisted in both public 
and private spaces. The incessant instances of midnight arrests in the homes of women 
combatants and the use of spaces such as the church for political strategy, among others, has 
revealed the ways in which violence was meted out, as well as the way in which it was resisted 
by private individuals, many of whom were women. The examples of Liliesleaf, and the Masilela 
home in Swaziland, and the homes of individuals such as Conny Braam in the Netherlands, 
shows the extent to which both internally and externally, the armed struggle was in fact carried 
out in conventionally private spaces. This has consequences for how we theorise and define 
combat.
It has been shown also that, while the war is firmly located within the balance of power 
politics of the post-World War II Cold War order between the US and the Soviet Union, this
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international posture often hides the fact that this was primarily a domestic contestation for the 
liberation of the oppressed majority. It has also shown that this domestic struggle took place in 
private spaces of the community. This study further shows that there is a distinction that is made 
between the urban and rural areas, which attributes the actions of the urban based combatants as 
the most decisive contributions to the armed struggle and the anti-apartheid struggle more 
broadly. What distinguishes South Africa’s guerrilla struggle from other countries in Southern 
Africa, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique, is that the struggles in such countries 
mainly took place in rural areas, similar to the guerrilla experiences of China and Cuba, which 
shaped the ways in which both Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara conceptualised the ideal terrain 
for guerrilla operations (Mao Tse-tung, 1961; Guevara, 1997; O' Gorman, 2011). As Badat’s 
(2012) work showed in Chapter Two, the South African guerilla struggle is often understood as 
an urban struggle, which can narratively obscure the methods of resistance that were used by 
combatants in the Bantustans. The study has shown that the distinctions used to understand the 
contributions of combatants and activists in the urban and rural areas does not appreciate the 
ways in which these spaces informed and shaped each other. This study has provided original 
data and analysis about the role of Poqo/APLA women combatants in the actions of Poqo as a 
mainly rural-based guerilla movement. The dual influence of the urban and rural for the PAC, 
whose members came, for example, from both Cape Town and the Transkei, shaped the forms of 
actions of combatants in the Bantustans, while the movement to urban areas shaped the guerilla 
strategies of Poqo there. The narratives of women combatants of Poqo/APLA in the early 
operations of 1960s are also illustrative of the methods of resistance that were possible in the 
different phases of the struggle. The underground activities of women combatants shaped and 
inspired the strategies that were adopted by the generation of “young lions” in the 1970s and 
1980s, who were incited into action by conditions in the Bantustans, and in the public resistance 
of their peers in the schools in the township. Thus, the study shows, in these spatial ways, the 
unconventional combatant moved between urban and rural spaces, shaping the methods of 
struggle that changed across time, through the contributions of multiple generations, young and 
old. The centering of focus upon the women combatants of Poqo who fought in rural Transkei in 
the 1960s, contributes to the dearth of literature on the important role played by activists in the 
Bantustans. Badat (2012) does well in centering women’s roles in banishment, by emphasising 
the important role of women such as Makwena Matlala and Helen Joseph. Although Kondlo
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(2009) provides a compelling account of the PAC and APLA, the main actors in the party’s 
history are overwhelmingly male. Thus although he points out the influence of the rural space in 
the shaping of PAC ideology and practice, women’s roles are not understood to be central in this 
process, in ways that this thesis shows.
Lastly, age has been shown in this study to be among the narrative technologies by means of 
which women become written out of the war effort. The emphasis on the generation of “young 
lions”, distorts the important ways in which the fight against apartheid relied on a close 
collaboration of the young and old. The combative mothers of Amabutho show in empirical 
ways how women’s homes became places of refuge. In turn, these combative mothers found 
themselves in constant confrontation with the security forces that frequented their homes, often 
in the dead of the night. The mothers used the church as a space for political strategy, to deal 
with the brutality of the police officers who also lived in their communities. The young women’s 
roles in schools, and in funerals as guards of honour, further show the complex terrain of the 
apartheid battlefront, and the types of combatants it produced. This is because age determined 
which spaces were accessible to different kinds of women. The findings in this thesis also 
contribute to a long-standing debate about women’s relationship with the national liberation 
movements and maternal politics. As Kimble and Unterhalter (1982), Gasa (2007) Miller (2009) 
and Magubane (2010) have all noted, it is important to understand the context of women’s 
struggle in order not to delegitimise their tools of participation. The shadows of apartheid 
violence fell in those spaces that are understood to be “women’s spaces” (Bonnin, 1997). The 
maternally centred forms of participations in the armed struggle were grounded in their defence 
of themselves and their communities, which included the protection of children.
8.2.2 The struggle continues
The study has shown that the state-assisted demobilisation programme was inadequate in 
supporting the transition of women combatants into civilian life in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Through developing categories from which to understand women’s participation in the armed 
struggle, the thesis has shown that most women combatants were excluded from the 
demobilisation process. This is the first study to center on women combatants and the
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demobilisation process. Unlike the major studies on South Africa’s demobilisation process, 
which have not substantially challenged the criteria for participation in the process, this study has 
shown substantively why the design of the process itself over-determined which type of 
combatant would be able to participate in the process, and who would be left out. Thus, a key 
critique of the study has been to examine the design of the process, and the ways in which it 
failed to resemble the context of the unconventional war whose combatants it sought to 
demobilise.
For the in-betweeners and the combative mothers who were left outside of this process, 
the transition to democratic South Africa is imbued with multiple socio-economic and 
psychological challenges. The majority of the women, young and old, are the heads of their 
households. The combative mothers head the homes where their own children are unemployed 
and depending on their old-age pension and informal work. They also look after their 
grandchildren, which compounds their financial responsibilities. It has been shown that the 
special pension, the only vehicle of financial support from the state for the in-betweeners and 
combative mothers, is not accessible to the majority of the unconventional combatants who have 
applied and have been unsuccessful in accessing it. Although the guerilla girls are an exception 
as having participated in the demobilisation process, the main source of support was the once-off 
payment and the monthly special pension that some of them receive. Even the women who were 
externally trained found the process frustrating, and were unable to support themselves in 
navigating life back home, and outside of the military.
The study shows that similar to other post-conflict contexts such as Namibia, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and South Sudan, among others, 
the silence in the literature on women combatants is not unique to the South African case. The 
study has shown, as have others, that even when women have fought in wars, the threat of a post­
war ex-combatant picking up arms against the state is understood to be exclusively masculine. 
Building on Motsemme (2004; 2011), the study has argued that the silence on women 
combatants has multiple functions, both as resistance and misrecognition. The study has argued 
that states’ reliance on tropes’ of women’s peaceful nature plays a role in the disregard for 
combatant women’s material and psychological needs in the post-war aftermath. Despite military 
experience, whether conventional or otherwise, women are not anticipated to be a security threat
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to the state, and their interests are, therefore, not regarded as urgent. It has also been shown that 
silence plays a complicated role, because it is also articulated as a symbol of strength by women 
combatants themselves. The social assumptions that African women are able to withstand 
enormous challenges without falling apart, is evident in the way women combatants articulate 
the necessity and their ability to construct post-war livelihoods without the support of the 
government. The coupling of the use of strength for black women, and the social assumptions 
about strengths of soldiers, play a significant role in how women make sense of their neglect by 
the state. The role of silence, articulated as strength, builds on a long literary tradition regarding 
how black women cope with structural discrimination from colonial times, during apartheid and 
in the post-apartheid state. This use of language as strength, has underplayed the real 
psychological challenges that all women combatants face. This study has shown that the legacies 
of the armed struggle remain in the consciousness of women combatant’s everyday reality.
The study has shown that there is urgent need for state redress for all ex-combatants. The 
current veterans’ legislation that governs the work of the DMV does not seem to appreciate the 
gender dynamics that affect the lives of women combatants. Gender neutrality implicit in the 
policy assumes that the challenges faced by women and male veterans are uniform in the 
policies’ gender-neutral approach. There is an urgent need to expand the mandate of the DMV to 
include the needs and recognition of all women combatants. There is a need for the work of the 
department to be more transparent and far reaching, beyond its headquarters in Tshwane.
Lastly, this thesis has shown that assumptions about women and men’s roles in war have 
not substantially changed to consider seriously the empirical realities of war. This holding up of 
provincial Western derived, masculinist and statist categories continues to undermine women’s 
contributions and actions in the writing, theorising of war and in national liberation histories in 
South Africa and the Global South more broadly. Thus, this thesis makes a contribution to the IR 
approaches that have been critical of the foundations that inform the tools and categories of 
analysis in the discipline. The thesis makes a specific contribution to the body of postcolonial 
feminism that takes both the empirical realities and histories of the people in the Global South 
seriously in the theorisation of war and other social processes.
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Ultimately, this study hopes to have shown that the material and symbolic recognition of 
all women combatants makes visible the broadness of the struggle against apartheid as a 
historical truth, and a matter of gender justice into an inclusive and more democratic future.
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